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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis offers a transnational history of the Jewish refugee crisis in 
South-Western Europe, and assesses the role of the Iberian Peninsula in the 
Holocaust. It does so by looking at Vichy France, Franco’s Spain, and Salazar’s 
Portugal. It explores the possibilities of rescue, and the offer of relief. It accounts 
for the persecution of Jews in Spain and Portugal. And it examines the role of 
the Western Allies in offering relief and promoting the rescue of Jews in the 
region. Crucially, this thesis also focuses in the role of humanitarian 
organisations, both private and intergovernmental, in tackling the Jewish 
refugee situation. The role of Jewish underground groups in organising the 
clandestine crossing of the Pyrenees is also explored in detail. Lastly, this thesis 
also accounts for the decimated possibilities of transportation from the Iberian 
Peninsula during the war, and for the repercussions of this transportation crisis 
for the Jewish refugee crisis and the Holocaust.  
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I stared at the ship. Glaringly lighted, it lay at anchor in the Tagus. Though I had 
been in Lisbon for a week, I hadn’t yet got used to its carefree illumination. In 
the countries I had come from, the cities at night were black as coal mines, and 
a lantern in the darkness was more to be feared than the plague in the Middle 
Ages. I had come from twentieth-century Europe’ 
 
Erich Maria Remarque, The Night in Lisbon (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1964), 5. 
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Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is twofold: to offer a transnational history of the 
Jewish refugee crisis in its South-Western European dimension, and to assess 
the role of the Iberian Peninsula in the Holocaust. Judging by its near absence 
in Holocaust historiography, the Iberian Peninsula has traditionally played a 
peripheral role in our understanding of the Holocaust. In purely geopolitical 
terms, Spain and Portugal did remain on the margins of World War II and did 
not witness the mass-murder of Jews within their boundaries. Yet to assume 
that the Peninsula has no significance to either the war or the Holocaust would 
be a tremendous mistake. In our collective memory, and to a certain extent also 
in Holocaust historiography, there prevails the notion that the Iberian 
Peninsula was a ‘safe haven’. This view has been supported by the fact that the 
majority of persecuted Jews who set foot south of the Pyrenees managed to 
survive the Holocaust. Owing to this ‘success story’, the significance of the 
Iberian Peninsula has been trivialised, and the experiences of those who saved 
their lives through this avenue —as well as those who failed in trying— have 
been overlooked. Surely, the many hazards facing Jewish émigrés in the 
Peninsula were in no way comparable to the horrors of Nazi camps and ghettos, 
but they were part of the same nightmare. Besides the moral need to research 
this chapter of the Holocaust, there are at least three different dimensions that 
make the Iberian Peninsula central to the Jewish refugee crisis.  
The first, and most obvious dimension, is the Peninsula’s role as a hinge 
between Nazi-occupied Europe and the free world. This was facilitated by the 
geographical context of the Peninsula —framed by the Atlantic Ocean and the 
Mediterranean Sea, and with a 623 km-long border with France— as well as by 
its multiple maritime connections to the Americas, Palestine, and North Africa. 
Whilst this was true since 1933, the Peninsula’s centrality as a land of transit 
came to the forefront after June 1940, when the German occupation of Western 
Europe narrowed emigration avenues to the ports of Spain and Portugal. There 
was one exception: the Port of Marseille. But this option, too, disappeared in 
November 1942 when the Axis took over Vichy France and sealed its borders 
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completely. From that moment until the liberation of France in August 1944, 
an uncertain journey across the perilous Pyrenees mountains became virtually 
the only way out of Europe’s inferno. For this reason, this thesis looks not just 
at the Spanish and Portuguese geographies, but also at that of Vichy France. 
After all, it is only possible to make sense of refugee transit through the Iberian 
Peninsula when considering the reality that existed above the Pyrenees. 
The second dimension is political. As signatory parties to the Second 
Hague Convention (1907) and neutrals in the war, both Spain and Portugal 
were legally required to grant asylum to prisoners of war from either side —
whether or not they lived up to this obligation will be discussed in detail.1 As 
for the refugees, however, there was no international treaty to protect them. 
Not even a legal definition of the term ‘refugee’. In fact, it was only in 1948 that 
the right to asylum was proclaimed, and in 1951 that the term ‘refugee’ was 
codified in international law.2 Until then, refugees wanting to move through 
national borders were entirely at the mercy of the states touched by the crisis 
and their immigration laws. ‘Asylum is a privilege conferred by the State. It is 
not a condition inherent in the individual’, wrote Sir John Hope Simpson in 
1939.3 Having omnipotent sovereignty over its national borders, states around 
the world refused admission to undesired foreigners, whether for reasons of 
national security, foreign or domestic policy, or simply national pride. This 
realistic approach to the ‘refugee problem’ also led to the rapid escalation of 
immigration restrictions in the Iberian Peninsula. For fear of lagging behind 
their neighbour, the Spanish and Portuguese governments engaged in an 
unconscious race with one another, that effectively reduced the Peninsula’s 
potential as land of transit and shelter for Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism.4  
																																																																		
1 Art. 13 of  the fifth treaty of  the Hague Convention of  1907 states: ‘A neutral power which 
receives escaped prisoners of  war shall leave them at liberty. If  it allows them to remain in its 
territory it may assign them a place of  residence.’ See Hague Convention, (V) Respecting the 
Rights and Duties of  Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of  War on Land (18 October 1907), art. 13. 
2 See UN General Assembly, ‘Universal Declaration of  Human Rights’, Resolution 217-A-III 
(10 December 1948), art. 14; and UN General Assembly ‘Convention Relating to the Status of  
Refugees’, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 189, No. 2545 (28 July 1951), art. 1. 
3 Sir John Hope Simpson, The Refugee Problem: Report of  a Survey (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1939), 231. 
4 This ‘domino effect’ is best described in Susanne Heim, ‘International Refugee Policy and 
Jewish Immigration under the Shadow of  National Socialism’, in Frank Caestecker and Bob 
Moore (eds.), Refugees from Nazi Germany and the Liberal European States (New York: Berghahn, 
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Naturally, the Nazis were aware of this dynamic, and exploited it to their 
benefit. Israeli historian Shlomo Aronson argued that the Nazi policy of forcing 
the emigration of Jews from the Reich was not just a way to get rid of 
‘undesirable’ elements in their society. It was also a premeditated attempt to 
‘fan’ antisemitism abroad. By forcing anti-Jewish radicalisation on third parties 
and dehumanising its victims, this policy aimed at weakening the capacity of 
the democracies touched by the refugee crisis to resist Nazism: 
‘With the Holocaust developing like a sort of a doomsday machine set in 
motion from all sides, the Jews found themselves between the hammer and the 
various anvils, each of which worked according to the logic created by the Nazis 
that dictated the behaviour of other parties and the relations between them 
before and during the Holocaust’.5 
The third dimension is that of rescue. This is not a straightforward issue, 
however. Let us consider Dan Michman’s definition of ‘rescue’: ‘an action 
taken to extricate Jews from an immediate Nazi menace or total removal of 
Jews from an area that the Nazis’ tentacles reached’.6 In view of this definition 
—and more specifically its latter part— a Jewish person removed from Nazi-
occupied territory into Spain would not be ‘rescued’ proper. Owing to Spanish-
German police collaboration and Francoist antisemitic practices more 
generally, the safety of Jews in Spain, even of Jews of Spanish nationality, was 
not guaranteed at any point during the war. In this sense, ‘rescue’ was not the 
result of a single act in time, such as migration to Spain. Instead, a series of 
‘rescue efforts’ was necessary to guarantee the survival of Jewish persons.  
For this reason, an understanding of the fine balance between the several 
agents and circumstances involved in this ‘process of rescue’ is crucial. In the 
first level of agency, there were those who assisted refugees on an individual 
basis, as well as private organisations who offered specialised migration, relief, 
and rescue aid. On a second level, there were the governments of the neutral 
																																																																		
2010), 17-47. 
5 Shlomo Aronson, Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004), xi-xiv. 
6 Dan Michman, Holocaust Historiography: A Jewish Perspective: Conceptualizations, Terminology, 
Approaches, and Fundamental Issues (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2003), 181.
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countries in this region: Vichy, Madrid, and Lisbon. Finally, the third level is 
that of the Western Allies: London and Washington. Methodologically, this 
thesis will approach the ‘process of rescue’ tending to the triangular relationship 
between these three levels of agency. In addition to the actors, it is also essential 
to consider circumstances concomitant to the refugee’s plight, such as the 
context of war itself, the scarcity and unreliability of means of transport, and 
red-tape obstacles to migration. An awareness of all these elements is necessary 
prior to assessing whether or not the Iberian Peninsula’s rescue potential was 
exploited to the fullest, and the extent to which the Allies acted upon such 
potential. 
Owing to its broad nature, this study informs itself and builds upon an 
extensive range of literature. In terms of geographical scope, Patrick von zur 
Mühlen’s monograph Fluchtweg Spanien-Portugal (1992) is closest to the 
rationale of this thesis, as it is the only narrative that conceives the role of the 
Iberian Peninsula per se in the Jewish refugee crisis.7 In regards to 
methodology, this thesis follows the example of a long list of previous works 
that deal with the Jewish refugee crisis from the perspective of humanitarian 
response. These studies are equally transnational in nature.8  
This thesis also builds upon scholarly literature specific to each national 
context, and seeks to contribute to each four different domains of Holocaust 
historiography: Vichy France, Franco’s Spain, Salazar’s Portugal, and the 
Allies. 
In regards to Vichy France, Michael Marrus’ and Robert Paxton’s Vichy 
France and the Jews (1981) still remains the work of reference on the attitudes of 
the Pétain regime towards Jews.9 In Uneasy Asylum (1999), Vicki Caron skilfully 
																																																																		
7 Patrick von zur Mühlen, Fluchtweg Spanien-Portugal: die Deutsche Emigration und der Exodus aus 
Europa 1933-1945 (Bonn: Dietz, 1992). 
8 See for instance Debórah Dwork, and Robert Jan van Pelt, Flight from the Reich: Refugee Jews, 
1933-1946 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2009); Caestecker and Moore (eds.), Refugees from Nazi 
Germany and the Liberal European States; Tommie Sjöberg, The Powers and the Persecuted: the 
Refugee Problem and the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR), 1938-1947 (Lund: Lund 
University Press, 1991); and Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust: the American Jewish 
Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981); Corry 
Guttstadt, Thomas Lutz, Bernd Rother, and Yessica San Román (eds.), Bystanders, Rescuers or 
Perpetrators? The Neutral Countries and the Shoah (Berlin: Metropol Verlag & IHRA, 2016). 
9 Michael R. Marrus, and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France and the Jews (New York: Basic Books, 
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integrated French public opinion with the role of the French Jewish 
Community in the rescue of persecuted Jews.10 Susan Zuccotti and Asher 
Cohen, on the other hand, have enlarged our understanding of Jewish survival 
in France, and examined the ways in which the French population assisted in 
this task.11 Others scholars, such as Anne Grynberg, have focused on the study 
of the conditions of internment in France.12 Considering how crucial the Port 
of Marseille was for the rescue of Jews from unoccupied France, and 
particularly during the first half of the war, Dona Ryan’s work is equally 
indispensable.13 Lastly, there is also an long historiographical tradition that 
deals specifically with the Jewish resistance in France, and the cooperation 
between underground movements and relief organisations in saving Jewish 
lives from arrest, internment, and deportation.14  
Although some of these studies have explored some aspects of the 
clandestine rescue networks across the Pyrenees, these have not been fully 
integrated with the context of the Iberian Peninsula. This thesis addresses this 
gap in the historiography, in particular, through the use of testimonies and 
documentation from the Jewish underground in France, as well as internal 
correspondence and memoranda from several relief organisations who 
participated from these rescue activities (Chapter 5B-C). Other France-related 
themes that feature in this study include the evacuation of Jewish children from 
unoccupied France by the US Committee for the Care of European Children 
(2C), the rescue work of Varian Fry at the head of the Marseille-based Centre 
																																																																		
1981). 
10 Vicky Caron, Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish, Refugee, Crisis, 1933-1942 (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1999). 
11 Susan Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews (New York: BasicBooks, 1993); Asher 
Cohen, Persécutions et Sauvetages: Juifs et Français sous l’Occupation et sous Vichy (Paris: Éditions du 
Cerf, 1993). 
12 Anne Grynberg, Les Camps de la Honte: Les Internés Juifs des Camps Français, 1939-1944 (Paris: 
Éditions La Découverte, 1991). 
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Jean Estèbe, Les Juifs à Toulouse et en midi Toulousain au temps de Vichy (Toulouse: Presses 
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(Paris: Nadir, 2001); Georges Loinger, Les Résistances Juives pendant l’Occupation (Paris: Albin 
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Américain de Secours (2D), and the terrible experience of Jews sailing from the 
Port of Marseille on so-called ‘floating concentration camps’ (2E). 
Ever since the end of World War II, the historiography on Franco’s Spain 
and the Holocaust has been polluted with the propaganda disseminated by the 
Francoist regime. This propaganda depicted General Franco as a benevolent 
dictator and ‘saviour’ of thousands of Jewish lives during the Holocaust.15 Two 
of the first scholarly attempts to correct this issue were severely handicapped by 
the Francoist government’s own intromission in the writing process. As such, 
the two monographs by Federico Ysart and Chaim Lipschitz largely reinstated 
the biased narrative of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.16 The flawed 
views presented in these two works were in turn exaggerated by a number of 
Spanish historians seeking to make apology of the dictator.17 Unfortunately, 
those tergiversations also permeated the work of foreign non-partisan historians 
who have echoed the regime’s propaganda unintentionally.18 Israeli historian 
Haim Avni was the first serious scholar to systematically challenge Francoist 
propaganda in his authoritative monograph Spain, the Jews, and Franco (1982), 
which remains the main work of reference after more than four decades.19 
Avni’s work was followed by Antonio Marquina Barrio’s and Gloria Inés 
Ospina’s España y los Judíos en el siglo XX (1987), which devoted one fourth to 
the period of World War II, and whose assessment of the Francoist role during 
the Holocaust was even harsher than Avni’s.20 Over the last two decades, 
																																																																		
15 See Pedro Correa Martín-Arroyo, ‘“Franco, Savior of  the Jews”? Tracing the Genealogy of  
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Press, 2018), 195-218. 
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several studies of excellent quality have informed our understanding of this 
subject in various ways. In Franco und der Holocaust (2001), German historian 
Bernd Rother added the perspective of German archival sources, and informed 
us of the atittudes of the Franco government towards the Nazi ‘repatriation 
campaign’ (Heimschaffungsaktion), as well as the role of Spanish diplomats in the 
rescue of Spanish Jews from the Holocaust.21 José Antonio Lisbona, on the 
other hand, has further explored the conflicting relationship between the 
government in Madrid and its foreign service abroad in regards to the 
protection of Jews in Nazi-occupied territories.22 Isabelle Rohr’s The Spanish 
Right and the Jews (2007) enhanced our understanding of Spanish antisemitism 
and its implications, both for Jews under Francoist jurisdiction as well as the 
Spanish Jewish colony in Spanish Morocco, the Balkans, and France.23 More 
recently, Josep Calvet has dedicated two monographs to the study of the 
Pyrenees mountain range as a land of transit during World War II.24 Lastly, 
there is also a number of scholars who have informed us of other aspects of 
Spanish Jewish life and the Spanish Sephardim from historical, 
anthropological, and sociological perspectives.25  
One aspect that has not been explored previously in historiography on 
Spain and the Holocaust and that this thesis advances is Spanish-German police 
cooperation in the persecution of Jews on Spanish soil, both foreign and 
Spanish nationals (Chapters 3C, 3D, 4A); as well as in the expulsion of Jews of 
Spanish nationality who were otherwise lawful Spanish residents (5A). This has 
been possible through the juxtaposition of several archival collections that are 
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25 See for instance Danielle Rozenberg, La España Contemporánea y la Cuestión Judía (Madrid: 
Casa Sefarad-Israel & Marcial Pons, 2010); Davide Aliberti, Sefarad: Una Comunidad Imaginada, 
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different in character: US and British diplomatic collections, Spanish 
penitentiary and police files, and material from several relief organisations. 
Some of which are being used here for the first time. A second contribution of 
this thesis to Spanish historiography, is that it offers a comprehensive narrative 
of the relief offer available to Jewish refugees in Spain throughout the whole 
period under scrutiny (Chapters 1E, 3E, 4B-C-D, and 5B-D). This has been 
possible through the cross-examination of internal correspondence, case files, 
reports, and memoranda from more than a dozen relief organisations that were 
active in the region. In particular, two relief efforts connected to the US 
Embassy in Madrid —those led by Virginia Weddell (3E) and David 
Blickenstaff (4B-C)— are here being narrated in detail for the first time. A third 
original contribution that runs through this thesis is the systematic comparison 
of Spain and Portugal in regards to police and official attitudes to Jewish 
refugees, their government’s immigration and visa policies, and attitudes 
towards relief more generally.  
Like Spain, Salazarist Portugal had a similar development so far as 
historiography is concerned. For decades, Salazar’s Estado Novo enjoyed the 
reputation of a ‘refugee paradise’ during World War II—one from which 
Franco’s Spain undoubtedly benefited. However, even if Portugal was arguably 
closer to that ideal than any other country in continental Europe at the time, 
that image is useless as from a historical point of view. It is only in recent years 
that several scholars have nuanced and differentiated, for instance, the actions 
and attitudes of the Portuguese government from those of ‘Righteous’ 
diplomats such as Aristides de Sousa Mendes and Alberto Teixeira 
Branquinho. Yad Vashem historian Avraham Milgram has published one of 
the most authoritative monographs on the subject, Portugal, Salazar, and the Jews 
(2011), which examines Salazar’s policies towards Jewish refugees, his 
collusion with Portuguese consuls abroad, the Portuguese relief dimension, as 
well as Portugal’s role in the ‘repatriation’ of Jews of Portuguese nationality 
from Nazi Europe.26 Another historian who has published extensively on 
																																																																		
26 See Avraham Milgram, Portugal, Salazar, and the Jews (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 2011); and 
Milgram, Avraham. ‘Portugal, the Consuls and the Jewish Refugees, 1938-1941’, in David 
Cesarani, and Sarah Kavanaugh (eds.), Holocaust: Responses to the Persecution and Mass Murder of  
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Portugal is Irene Flunser Pimentel, who has authored two major works on 
Salazarist Portugal and the Holocaust —one of them in cooperation with 
Cláudia Ninhos.27 Ansgar Schaefer’s monograph, on the other hand, focuses 
on German Jewish migration to Portugal in the crucial period of 1933-1940.28 
Marion Kaplan has researched on refugee life in Lisbon during the war.29 
Douglas Wheeler, on the role of the PVDE, the Portuguese secret police, and 
its connections with its German and Spanish counterparts.30 Lastly, José Freire 
Antunes and Esther Mucznik have addressed several aspects of Jewish life in 
Portugal and the Holocaust.31 
In addition to providing a side-by-side comparison with Francoist Spain, 
this thesis contributes to Portuguese historiography in at least two ways. The 
first has to do with the extensive relief initiatives organised by private aid 
organisations from Lisbon (Chapters 3F, and 5D). The emphasis is placed on 
how the various groups operative the Portuguese capital came together to 
maximise the offer of relief most efficiently (3F), and why did the War Refugee 
Board (WRB) ‘fail’ to produce any significant results in the Peninsula (5D). 
This thesis’ second contribution to this field concerns the ever-present role of 
Portuguese shipping and the Port of Lisbon in making possible the evacuation 
of thousands of refugees and POWs from Europe (Chapters 3B, 4C). 
The fourth and last historiographical field with which this thesis engages 
with is the debate around the possibilities of rescue by the Allies —particularly 
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the governments of the US and the United Kingdom— and the extent of their 
achievements. This debate is particularly dominant in US historiography, 
which has produced a long list of monographs critical of the US government’s 
role during the Holocaust, and whose claims have achieved greater popularity 
over the last few decades.32 In the case of Britain, publications critical of the 
role of the Allies have been on the whole more moderate.33 Scholars on this side 
of the debate criticise the ‘failure’ of the Allied governments in saving more 
Jewish lives from murder at the hands of the Nazis and their accomplices. Their 
arguments focus, for instance, on the restrictive immigration policies of the US 
and Great Britain; the fact that the two Western Allies did not bomb Auschwitz 
and the other death camps; and their refusal to negotiate with the Nazis on 
behalf of European Jews. This historiography places a considerable share of 
guilt for the murder of six million European Jews on the Allied governments 
and the Jewish communities of Britain and the US. But these arguments fail to 
acknowledge the obvious. Although the Allies failed at many things, it was the 
‘success’ of the Nazi’s killing machine that made the extermination of six 
million Jews possible.34 Indeed, the capacity of the Allied governments to 
engage in the rescue of Jews was severely limited by the adverse military 
situation that lasted for most of the war, and often futile.35 Israeli historian 
Yehuda Bauer has passionately rejected this ‘America-centric’ historiography 
for its ‘provincial and limited’ understanding of the role of the US in the Jewish 
refugee crisis, as disconnected from the rest of the world.36 Last, but not least, 
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there is also an important list of publications on the work of American aid 
organisations with Jewish refugees in Europe on which this thesis builds upon.37 
Rebecca Erbelding’s recent addition to this list, Rescue Board (2018), deserves 
special mention as it is the first comprehensive study of the WRB, the single 
most powerful US government initiative to rescue Jewish lives from the 
Holocaust.38 
Although this thesis focuses on the Iberian Peninsula and its vicinity, it 
has also implications for the role of the Allies in the Holocaust. In particular, it 
questions the claims of ‘cirtical’ historiography in two ways. On the one hand, 
it does so by pointing towards the many ways in which the Allies engaged in 
offering relief, and the extent to which they promoted the rescue of victims of 
racial persecution through the Peninsula (Chapters 2C-D-E, 3E-F, 4A-B-C-D, 
and 5A-B-C-D). This results mainly from the analysis of archival material from 
private relief organisations together with US and British governmental sources. 
A second contribution to this historiographical debate aims to ‘relativise’ the 
role of the Anglo-American Allies in the Jewish refugee crisis. In other words, 
by emphasising the numerous obstacles in the way of relief, rescue, and 
emigration from the Iberian Peninsula, this thesis subscribes to Aronson’s view 
that ‘the interplay between the various parties contributed to the victims’ doom 
first by preventing help and later by preventing rescue … the victims were 
manoeuvred into death in stages, and the final outcome was neither within their grasp 
nor open to their influence or action’.39 
This PhD Thesis is structured chronologically in three parts. Each of these 
three sections corresponds to three distinctive stages of Jewish persecution. The 
first part corresponds to Chapter 1, and deals with the six years between Hitler’s 
takeover and the outbreak of war (1933-39). The second part comprises 
Chapters 2 and 3, and covers the two years between the German occupation of 
																																																																		
37 See Yehuda Bauer, My Brother’s Keeper: a History of  the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
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(New York: Doubleday, 2018). 
39 Aronson, Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews, xi-xiv. 
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Western Europe and the Allied military landings in French North Africa (1940-
42). The third part encompasses Chapters 4 and 5, and spans from the Allied 
North African offensive to the liberation of France (1943-44).  
 
Chapter 1. The International Community and the Jewish Refugee 
Crisis, 1933-1939: deals with the development of the Jewish refugee crisis and 
the responses of the international community from Hitler’s arrival to power in 
1933 to the onset of the war in 1939.  
A) The League of Nations and the Jewish Refugee Problem: 
contextualises the Jewish refugee crisis within the larger ‘refugee problem’ that 
ensued the Great War, the Bolshevik revolution, and the redrawing of Europe’s 
borders at the Versailles peace process. It also provides an overview of the 
League of Nations’ attempts to tackle the ‘Jewish refugee problem’. 
B) Forced Emigration from Nazi Germany: examines the increasingly 
radical policies of the Nazi government aimed at forcing the emigration of 
German Jews from the Reich. 
C) The International Community and the Closed-Door Policy: surveys 
the possibilities of absorption of Jewish refugees from Germany around the 
globe, observing a direct correlation between the increasing radicalisation of 
Nazi Germany’s anti-Jewish policies and the tendency of the international 
community towards stricter immigration policies. 
D) The Iberian Peninsula and the Jewish Refugee Crisis: focuses on the 
Iberian Peninsula as land of refuge, outlining the interaction between political 
developments in Portugal (Estado Novo) and Spain (Second Spanish Republic, 
and Spanish Civil War) and the shifting attitudes towards Jewish refugees. 
 
Chapter 2. Escaping France, 1940-42: accounts for the intensification of 
the Jewish refugee crisis following the outbreak of war, and especially, after 
Hitler’s occupation of Western Europe. 
A) France: Internment and Persecution: examines the rapid 
deterioration of French refugee policies after September 1939, the signing of the 
armistice in June 1940, and the subsequent establishment of the Vichy 
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government. In addition to the mass imprisonment of refugees, this section also 
accounts for the introduction of racist antisemitic policies by Pétain’s regime. 
B) Relief and Rescue in Vichy France: offers an overview of the relief 
and rescue initiatives in the camps of unoccupied France, jointly organised by 
various groups of different political and religious background.  
C) The US Committee for the Care of European Children: accounts for 
the work of the USCOM, the first government-supported children rescue 
initiative in the US since the beginning of the war. 
D) Emergency Rescue: examines various attempts to assist the migration 
of Jewish and political refugees  from Vichy France after the summer of 1940. 
E) Ships to Nowhere: explores sailings from the Port of Marseille to the 
French Caribbean as an alternative to Peninsular migration to the Americas, 
and demonstrates how challenging and dangerous emigration could be. 
 
Chapter 3. The Iberian Peninsula: Europe’s Bottleneck, 1940-42: 
covering the same chronology, this chapter focuses instead on the escalation of 
the Jewish refugee crisis in the Iberian Peninsula after the fall of Western 
Europe to the Germans. 
1. A) Iberian Transit: examines the role of the Iberian Peninsula as a land 
of transit during the early months of the war, and accounts for the 
toughening of Portuguese and Spanish immigration policies in response 
to this influx. 
2. B) The Transportation Crisis: like 2E, this section accounts for the 
shortage of transportation possibilities available to refugees stranded in 
the Iberian Peninsula, and how the escalation of US foreign policy from 
neutrality to war affected the shipping crisis. It also proposes this 
shortage of transportation as one of the triggers for the halt to the Nazi 
policy of forced emigration, and the transition to the ‘Final Solution’.  
3. C) The Iberian Peninsula and the Axis: examines the foreign policy of 
both Iberian dictatorships in the war in regards to their ‘neutrality’, and 
accounts for Francoist Spain’s collaboration with the Axis, particularly 
in regards to Spanish-German police cooperation. 
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4. D) The Persecution of Jews in the Iberian Peninsula: accounts for the 
persecution of Jews in mainland Spain as well as Spanish-occupied 
Tangier, in contrast with Portugal, where Jews were relatively safe. 
1. E) The Organisation of Relief in Franco’s Spain: accounts for the 
Spanish lack of cooperation on relief matters and hostility to foreign 
relief organisations, and how the US Embassy in Madrid managed to 
organise relief despite such hostile environment. 
2. F) Lisbon: Europe’s Refugee Capital: in contrast to Spain, Salazar’s 
Portugal tolerated and even facilitated the work of private relief 
organisations with Jewish refugees coming from the Europe. This 
section highlights the city of Lisbon as the ‘refugee capital’ from where 
most of the relief and rescue work in the region was orchestrated. 
 
Chapter 4. The Allied Response, 1943-44: begins in November 1942, 
with the Allied amphibious invasion of French North Africa and the subsequent 
occupation of Vichy France by the Axis. This chapter accounts for  the shifting 
Allied attitudes towards relief and rescue. 
1. A) Franco’s Spain: The Stumbling Block: following the sudden halt to 
legal migration from Nazi-occupied Europe, Francoist Spain replaced 
Portugal as the crucial land of transit. Spain is flooded with clandestine 
refugees and POWs and the Franco government struggles to resist 
pressure from both sides to the war. 
2. B) The Embassy of the Stateless: accounts for the establishment of 
RSARO, a relief committee dependent  and protected by the US 
Embassy that is created ad hoc to address Spain’s stateless problem. Soon 
after, it became the busiest refugee centre in the entire Iberian Peninsula. 
3. C) Evacuation from Spain: coordinated by RSARO and the various 
relief committees it represents, the Americans proceed to evacuate 
Spain’s stateless and POW population, doing a great service to the 
Spanish government. 
4. D) Bermuda, the IGCR, and Fedhala: deals with the Anglo-American 
refugee conference at Bermuda and two of its main goals: the 
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reactivation of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR); 
and the establishment of an UNRRA-administered refugee centre in  
Fedhala, in French North Africa, to funnel Jewish refugees from Spain 
in an attempt to persuade the Franco regime to adopt more lenient 
border policies. 
 
Chapter 5. Rescue against the Clock, 1943-44: this chapter examines 
several attempts to remove Jewish persons from Nazi-occupied territory and 
into the Iberian Peninsula. The narrative ends in August 1944, when the 
liberation rendered the these activities unnecessary.   
A) Rescue and Deportation: it deals with the inconsistent rescue policies 
of Franco and Salazar surrounding the German ‘repatriation campaign’ 
(Heimschaffungsaktion) of Jewish individuals with Portuguese and Spanish 
passports to their respective countries, which, paradoxically, was initiated by 
the Nazi government in early 1943 as a sign of ‘diplomatic deference’ towards 
all neutral countries. This section also contrasts this ‘rescue’ initiative with the 
expulsion of foreign-born Jews of Spanish nationality from Spain.  
B) The Jewish Resistance and the Rescue of Children: provides with an 
overview of the Jewish underground movement in Southern France, and the 
beginning of their clandestine rescue initiatives following the onset of the 
deportations in 1942. It deals in particular with the efforts of the Armée Juive, 
and a clandestine organisation (SER) specifically created to direct children 
convoys into Spain. It also accounts for the reception of these children convoys 
into Spain. 
C) The Jewish Resistance and the Rescue of Adults: building on the 
previous section, this one deals with the Armée Juive’s underground rescue 
network for adults (SERE) and examines their not so successful attempts to 
obtain the cooperation of the relief agencies on the southern side of the 
Pyrenees. 
D) The War Refugee Board in the Peninsula: a Lost Opportunity? 
established by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt in January 1944, the War 
Refugee Board sought ways —often clandestine— to rescue Jewish persons 
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from Nazi-occupied Europe. Despite its great drive, the WRB was rather 
unsuccessful in the Iberian Peninsula: in Madrid, owing to the US 
ambassador’s obstinacy; and in Portugal, due to the incompetence of the WRB 
delegate and the lack of cooperation between relief committees, particular 
regarding the custody of the children-refugee convoys that the Jewish resistance 
was smuggling over the Pyrenees. 
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The League of  Nations and the Jewish Refugee Problem 
 
In the nineteenth century there was no ‘refugee problem’. There had been 
‘exiles’ who went into foreign lands seeking political, artistic, and intellectual 
freedom.1 But this situation shifted dramatically consequence of the brutal 
conflicts that launched the twentieth century: the Great War (1914-1918), its 
preamble (Balkan Wars of 1912-13), and its aftermath (Caucasus wars of 1918-
21, Polish–Soviet War of 1919-21, and Greco-Turkish War of 1919-22). In the 
Russian Empire alone, the Great War and the 1917 revolutions generated at 
least one and a half million refugees, and as many as seven million displaced 
persons.2 The redrawing of Europe’s boundaries agreed at the Versailles Peace 
Conference in 1919, and the population exchanges between Greece and Turkey 
stipulated at Lausanne in 1923 also contributed to a rapidly growing refugee 
population.3 Coinciding with the rise of the nation-state and ethnic nationalism, 
governments across Europe began to introduce elaborate passport and visa 
regimes to assert the distinction between citizens and those who were not 
socially or economically desirable.4 In Turkey, these practices led to the 
denationalisation of nearly 250,000 Assyrians, Greeks, Armenians, and other 
ethnic minorities. In the Soviet Union, the issuance of denationalisation decrees 
to Russian exiles aimed at diminishing anti-Soviet activity abroad during the 
1920s, and resulted in some 500,000 stateless refugees.5 By 1926, Europe’s 
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Conference of  Jewish Organisations, 2 (London: Office of  the Anglo-Jewish Association, February 
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refugee population reached 9.5 million people.6 
Faced with this ‘threat’ to the nation-state, governments around the world 
reacted by introducing conservative immigration policies with racist 
undertones. In the USA, the introduction of the quota system by the 
Immigration Acts of 1921 and 1924 not only resctricted immigration; it also 
served to engineer a desired ethno-national composition.7 Canada introduced 
similar legislation to prioritise the arrival of persons from ‘preferred’ countries 
in Western and Northern Europe over ‘non-preferred’ countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe; whilst Jewish, Asian, and African backgrounds were dismissed 
as less desirable.8 British Dominions such as Australia and New Zealand also 
introduced immigration restrictions for non-British migrants. Latin American 
governments, on the other hand, gave preferential treatment to agricultural 
colonists and immigrants of similar cultural tradition from Italy, Spain, and 
Portugal.9  
The first attempts to deal with the refugee problem internationally were 
prompted by the aggressive denationalisation policy of the Bolshevik 
government. In July 1922, the League of Nations convened at Geneva to 
discuss the situation of stateless persons of Russian origin who needed travel 
documents but could not appeal to their national authorities. The resulting 
agreement introduced the ‘Nansen Passport’, an alternative identity document 
that did not confer citizenship rights upon the bearer, but allowed stateless 
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persons to travel through international boundaries. Named after the League’s 
High Commissioner for Refugees, the Norwegian Dr Fridtjof Nansen, these 
identity documents were usually valid for a year and became void when the 
bearer adopted a new nationality. Although the goal of the Nansen passport 
was to improve the situation of stateless refugees of Russian origins, this 
agreement laid the towards a legal definition of refugee. Thus in 1924, the High 
Commissioner’s mandate was extended to Armenian refugees.  
A second breakthrough took place in June 1928 at the Intergovernmental 
Conference on the Legal Status of Refugees, the first international meeting to 
examine the refugee problem in greater depth. To protect refugees from the 
former Ottoman Empire and the new Turkish Republic, the mandate of the 
High Commissioner was extended to include refugees from Assyrian, Assyro-
Chaldean, Syrian, Kurdish, and Turkish origin. In addition, the 1928 
Intergovernmental Conference also proposed the standardisation of refugee 
rights such as the right to work and to access a court. But given that these 
recommendations were non-binding, the conference failed to allocate specific 
responsibilities on signatory states.  
Indeed, when Hitler rose to power in 1933, the concept of ‘refugee’ as a 
legal category in its own right had not yet been established.10 The Convention 
Relating to the International Status of Refugees, signed in October 1933, was a 
first attempt to introduce a comprehensive legal protection for refugees tailored 
after the rights then accorded to aliens. Most importantly, it was the first 
international agreement to codify the right to ‘non-refoulement’ —from the 
French refoulement: to drive back, or repel. This meant that signatory countries 
pledged not to refuse entry to refugees, nor to forcibly remove them to a country 
or territory where they could be exposed to persecution.11 Unfortunately, the 
provisions of the 1933 Convention were limited to refugee demographics 
already recognised by the League of Nations’s mandate, and not to German 
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Jewish refugees.  
In the midst of the economic catastrophe that ensued the 1929 Wall Street 
Crash, the League postponed indefinitely the extension of the High 
Commissioner’s mandate to the Jews of Germany.12 As early as June 1933, 
Dutch, Belgian, Swiss and French workers’ delegates had warned that their 
respective national labour markets were unable to cope with the inflow of 
Jewish refugees from Germany.13 The deteriorating economic and political 
landscape that surrounded the Great Depression also led many governments to 
deny key social benefits, such as the right to work, to foreign aliens regardless 
of nationality. In France, for example, a law of May 1932 attempted to protect 
the national labour force by capping the number of foreigners who could be 
employed in each industrial sector at 5 to 30 per cent.14 
Although discussions regarding the need to establish an international 
organ to care for refugees froim Nazism began during the spring of 1933, none 
of the League’s member states dared to push for its creation for fear of 
antagonising Hitler. Although Nazi Germany had abandoned the League in 
October 1933 over the disarmament issue, membership withdrawal only 
entered into force after a period of two years, during which Germany retained 
the capacity to veto any of the League’s initiatives in favour of German 
refugees. Indeed, the German representative at the League of Nations made it 
clear that his government would oppose any new refugee organisation 
established by the League unless it was politically and financially independent 
from it. This was a calculated strategy of the Nazi government to silence any 
criticism from the League’s General Assembly, which thereafter would have no 
say on Berlin’s anti-Jewish policies.15  
In October 1933, the League of Nations appointed James G. McDonald 
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as High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany (Jewish and 
other). To satisfy German demands, McDonald’s enterprise was effectively 
deprived from any political or financial support from the League of Nations 
and its member states. Struggling to survive on unfulfilled promises and the sole 
support of private Jewish organisations, McDonald resigned in December 1935 
having achieved very little. In his resignation letter, McDonald argued that 
relief measures alone would not suffice to address the plight of Jewish refugees, 
and urged the League to direct political action ‘at its source, if disaster is to be 
avoided’.16 
In February 1936, the League of Nations decided to appoint a new High 
Commissioner to look after the intersts of refugees coming from Germany: Sir 
Neill Malcolm, a retired British general with good contacts in Germany dating 
from his work for the Inter-Allied Military Commission during the Versailles 
peace process. One of Malcom’s most pressing tasks was to organise a new 
intergovernmental conference that convened in Geneva in early July 1936. Its 
main outcome was the adoption of the Provisional Arrangement Concerning 
the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, which made available to 
German refugees identification documents equivalent to the Nansen Passport, 
and forbid their expulsion from host states unless ‘dictated by reasons of 
national security or public order’.17 Unfortunately, the 1936 Provisional 
Arrangement fell short of its potential. In line with the League’s appeasement 
policy, it provided a vague interpretation of the term ‘refugee coming from 
Germany’ that abstained from identifying Jews as the main refugee 
demographic in need of assistance, nor racial discrimination as the main  reason 
for their plight. Similarly, it made no mention of the refugee’s right to work, 
welfare, or relief —all issues that had been covered in the 1933 Convention. 
Even if the 1936 Provisional Arrangement did improve the situation of refugees 
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who left Germany during the first years of Nazi rule, it failed to achieve a long-
term solution to the Jewish refugee problem, as signatory states were reluctant 
to guarantee asylum to future refugee arrivals.  
To amend the shortcomings of the 1936 agreement, a new international 
refugee conference took place in Geneva in February 1938 and adopted the 
Convention Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany.18 The 
1938 Convention expanded the definition of ‘refugees coming from Germany’ 
to include all stateless persons fleeing Nazi regime regardless of national origin. 
It also clarified that the expulsion of refugees posing a threat to national security 
should only be used by host states as a last resort, if refugees failed —‘without 
just cause’— to organise their migration to a third country after being required 
to leave by one of the contracting parties. Likewise, the 1938 Convention 
stipulated that national labour protection laws —such as the aforementioned 
French law of 1932— should not be enforced ‘in all severity’ if refugees were 
lawful residents of that country, and waived altogether if they had been 
residents of that country for at least three years, or had familial ties to one of its 
nationals. 
Some scholars have identified both the 1936 Provisional Arrangement 
and the 1938 Convention as two attempts of the League of Nations to appease 
public opinion on the issue of German refugees without making any major 
concession in the field of immigration policy. The right to ‘non-refoulement’, 
for instance, is completely absent in these two agreements, and their provisions 
governing asylum weaker than those of the 1933 Convention. From the 
perspective of the governments touched by the crisis, the main purpose of these 
two agreements was to normalise the status of refugees already living within 
their borders while creating new legal provisions to safeguard national interests. 
In doing so, policy makers also implied that such preferential treatment would 
not be available to future refugee arrivals. As a result, even if these conventions 
did advance refugee rights internationally, the social benefits offered on paper 
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did not materialise in practice, and fell short in providing a long-term solution 
to the Jewish refugee problem.19 
Nazi Germany’s annexation of Austria (Anschluss) and the German-
speaking regions of Czechoslovakia (Sudetenland) in March and October 1938 
respectively initiated a new wave of refugees from Austria an Czechoslovakia 
that stunned governments across Europe. Most potential countries of refuge 
reacted by closing their borders or implementing evermore restrictive 
immigration and refugee policies, as their governments feared that Jewish 
refugees would remain permanently after their visas expired. This caused a 
chain reaction by which the governments touched by the crisis toughened their 
immigration policies independently from one another, in an attempt to repel 
the stream of refugees who had been rejected by neighbouring countries.20  
The last important international conference on the refugee issue before the 
outbreak of World War II convened on initiative of US President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt in mid-July 1938 at Évian, on the French side of Lake Geneva. 
Contrary to the common myth deeming Évian a ‘failure’ to rescue Jews from 
Nazi Germany, the sole purpose of the conference was to discuss and exchange 
information regarding the plight of Jewish refugees with no binding character.21 
A more tangible consequence of the Évian conference was the establishment of 
the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR). The goal of this 
autonomous refugee organisation was to mediate between Berlin and potential 
countries of resettlement in replacing the chaotic exodus from Nazi Germany 
with an orderly emigration scheme.  
The London-based IGCR first convened in August 1938, and by early 
1939 had already presented plans for the migration of 400,000 Jews from the 
Reich. Although the Germans initially refused to meet with IGCR Chair 
George Rublee, it was the German Minister of Economy Hjalmar H. G. 
Schacht —the economic ‘wizard’ behind the German economic miracle— who 
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first presented the American lawyer with an emigration plan in December 
1938.22  
In business-like fashion, Schacht devised a plan that would  facilitate the 
migration of 400,000 Jews from the Reich over a three-year period, and tackle 
at the same time Germany’s balance-of-payment crisis. Schacht’s migration 
plan was to be entirely financed with the property of German Jewry, which he 
estimated at about six billion Reichsmark (RM). Since German Jews could only 
legally remove about 25 per cent of their capital, Schacht proposed that the 
German government would impound 25 percent of the total wealth of German 
Jewry —about 1.5 billion RM— and place it in a giant trust fund that was to 
serve as a collateral for bonds issued to prospective migrants by an international 
corporation representing ‘international Jewry’. These bonds, each for value of 
10,000 RM, would be granted to German Jews in foreign currency to facilitate 
their resettlement elsewhere. Crucially, repayment of this debt in foreign 
exchange was made contingent on an increase in German exports. The plan 
found strong opposition within the US government, which objected to the 
promotion of Germany’s export trade, as well as within Jewish circles, who 
interpreted Schacht’s scheme as an attempt to blackmail German Jewry and 
promote the antisemitic trope of ‘international Jewry’.  
Against all odds, George Rublee continued to negotiate with the German 
government even after Schacht’s dismissal from the Reichsbank in January 1939. 
During a meeting in London on 13 February, the IGCR Chairman presented a 
revised version of Schacht’s plan that circumvented the contentious need to 
repay through an increase in German exports, and was thus favourably 
regarded by the US government. Despite successful negotiations with Berlin, 
the Schacht-Rublee plan progressed slowly over the following months and 
would never materialise. Whilst the IGCR struggled to find countries of 
resettlement, Jewish relief organisations had no less difficulties to raise the 
exorbitant sum of money needed to fund the project. The initiative was 
abandoned altogether following the German invasion of Poland in September 
																																																																		
22 See for instance Hjalmar H.G. Schacht, Confessions of  “the Old Wizard”: the Autobiography of  
Hjalmar Horace Greeley Schacht (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1974). 
  39 
1939.23 Over the first three and a half years of the war, the IGCR existed only 
on paper. It was not until the spring of 1943 that the Anglo-American 
conference at Bermuda would seek new ways to reinvigorate the IGCR.  
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Forced Emigration from Nazi Germany 
 
During the first eight and a half years that spanned between Hitler’s arrival 
to power in 1933 and the regime’s ban on Jewish migration of October 1941, 
the Jews of Germany were ‘encouraged’ and often forced to migrate from the 
Third Reich. But in 1933, the majority of them did not resort to emigration 
because they reckoned that Hitler and his regime were a ‘passing 
phenomenon’.24 As Nazi antisemitism radicalised, however, pressure to 
migrate escalated. With every new act of violence and piece of legislation aimed 
at equating citizenship to ethnic community, the Jews of Germany were 
progressively excluded from Hitler’s ‘people’s community’ (Volksgemeinschaft).25  
This process can be sequenced in several stages of increasing 
radicalisation. The first phase of antisemitic persecution started in March 1933 
with the introduction of anti-Jewish legislation aimed at ostracising Jews from 
public life. A second stage of radicalisation ensued the proclamation of the 
Nuremberg Laws in September 1935, whereby German Jews were biologically 
classified as second-class subjects of the state and the legal category of ‘non-
Aryan’ was established, laying the foundation for more subsequent persecution 
measures. Following the annexation of Austria in March 1938, the situation of 
the Jews under Nazism rapidly deteriorated, reaching its critical point during 
the pogroms of ‘Kristallnacht’ of 9-11 November 1938. Thereafter, the Nazi 
government forced the emigration of Jews from the Third Reich using every 
method at their disposal.  
The first wave of antisemitic persecution began as soon as Hitler received 
full powers from the newly elected Reichstag on 23 March 1933. Overnight, 
acts of violence against Jewish individuals and Jewish property ensued, 
accompanied from above by anti-Jewish legislation aimed at eliminating Jews 
from Germany’s political, intellectual, and economic life. During April, four 
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laws barred ‘non-Aryans’ from civil service, the legal profession, medicine, and 
established quotas on the number of Jewish students in universities and public 
schools.26 In an omen of what awaited European refugees abroad, the Nazi 
government continued by alienating its own Jewish refugee population. On 14 
July 1933, the law concerning the Cancellation of Naturalisations and the 
Deprivation of German Nationality empowered the government to revoke 
citizenship rights, and was mainly directed against Jewish immigrants who had 
settled down in Germany in the interwar period.27  
Against all odds, anti-semitic legislation in Nazi Germany seemed to relax 
towards the end of 1933, when several measures promoted the illusion that the 
Nazi government would restrict yet tolerate Jewish economic activities. This 
impression was favoured by several policies such as the Ministry of Economics’ 
ban on boycott actions against non-Aryan firms (8 September), and its order 
protecting non-Aryan workers, artisans, and businessmen from discrimination 
(24 November). The Ministry of Labour also issued an order purportedly 
equating the rights of Jewish and non-Jewish employees. As Nazi racist 
legislation seemed to temper, German Jewish leaders began to advise Jews not 
to risk the dangers of emigration. Accordingly, Jewish emigration from 
Germany subsided from about 400-500 persons a day in mid-1933, to 10-20 in 
early 1934. As summarised by the president of the Hilfsverein der Deutsche Juden 
(‘Relief Association of German Jews’), German Jews desired ‘to stay in their 
homeland, Germany, whose future was their own’.28 
From the onset, Jewish organisations in Germany opposed a general 
exodus from the onset, favouring instead the gradual and orderly emigration of 
a number of people proportional to the possibilities of absorption abroad.29 
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Rather than looking for havens at any cost and under any conditions, they 
thoroughly investigated weather conditions, employment possibilities, and 
other cultural and social considerations within the countries of emigration.30 
Jewish organisations focused their relief work on those who had less means to 
arrange and finance their emigration; while those who had financial means and 
relatives abroad often organised their own resettlement.  
This was an exhausting process. To obtain all the necessary 
documentation, prospective emigrants had to dwell with a long list of agencies, 
at the risk of being denied departure if one single document was missing or 
expired. To facilitate this process, as well as to escape persecution in their 
hometowns, many Jews moved to more populous cities. Those who had distant 
relatives in potential countries of refuge contacted them asking for financial 
guarantees, money, or support with their immigration. Following many 
complaints from foreign non-Jews who had received such appeals from 
desperate German Jews with whom they had no connection, Berlin prohibited 
Jews from writing letters to foreign citizens of the same family name.31   
As the Nazi government became more stable than initially thought, public 
opinion towards refugees in countries of refuge became increasingly more 
hostile. The negative social effects of the Great Depression and widespread 
unemployment prompted governments abroad to refuse entry to immigrants in 
the belief that they would take away jobs and burden the state’s welfare 
schemes. The governments of France, Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria 
raised concerns over the increased competition that German Jewish refugees 
could bring to their respective national communities, and tightened their 
immigration policies accordingly. Sometimes even Jewish communities 
adopted an anti-refugee stance for fear that the stream of German Jewish 
refugees might exacerbate antisemitic feelings at home.32 Consequently, if 
50,000 German Jews found asylum abroad in 1933, this figure dropped to 
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23,000 in 1934, and to 21,000 in 1935.33 
The proclamation of the Nuremberg Laws ‘for the protection of German 
blood and honour’ on 15 September 1935 legally sanctioned biological racist 
ideology and prompted a new stage of anti-Jewish radicalisation in Hitler’s 
Germany. By virtue of these laws, ‘non-Aryan’ subjects of the state were 
redefined as ‘state subjects’ (Staatsangehörige), thus ceasing to be German 
citizens proper (Staatsbürger). In addition, Jews were forbidden from marrying 
or maintaining sexual relations with ‘Aryan’ Germans. This distinction 
between subject and citizen laid the foundation for further exclusionary 
policies.  
Simultaneously, the Nazi regime continued to alienate German Jewish 
citizens from the economy, most notably through the policy of ‘Aryanisation’ 
of Jewish firms, which involved their transfer to non-Jewish owners at a price 
far below their market value. By the end of 1935, it is estimated that nearly 25 
per cent of Jewish business had been liquidated in this way.34 Even if anti-
Jewish persecution eased briefly during the 1936 Summer Olympics in a 
calculated attempt to cultivate the regime’s international image, it was clear by 
then that the Nazi government would continue to force the eradication of the 
German Jewish community through emigration.35 Indeed, despite diminishing 
emigration possibilities abroad, Jews continued to crowd the offices of the 
Hilfsverein. By the end of 1937 it was estimated that a total of 140,000 Jews had 
left Germany.36 
During 1938, Nazi Germany unleashed a new stage of anti-Jewish 
persecution, this time beyond its actual borders. On 12 March 1938, Austria 
‘joined’ (Anschluss) Hitler’s Germany, thus bringing 186,000 more Jewish 
persons under Nazi jurisdiction. Considering that the Nazis’ plans to reduce to 
penury the Jews living in this region was executed in just a few weeks —as 
opposed to several years in the case of Germany— the experience of Austrian 
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Jews under Nazi rule was relatively more brutal.37 The Nuremberg Laws were 
introduced on 27 May 1938, and by January 1939 the total exclusion of the 
Jews of Austria from active participation in public life was already complete.  
Up to 1938, migration from the Reich had been supervised by non-Nazi 
administrators at the Ministry of the Interior’s Office of Migration in close 
cooperation with Jewish aid organisations. From the spring of 1938, however, 
the Office of Migration was taken over by the SS, which replaced the relatively 
orderly migration methods of the preceeding bureaucracy with merciless tactics 
of forced migration. Four days after the annexation, Adolf Eichmann arrived 
in Vienna to direct the Central Office for Jewish Emigration (Zentralstelle für 
jüdische Auswanderung) with instructions to force the emigration of Austrian 
Jews. One of the tactics utilised to that end was the so-called ‘Green Border’, a 
slang expression used by the Gestapo to denote the act of picking up foreign-
born Jews and dumping them across the border into no-man’s land.38 These 
ruthless methods of forced migration had been commonplace with the Polish 
Jewish community living in the Third Reich. By October 1938, about 28,000 
Polish Jews who had been German residents for years (the so-called ‘Ostjuden’) 
were deported to bordering regions between Germany and Poland.39 In the case 
of Austrian Jews, the SS employed trucks and trains loaded with refugees who 
were dumped in no-man’s land, or casted adrift on small ships on the Danube. 
Jews who failed to leave the Reich were often arrested and endured internment 
in concentration camps under horrible conditions. Others were given false 
foreign visas by the Gestapo, despite the negative effects that these practices 
would inevitable have on the immigration policies of third countries. As a 
consequence of this policy, refugees aboard ships bound for the Western 
hemisphere such as the SS Koenigstein, the SS Caribia, and SS St. Louis, were not 
																																																																		
37 Simpson, The Refugee Problem, 126-36. 
38. See Feingold, The Politics of  Rescue, 5. 
39 According the census of June 1933, more than half —57 per cent— of the 98,747 foreign Jews 
living in the Reich were Polish subjects. The Polish Republic showed no interest in them, and 
indeed hindered their return through several administrative measures that culminated in the 
laws of March and October 1938, by which most Polish Jews living abroad lost their Polish 
citizenship. Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews: The Years of Persecution, 1933-1939 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997), 266-8. 
  45 
allowed to set foot at destination because their visas had no real validity.40  
But Austrian Jews were not passive victims to their fate, as they attempted 
to overcome immigration barriers by means of vocational retraining. During 
the next two years after the ‘Anschluss’, 24,000 Jewish men and women trained 
in domestic service (4,351), and the clothing (3,473), and metal (2,409) 
industries. Many began taking Spanish lessons hoping that this would increase 
their chances of admission to countries in Latin America. Unfortunately, these 
efforts proved futile in the majority of cases, as recipient countries continued to 
restrict the admission of refugees.41  
But Hitler’s thirst for expansion did not stop with Austria: in October 
1938, the occupation of the German-speaking border regions of Czechoslovakia 
(Sudetenland) increased the number of Jews under Nazis rule in 120,000 
individuals. From this figure, 20,000 fled almost immediately to the remaining 
territory of the Czechoslovak Republic.  
The most violent episode of Nazi antisemitic persecution during 1938, 
however, unfolded during the pogroms of 9-11 November 1938 (‘Kristallnacht’). 
The Nazi party used the assassination of the German diplomat Ernst vom Rath 
at the hands of Herschel Grynszpan, a Polish-Jewish refugee in his teens, as 
pretext to unleash a state-sponsored pogrom across the entire nation. 
Synagogues, offices, commercial stores, and private homes were looted or set 
afire as a consequence of systematic violence against Jews, whom the Nazi 
regime held collectively responsible for the devastation caused by state 
initiative. Indeed, Jews were collectively penalised with an exorbitant fine of 
one billion RM. In addition to the material loses, thousands were arrested and 
confined in concentration camps. Meanwhile, Hitler’s Government continued 
to pass anti-Jewish legislation such as the Decree concerning the Elimination 
of the Jews form German Economic Life (23 November 1938), which barred 
Jews from retail and handcraft activities. 
On 24 January 1939, Field Marshall Hermann Göring instructed 
Reinhard Heydrich, as chief of the  Reich’s Main Security Office, or 
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Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA), to establish the Reich Central Office for 
Jewish Emigration (Reichszentrale für jüdische Auswanderung) in order to force the 
emigration of Jews ‘by all possible means’.42 The next day, a circular from the 
German Foreign Ministry stated it clearly: ‘the ultimate aim of Germany’s 
Jewish policy is the emigration of all Jews living in German territory’.43 
Thereafter, the number of Jews fleeing the Reich skyrocketed.  
In March 1939, another wave of emigration followed the German 
occupation and dissolution of Czechoslovakia, and the creation of the 
Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. In July, Eichmann’s Central Office for 
Jewish Emigration opened a branch in Prague, forcing the migration of 100,000 
Jewish persons by the end of 1940. Additionally, it is estimated that at least 
15,000 Jews fled the neighbouring puppet-state of Slovakia, which had sided 
with the Axis following threats that the country would otherwise be partitioned 
between Hungary and Poland.44 As a result, the total number of Jewish persons 
who fled Hitler’s empire between 1933 and October 1939 ranges —depending 
on the source— between 360,000 and 420,000.45 
In Holocaust historiography, there is the widespread notion that German 
authorities treated the matter of forced Jewish emigration very inconsistently. 
One of the main arguments is that the Nazis did not make any effort to remove 
the many economic obstacles that turned Jews into penniless ‘undesirables’, 
which, in turn, reduced their chances to migrate and promoted anti-refugee 
policies abroad. Indeed, the amount of cash that German emigrants were 
entitled to take with them decreased from 200 RM ($47) in 1933, to just 10 RM 
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($4) in 1937.46 The law of 18 May 1934 introducing a ‘flight tax’ 
(Reichsfluchtsteuer) of 25 per cent for emigrants who took with them sums larger 
than 200,000 RM. The remaining 75 per cent of their capital had to be deposited 
as blocked marks in a non-transferable account whose financial worth soon 
dropped in value.47 Besides the flight tax, the Nazis also imposed a special 
‘atonement fine’ (Suehnesteuer) on all Jews possessing more than 5,000 RM, 
initially for value of 20 per cent of each individual’s fortune, and later increased 
to 25 per cent. On top of this, Jews had to give up 5 per cent of their capital 
upon emigration as payment for their passport.48  
But this paradox was not the product of miscalculation. It was a 
premeditated outcome of a policy which aimed at dehumanising Jews, 
exporting the ‘Jewish problem’, and destabilising the democratic world. 
Furthermore, as a result of widespread economic sanctions, the Nazis managed 
to enrich the national treasury at the expense of Jews, and to export penniless 
refugees who were condemned to survive on foreign welfare, charity, and relief. 
This, in turn, stoked antisemitic and anti-refugee attitudes abroad and led to the 
toughening of immigration policies. 
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The International Community and the Closed-Door 
Policy  
 
When the Nazis took over in Germany in 1933, the world was still 
suffering the negative effects of the worst economic crisis know thus far. A 
‘closed-door’ immigration policy towards refugees from Nazism was thus 
concomitant to this unstable political and social context. Another factor 
diminishing their emigration possibilities was the occupational status of the 
Jews from Nazi Germany. Whereas there were some job opportunities left in 
overseas countries for skilled factory workers and farmers, openings in banking, 
commerce, and the liberal professionals were rare —with the exception of 
engineers, chemists, and highly skilled workers.49 
British Palestine surpassed all other overseas countries as a Jewish refugee 
haven during the 1933-39 period. Palestine’s prominent role as a recipient 
country was favoured by both the Balfour Declaration of 2 November 1917, as 
well as the Jews’ longing for a Jewish national home in Palestine. This desire 
was also shared by the Jewish Agency for Palestine (JAP), which was the only 
institution accredited by British authorities to represent Jewish interests in 
Palestine. A further reason is that, unlike the rest of immigration countries 
which the effects of unemployment and the economic recession, Palestine 
enjoyed a period of economic prosperity during the 1930s which benefited from 
immigrant labour.50 Thus, between 1933 and 1936, the Jewish population of 
Palestine increased from 234,967 to 384,078. In protest, the Arab community 
started a six-month general strike on 15 April 1936, which saw violent attacks 
on Jewish property and the Jewish community itself —who counted eighty 
casualties by October.51 The British responded by appointing a Royal 
Commission chaired by Lord Peel to investigate the causes of unrest in 
Palestine. In July 1937, the Peel Commission presented a partition plan for 
Palestine and enabled the High Commissioner to establish immigration 
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quotas.52 Although the partition plan was never implemented, the White Paper 
of May 1939 restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine to a maximum of 
75,000 persons for the following five-year period —a number which was 
significantly below the number of application requests made to the JAP.53 On 
25 September 1939, moreover, the British government decided it could not 
continue to allow the emigration of enemy nationals to Palestine, thus 
rendering illegal most Jewish immigration from Europe. As a result, the so-
called Aliyah Bet (‘secondary immigration’) became the main form of Jewish 
migration to Palestine throughout the war.54 
Although the United States was one of the few countries to absorb large 
numbers of Jewish refugees during the war, its immigration record during the 
1930s is a completely different story. The 1929 stock market crisis left as many 
as fifteen million Americans unemployed, thus plunging the US into the ‘Great 
Depression’. With so many jobless citizens, US immigration policies became 
the target of a series of reforms. On 8 September 1930, President Herbert C. 
Hoover issued a directive instructing consular officials to deny visas to 
applicants likely to become a ‘public charge’. In combination with the Alien 
Contract Labor Law of 1885, which denied immigrants the possibility to secure 
jobs prior to landing in the US, Hoover’s directive meant that only the 
wealthiest migrants would be let in. This meant a fatal blow for Jews seeking 
to flee Hitler’s Germany after 1933, who had been left penniless by Nazi 
antisemitic policies. Responsibility for their maintenance thus shifted to 
relatives and friends in the US, who could produce affidavits to assume 
financial responsibility for immigration candidates. But this also introduced 
endless red-tape complications for the refugees. In addition to submitting 
financial affidavits, potential immigrants had to present an unexpired passport, 
a certificate of good conduct issued by the police, a certificate attesting good 
health, a thorough financial statement, and duplicate records of all personal 
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documentation including birth, marriage, and divorce certificates. Even though 
American sympathy towards European Jewish refugees grew in the aftermath 
of the Austrian and Czechoslovak crises, the Roosevelt administration had to 
temper any humanitarian impulses as this was not politically astute in view of 
widespread anti-immigrant sentiments amongst the US population.55 
But contrary to the move towards more conservative anti-immigrant 
measures observed in the rest of the world, the US government actually relaxed 
its immigration policies in the months immediately preceding the war. This was 
made possible after Roosevelt administration felt in a politically secure position 
following reelection in 1936 to push for a more lenient interpretation of 
immigration rules. Thus in the wake of the Anschluss in March 1938, the 
Roosevelt administration called for the international conference at Évian, and 
devoted considerable work to relax the US immigration system to the benefit 
of the refugees. Measures include the exempting of political and religious 
refugees from the ‘likely to become a public charge’ clause, and the merging of 
the Austrian and German quotas to a resulting quota of 27,370 persons per 
fiscal year.56 As a result, nearly 38,000 immigrants entered the US during the 
1938-39 fiscal year —as opposed to 17,199 persons during the 1937-38.57 
American Jewry, on the other hand, reacted by establishing the United Jewish 
Appeal in 1939 to conduct annual fund-raising events that went on to finance 
the crucial relief and migration work of the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee (JDC) and the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS).58 
Within Europe, France was the single country that proved most 
welcoming to refugees from Nazism, as it opened its doors to approximately 
three million foreigners —of whom 50,000 to 60,000 were Jews.59 Within weeks 
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of Hitler’s arrival to power, the French Minister of the Interior, Camille 
Chauteamps, stated that ‘those who seek asylum and come to our country will 
be welcome, in accordance with the traditions of French hospitality’.60 Indeed, 
by the end of 1933, the number of German refugees who had found asylum in 
France amounted to 25,000 —85 per cent of them Jews.61  
The living conditions of refugees in France were regulated by laws 
regarding foreign aliens, and these laws became increasingly restrictive over the 
next years. Upon arrival, refugees had to apply for a residence permit (carte 
d’identité), and for work permits if they so desired, although there were few who 
succeeded at this. The Bureau of Foreign Labour only granted such permits to 
aliens who had residence in France for more than five years, and this was 
further complicated by the Ministry of Labour’s law of 10 August 1932, which 
had established quotas for the employment of aliens in certain professions. To 
further protect the national labour force, the Pierre Laval administration issued 
a decree-law on 8 April 1935 that banned refugees from working in the garment 
industry without a work permit. Commerce and industry were still available to 
refugees, so long as they had resources to set up their own business and enrolled 
at the Court of Commerce’s register. Some wealthier refugees were able to 
regularise their residence status in this way, but on 17 June 1938 another decree 
ruled out this possibility by making registration conditional on the possession 
of residence permits. Consequently, it was estimated that at least 42,000 of the 
60,000 Jewish refugees who were in France by the end of 1938 had irregular 
status.62 
 Another challenge facing refugees emanated from the Ministry of the 
Interior’s absolute discretionary powers over the expulsion (refoulement) of 
aliens, which meant that prefects had the capacity to issue expulsion orders to 
refugees without the possibility of appeal. Excluding the two administrations of 
Léon Blum’s Popular Front government, which offered refugees some respite, 
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expulsion orders were widely issued. Refugees in this situation were usually 
deported to the Belgian border and imprisoned if found in violation of an 
expulsion order. The government of Édouard Daladier, who in 1933 had 
identified refugees as the ‘Trojan horse of spies and subversives’, was 
particularly hostile towards them.63 On 2 May 1938, Daladier introduced harsh 
anti-refugee measures including confinement in regime of forced residence 
(résidence forcée), fines to undocumented persons of up to 1,000 francs, and 
increased prison sentences for refugees found in violation of expulsion orders 
from six months to three years. Paradoxically, the same decree also instituted 
two very important provisions in favour of refugees: the right to appeal an order 
of expulsion, and the right of asylum for those who could prove having nowhere 
else to go.64 In the aftermath of Kristallnacht, the Daladier government also 
created a special border police to repel illegal immigrants, and ordered the 
construction of special internment camps (‘centres spéciaux de rassemblement’) to 
hold those who were unable to leave France.65 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, saw itself as a land of temporary 
refuge and transit, and not as a host country. Rather than formally adopting 
any specific refugee policy, the government’s response to the influx of refugees 
after 1933 was to leave the restrictive British immigration system unchanged, 
even if the Home Office made some informal modifications in practice. Most 
crucially, it accepted the guarantee given by the country’s Jewish organisations 
that no refugee would become a public charge, and that the Jewish community 
would organise their migration overseas. In view of the modest number of 
Jewish refugees who demanded admission to Britain, this arrangement worked 
to the government’s interest during the first few years of Nazism. With the 
intensification of the Jewish refugee crisis in 1938, however, the number of 
applications for admission skyrocketed, and an overwhelmed British Jewish 
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community had to retract its previous guarantee in favour of the refugees. In 
May 1938, visas became mandatory, while consular officials were instructed to 
scrutinise applications from Jews and those with ‘non-Aryan affiliations’ during 
the preselection process. Only applications by leading scientists, artists, and the 
wealthy were to be referred to London for consideration. In the months leading 
to the outbreak of the war, the poor financial situation of the British Jewish 
community, together with the lack of potential countries of emigration 
overseas, meant that British Jews were no longer capable of taking 
responsibility for new arrivals, and had to ask the British government to 
interrupt new admissions altogether.66  
In the Netherlands, the refugee population at the outbreak of the war was 
estimated at 30,000 persons accommodated in public buildings in settlements 
scattered across the country. Although the Dutch Government did not assume 
any legal or financial responsibility towards the refugee, it did much to help 
their situation. Thus, in 1934, a Ministerial Instruction recognised refugees as 
a category of aliens deserving special and sympathetic treatment. Although this 
lenient treatment hardened after the Anschluss, when only transients possessing 
visas and steamship tickets for an overseas country were admitted, cases of 
deportation of irregular refugees were quite rare.67 
Belgium’s refugee record looks similarly favourable. By 1939, at least 
40,000 refugees transited through the country, and by the outbreak of the war 
Belgium was sheltering 25,000 refugees. This was so despite the practice of the 
Belgian authorities of refusing refugees from Germany at the frontier during the 
first few years of Nazi government. Following the introduction of the Royal 
Decree of 20 February 1936, however, Belgium liberalised its attitude towards 
refugees. The decree established, for instance, an Interdepartmental 
Commission comprised of members of several ministries to which the Minister 
of Justice could refer any proposal for the expulsion of a refugee made by the 
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police. The function of this commission was to discern between regular aliens 
and refugees, and to enable the refugee to defend in court against such 
expulsion order.68 
Switzerland worried considerably about the influx of foreigners into its 
borders well before Hitler’s arrival to power. Since 1924, the Swiss federal 
assembly had sought measures to tackle the fear of being ‘overrun by foreigners’ 
(Überfremdung) by reducing the proportion of foreigners living in Switzerland, 
and even establishing a special police department to keep the non-Swiss under 
control. During the 1930s, both the ‘alien’s Police’ (Fremdenpolizei) and the 
Bundesrat’s restrictive refugee policies made of Switzerland a country of transit 
only concerned with ‘onward migration’ (Weiterwanderung). Following the 
Anschluss in March 1938, Jewish refugees began to pour into the country in great 
numbers and the Swiss federal council sought alternative ways to limit this 
influx. Not avoid harming the social and economic bonds between the two 
nations, the Swiss sought ways to deter the influx of Jewish refugees without 
the need to impose visa requirements to all German citizens. This crystallised, 
in October 1938, in the adoption of visa requirements for German Jews, whose 
passports would be stamped with the letter ‘J’ for identification purposes.69  
Migration possibilities in the rest of the world were only considered by 
Jewish refugees towards the late 1930s, in parallel to the toughening of refugee 
policies across the globe. Immigration to the South African Union was greatly 
restricted after the Aliens Act of February 1937, only allowing thereafter 
relatives of persons who were already inside the Union. In the course of 1938, 
both Southern Rhodesia and Kenya also restricted the inflow of immigrants. In 
Asia, there were no major emigration opportunities for Jews with the exception 
of the Philippines and the International Zone of Shanghai. The only other 
government that seemed to stir against the tide was Australia, where fifteen 
thousand visas were made available for refugees from Greater Germany 
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between 1938 and 1940 on the basis of 5,000 per annum.70  
After the decisive events of 1938, Countries in Latin America also began 
to introduce restrictions to immigration, signifying an end to their open-door 
policy. Argentina and Brazil demanded desirous migrants to have relatives in 
these countries possessing sufficient financial means to act as guarantors.71 
Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela granted visas in exceptional cases only. 
Ecuador welcomed immigrants who landed with $100 and could produce an 
amount of $400. The situation in the Caribbean was similar: Jamaica, Costa 
Rica and Nicaragua remained closed to immigrants. Barbados, Dominican 
Republic, Trinidad, Cuba, and Guatemala, on the other hand, required 
migrants to have considerable capital. Honduras, on the other hand, did only 
admit bona-fide farmers.72 The Mexican Ministry of the Interior also decreed 
that stateless aliens would not be admitted into country, thus closing its doors 
to Jewish migration —only 2,000 had been granted asylum by 1945.73 In 
February 1939, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay signed a convention aimed 
at reducing trade barriers which included a provision to further restrict 
immigration into those three countries, and to cooperate with each other in 
keeping out undesirable persons.74 In spite of these restrictions, Jewish 
immigrants continued to pour in thanks to inefficient administrations, 
corruptible immigration authorities, and the widespread use of fake 
documentation. Paradoxically, more than 90 per cent of the 90,000 German-
speaking refugees who migrated to Latin America between 1933 and 1942 did 
so from 1938 onwards, in spite of the end of the open-door policy in Latin 
American states.75  
Whilst adult refugees were perceived as a potential burden to the state and 
an added stress to national labour markets in countries of refuge, children 
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refugees raised more sympathies amongst the population and did not compete 
for labour. By 1939, 18,149 unaccompanied Jewish children and adolescents 
—the upper age limit varied between 14 and 17 depending on each country— 
from Central Europe found asylum in various countries of refuge.76 Most of 
these unaccompanied children migrated thanks to the Kindertransporte initiative, 
which began in Austria shortly after the Anschluss, and in Germany following 
Kristallnacht. Giving their children away was something that very few Jewish 
parents would have considered before 1938, but the tragic events of that year 
made many of them reconsider this possibility favourably. By far, the country 
that accepted the largest number of children refugees was the United Kingdom, 
which took in nearly 10,000 of them. Some scholars have argued that the 
United Kingdom’s generosity towards Jewish children is inextricably linked to 
foreign policy considerations such as the negative publicity brought about by 
the White Paper of May 1939, which restricted Jewish migration to Palestine. 
A similar logic may apply to Switzerland, Belgium, and the Netherlands, where 
the initial quota numbers were enlarged on several occasions to accommodate 
more endangered children. By the onset of the war in September 1939, each of 
these three countries had taken in nearly 300, 1,000, and 2,000 unaccompanied 
children respectively.77  
In the US, immigration regulations were also more lenient towards 
unaccompanied children, who could enter with fewer bureaucratic restrictions 
than adults. Thus in 1933, the American Jewish Congress (AJC) was the first 
to adopt a resolution urging the US to take some 40,000 German Jewish 
children. Subsequently, representatives of the AJC and the B’nai Brith 
organisation devised a programme to bring German Jewish children to the US 
that culminated in the establishment of the German-Jewish Children’s Aid 
(GJCA) in April 1934. Within a year, a total of 146 children refugees arrived in 
the US under GJCA care, but the lack of funds and the scarcity of eligible foster 
homes greatly hindered the work of the GJCA thereafter. In the midst of the 
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Great Depression, few American Jewish families could provide refugee 
children with the minimum economic standards required by US immigration 
laws and procedures, which required, for instance, a separate bed for every child 
in foster care, and no more than two children per room. This explains why, by 
March 1938, the GJCA had only managed to place 351 children in foster homes 
in the US.78 Following the German annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland, 
Robert Wagner —a New York German-American senator—, and Edith Rogers 
—a representative from Massachusetts— campaigned for the entry of 20,000 
German children into the US outside of quota restrictions. Unfortunately, 
despite several congressional hearings and public debate during the spring of 
1939, the Wagner-Rogers bill was defeated and never came to a vote.79 
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The Iberian Peninsula and the Jewish Refugee Crisis 
 
Prior to the Anschluss and the rapid escalation of Nazi anti-Jewish policy 
during 1938, the Iberian Peninsula had remained on the periphery of the Jewish 
refugee crisis. For the majority of German Jews seeking to migrate, neither 
Spain nor Portugal, with their backward economies and near absence of Jewish 
community life, represented attractive destinations.80 Another important 
deterrent was the unstable political context of the Iberian Peninsula in the 1930s 
also acted as another important deterrent. Portugal had been a military 
dictatorship since 1926, and even though German citizens could enter the 
country without a visa by virtue of a trade agreement between the two 
countries, few German Jews took advantage of this treaty provision.81 The 
Spanish Republic, by contrast, represented a more appealing destination for 
many Jews who identified with the progressive and modernising drive of the 
young Spanish democracy. But this favourable situation came to an abrupt end 
with the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July 1936. Paradoxically, it was 
only whilst Spain wallowed in bloodshed that —owing to the violent 
antisemitic campaign unleashed by the Nazis during 1938— the Iberian 
Peninsula became a crucial land of transit, and the port of Lisbon turned into a 
most coveted destination for thousands of Jews desperate to migrate.  
It was at the request of the Portuguese military that António de Oliveira 
Salazar rose to power as President of the Council of Ministers in July 1932, and 
became Portugal’s de facto dictator in 1933. Salazar’s Estado Novo was a 
corporatist, conservative, and authoritarian regime governed by a right-wing 
civilian elite, and influenced by both fascist and social-Catholic doctrine.82 
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Xenophobia was another key element of the new regime, which considered 
foreigners and their ‘modern’ ideas a dangerous source of social and political 
unrest. As early as January 1933, the Salazarist government introduced visa 
requirements for citizens from countries without a bilateral free-trade 
agreement with Portugal, and barred entry to the destitute, the homeless, and 
the ‘undesirables’.83 Who exactly belonged in this category was to be defined, 
as the government saw fit, over the following years. The first group to join the 
list of ‘undesirables’ were the so-called Ostjuden, Polish Jews who had settled in 
Germany decades before being forced to migrate by the Nazi government. 
From April 1934, the Portuguese government made the concession of visas to 
Polish Jews conditional on previous consultation to the Portuguese secret 
police, the Polícia de Vigilância e Defesa do Estado (PVDE).84 In May 1935, these 
restrictions were extended to all stateless persons, and in July, to Nansen 
passport-holders and persons born in Russia and the Baltic states.85  
Although Salazar’s restrictive immigration policies affected Jewish 
refugees primarily, most scholars agree that these measures were manifestations 
of anti-immigrant feelings that were ubiquitous at the time, and that 
antisemitism was neither an inherent ideological component of the Salazarist 
regime, nor was it prevalent —with the exception of a number of far-right 
intellectuals influenced by French modern antisemitism— in Portuguese 
society.86 In fact, antisemitism was not even popular amongst the Portuguese 
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fascists of the Blueshirt movement (Camisas Azuis), who despite being 
committed national-socialists, frowned upon Hitler’s racial policies and did not 
oppose the arrival of Jewish refugees to Portugal.87 There were, however, a 
number of high-ranking officials in Lisbon who did certainly display antisemitic 
tendencies, particularly within the Portuguese secret police. The most notorious 
example is that of Captain Paulo Cumano, a Berlin-trained police official and 
‘certified’ antisemite who, from his position as Chief of Customs and Border 
Services at the PVDE’s International Section, pushed for an inflexible stance 
regarding the issuance of visas to Jewish persons.88  
In contrast with this hostile anti-refugee trend in Portugal, the political 
context in Spain was relatively more welcoming upon Hitler’s arrival to power. 
Born in April 1931, the Second Spanish Republic (1931-39) was greeted by 
many Spaniards as a regime that signalled the end of an unjust, corrupt, and 
decadent past, and heralded a new era of social justice and democratic reform 
that would lead Spain into the twentieth century proper. Indeed, the so-called 
liberal biennium of 1931-33 saw a tremendous reformist drive that aimed at 
modernising every aspect of Spain’s social and political life: from the 
redistribution of land, the promotion of worker’s rights, and the championing 
of state-sponsored secular education; to the reform of the military, and the 
separation of church and state.89 For Spanish Jews in particular, the 
introduction of religious freedom and equal rights to Jews and Catholics by the 
constitution of December 1931 represented an end to centuries of persecution 
and discrimination.90 
From the onset, the new republic showed numerous signs of 
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rapprochement towards Jews. On 29 April 1931, the provisional government 
issued a decree providing for the naturalisation of Jews living in Spanish 
Morocco, and in May, a synagogue was consecrated in Madrid for the first time 
since the Edict of Expulsion of 1492.91 Although this royal decree was never 
formally repealed, Republican authorities considered it void of meaning in view 
of the new constitutional legality.92 These pro-Jewish initiatives fostered 
rumours that the Republican government was planning the ‘return’ of the 
Spanish-speaking Sephardic communities of the Balkans and the Near East 
after more than four hundred years of diaspora, although this was never 
accomplished.93  
Indeed, Manuel Azaña’s Republican-Socialist government maintained a 
contradictory attitude regarding the plight of German Jewry upon Hitler’s 
arrival to power. Before the League of Nations, Spanish representatives Luis de 
Zulueta and Salvador de Madariaga denounced the National-Socialists for their 
mistreatment of Jews in Germany and Upper Silesia.94 Yet at the same time, 
Azaña’s coalition government did place obstacles to the arrival of Jewish 
refugees while shielding itself behind protectionist arguments that were popular 
with governments around the globe. As early as May 1933, the Ministerio de 
Asuntos Exteriores (MAE) —Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs— reintroduced 
visa requirements for German citizens and instructed its diplomats abroad to 
restrict whenever possible the influx of foreign ‘undesirables’ who could 
																																																																		
91 Issued by Catholic Kings Ferdinand and Isabella on 31 March 1492, the Edict of  Expulsion 
—or Alhambra Decree— gave Jews four months to either embrace the Christian religion or go 
into exile. Those who chose to convert and their descendants endured centuries of  persecution 
at the hands of  the Inquisition, and racial discrimination by virtue of  ‘Blood Purity Laws’ that 
effectively turned them into second-class subjects. See Henry Kamen, The Spanish Inquisition: A 
Historical Revision (4th ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014); and Joseph Pérez, The 
Spanish Inquisition: A History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005). 
92 Isidro González, Los Judíos y la Segunda República, 1931-1939 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 
2004), 111-32; and Rohr, The Spanish Right and the Jews, 40–2. 
93 These hopes were founded on art. 23 of  the constitution of  December 1931, which pledged 
to extend Spanish nationality to ‘persons of  Spanish origin living abroad’. The only official 
attempt to implement this in practice is reflected in the circular order of  27 February 1933, and 
had the clear intent of  expanding Spain’s economic and diplomatic influence in the Balkan 
Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean. Marquina and Ospina, España y los Judíos, 91-112. 
94 There were many within the Republican-Socialist government who expressed sympathy for 
the Jewish people and the Zionist movement, such as Fernando de los Ríos, Minister of  
Education; Indalecio Prieto, Minister of  Finance; and Miguel Maura, Minister of  the Interior. 
See Rohr, The Spanish Right and the Jews, 46–48; and Avni, Spain, the Jews, and Franco, 37-8. 
  62 
contribute to aggravating the Spanish labour crisis.95 Following the formation 
of the High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany in October 1933, 
Madrid also declined James McDonald’s invitation to join the discussions on 
the German refugee problem.96 Perhaps to compensate for this obstructionist 
attitude, the Republican-Socialist government granted asylum to a number of 
Jewish intellectuals, scientists, and artists in an attempt to gain international 
prestige.97 The most famous case was that of Albert Einstein, who briefly 
considered accepting the Spanish government’s offer of a chair at the University 
of Madrid before opting for Princeton University.98  
Spain’s ambivalent policies towards Jews took a turn for the worse during 
the administration of the Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas (CEDA), 
a coalition of right-wing parties in government between 1934 and 1936. CEDA 
was a counterrevolutionary and anti-parliamentary movement that claimed to 
defend the principles of ‘Christian civilisation’ from the desecrations of the 
Republic.99 Influenced by both modern antisemitism and Nazi ideology, the 
Spanish Right conflated Jews, Freemasons, and communists into the so-called 
‘anti-Spain’; the force supposedly behind the Republic’s attempts to obliterate 
the ‘true Spain’, which they saw as inherently Catholic and conservative.100 In 
this context, the CEDA government regarded Jewish refugees with special 
suspicion for fear of communist infiltrations, although this concern was not 
entirely the result of anti-Marxist paranoia. In August 1934, for instance, a 
number of Central and Eastern European Jews with communist leanings 
travelled to Spain under the pretext that they were attending a conference on 
Esperanto linguistics in Valencia. Unfortunately, incidents such as this helped 
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substantiating the view shared by many on the Spanish Right who identified 
Jews as communists agitators. As the number of refugees seeking asylum 
continued to increase, the CEDA government further restricted the influx of 
Jews by imposing stricter immigration controls as well as the need for financial 
guarantors within the country.101 
Those Jewish refugees who managed to migrate to Spain settled across 
several regions. A small number established themselves in Madrid and smaller 
cities such as San Sebastián, Bilbao, Málaga, Valencia, Alicante, Seville, and 
Granada.102 The most affluent Jews —mainly retired professionals, pacifists, 
and other intellectuals seeking freedom and repose in this ‘alternative scene’ 
away from the Third Reich— found asylum in the Balearic islands of Mallorca 
and Ibiza. Amongst the most notable guests of the Balearic archipelago were 
philosopher Walter Benjamin, poet Erich Arendt, authors Franz Blei and Karl 
Otten, and ‘degenerate’ artists Alfred Otto Wolfgang Schulze (‘Wols’), and 
Arthur Segal.103  
But the most popular refugee haven was Barcelona, one of Spain’s most 
international and industrially developed cities. By 1933, Barcelona was home 
to about 800 Jews. In terms of social status and ethnic background, there were 
two main demographics: a prosperous local Jewish community of Spanish 
Sephardim; and a more modest ‘community of brothers’ (Agudad Ahim) 
consisting of craftsmen and small merchants of Turkish and Balkan Sephardic 
origin who settled in Barcelona after the Great War.104 Within the first year of 
Nazi rule in Germany, Barcelona’s commercial and industrial activity attracted 
no less than 3,000 Jewish refugees, and by the eve of the July 1936 military 
coup, the city’s foreign Jewish population may have reached 5,000 people.105 
Many refugees established small businesses or earned a living as peddlers, while 
others pursued trades in economic fields as disparate as the beer and film 
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industries. The example of Ibérica Films, a film production company established 
by two German Jews who found asylum in Barcelona in September 1933, is a 
perfect example of the newcomers’ contribution to Spanish economic and 
social life.106  
As the Nazi government expanded its vicious policy of confiscation, 
taxation, and sequestration of Jewish property, the capacity of Jewish refugees 
to subsist in exile rapidly deteriorated. This was not helped by the fragile 
economic situation and soaring unemployment in Spain. Claiming to protect 
the national labour workforce, the CEDA’s Ministry of Labour restricted the 
issuance of work permits to aliens and barred them from peddling and petty 
trading, from which the poorer refugees made their living.107 Many penniless 
Jews received assistance from HICEM, which offered relief to refugees in 
Madrid and Barcelona through a branch organisation named Ezra (‘help’).108 In 
addition to providing financial assistance to about 500 Jewish refugees by 1934, 
HICEM also helped refugees integrate in Spanish economy, and assisted in 
their migration to countries overseas.109  
Government attitudes towards Jewish refugees liberalised following the 
victory of the Popular Front in the elections of February 1936. In contrast with 
its predecessor, Manuel Azaña’s left-wing coalition opposed the deportation of 
Jewish refugees, and introduced several measures to facilitate their integration 
in Spanish society. This, in turn, fomented the conspiracy theories held by 
many in the Spanish Right, who claimed that the Spanish democracy had fallen 
prey to a ‘Judeo-Masonic-Bolshevik’ conspiracy aimed at the destruction of the 
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Spanish nation. Paradoxically, it was on the basis of these conjectures that 
Spanish ultraconservatives —soon to be known as ‘Nationalists’—  began 
plotting their own ‘Crusade’ against the republican government, and staged the 
military coup of 18 July 1936.110  
As seen from Salazar’s conservative government, the formation of the 
Popular Front government in Spain —which amalgamated socialists, 
communists, anarchists, and Trotskyists amongst other political forces— posed 
a serious threat to the stability of the Portuguese Estado Novo, which responded 
by intensifying its fascistic and repressive nature. Hence during the year 1936, 
Salazar —who was already President of the Council of Ministers and Minister 
of Finances— also became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of War.111 
Further, in May and September 1936 respectively, the Salazarist regime 
established the Hitlerjugend-inspired uniformed youth movement Mocidade 
Portuguesa, which was compulsory for males aged 7 to 14; and the Portuguese 
Legion (Legião Portuguesa), a paramilitary organisation tasked with defending 
the state from the communist and anarchist threats.112  
Following the onset of the Spanish Civil War in July, Salazar’s regime 
sided with the Spanish rebel army, and launched a ‘Crusade’ of its own that led 
to the mass incarceration of persons considered politically dangerous.113 The 
policies of the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs towards refugees were no 
exception to this trend. On 24 March 1936, the Ministério dos Negócios 
Estrangeiros (MNE) introduced three kinds of visas for incoming foreigners: 
permanent residence visas, tourist visas valid for thirty days, and transit visas 
valid for forty-eight hours. Excluding immigrants of ‘outstanding’ status whose 
visas continued to be issued by MNE, the granting of visas became competence 
of the Portuguese Secret Police, or PVDE. In June, the Ministry of Interior 
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advised the government to further restrict the entry of stateless, Soviet, and 
Polish refugees into Portugal on the basis that they were experts in ‘espionage 
and international agitation’.114 This recommendation materialised on 24 
September 1936, when the MNE banned the issuance of permanent residence 
visas to persons with identification documents issued by countries other than 
their own, such as Nansen-passport holders.115 Stateless refugees could still 
obtain tourist visas for thirty days —which could be extended to sixty with the 
PVDE’s authorisation— provided their passports were valid and not nearing 
the expiration date.  
In the wake of the bomb attacks perpetrated against the Salazarist regime 
by Anarchist activists in January 1937, the Portuguese police found the perfect 
opportunity to scapegoat the foreign refugee community for such turmoil.116 
Consequently, the PVDE ordered the expulsion of all German, Polish, and 
Nansen refugees arrived since 1933, and imprisoned those suspected of 
subversive political activities. According to the police order, those who failed 
to leave Portugal within eight days were to be deported to Spain, where 
Franco’s rebel army would ‘take care of them appropriately’.117 When the 
British Ambassador to Portugal, Sir Charles Wingfield, questioned the 
Salazarist government regarding this merciless ruling, MNE Secretary-General 
Luís Teixeira de Sampayo rectified that his government did not intend to expel 
all refugees from the country, but only those of dubious political background or 
in possession of forged documents.118 Although accurate figures are lacking, the 
founder and head of the PVDE, Captain Agostinho Lourenço, counted at least 
1,409 expulsion orders issued to foreigners by the end of 1938.119 
Despite the Salazarist regime’s great concern over the presence of 
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foreigners, Portugal remained a marginal destination for Jewish refugees well 
into 1938.120 In fact, the Portuguese were not even invited to the Évian 
Conference in July. This negligence was corrected on 8 September, when the 
Salazar government was asked to join the newly-established IGCR. Portugal 
only emerged as a decisive country of transit following the Anschluss of March 
1938 and the brutal campaign of forced migration unleashed by the SS against 
the Jews of Austria. By June 1938, the Dutch, Belgian, and Swiss consuls in 
Vienna had stopped issuing transit visas to Austrian Jews due to the growing 
number of transients who failed to leave these countries whether because they 
preferred to stay in Europe, or simply for lack of funds to continue their journey. 
As the word spread that German and Austrian subjects could enter Portugal as 
‘tourists’ for up to thirty days without the need for transit visas, thousands of 
Jews directed their hopes at the Atlantic country in a desperate attempt to 
migrate to a country overseas.121  
Overwhelmed by the number of ‘tourists’ pouring into Portugal, the 
PVDE shortened the duration of tourist visas from thirty to ten days, and 
imprisoned those who failed to leave the country thereafter.122 The MNE, on 
the other hand, began to look for a way to halt the inflow of Jewish refugees 
into Portugal without the need to repeal the German-Portuguese trade 
agreement of 1926, which provided for the free circulation of persons between 
the two countries. Ultimately, Berlin’s decision to identify ‘non-Aryan’ 
passports with the red ‘J’ stamp from late September allowed Portuguese 
authorities to impose border restrictions on Jews without damaging diplomatic 
relations with Nazi Germany. Thus, on 28 October 1938, the MNE forbade the 
settlement of Jewish refugees, and made their transit through Portugal 
contingent on the obtention of transit visas valid for thirty days. This decree 
remained the basic directive regulating the transit of Jews through Portugal 
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until the end of the war.123 Meanwhile, Salazar expanded the PVDE apparatus 
and trusted its International Department with exceptional powers to limit the 
entry of aliens. By early 1939, the Portuguese secret police had such control 
over immigration that shipping companies often refused to sell tickets to 
persons without written police approval —even if they held consular visas— for 
fear that such passengers would not be allowed to disembark upon arrival to 
Lisbon.124 
Although the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War on 18 July 1936 brought 
to a halt the stream of Jewish refugees who had found asylum in Spain since 
1933, Jewish connections remained instrumental to both sides of the war. The 
Popular Front government, on the one hand, sought to enlist Jewish support in 
forums such as Amsterdam’s World Conference of Sephardic Communities of 
May 1938, and through the appointment of Jews to key positions abroad. This 
was the case of Max Aub, a Spanish author and playwright of Franco-German 
origin, who as cultural attaché at the Spanish Embassy in Paris sought the 
support of the French Jewish community, and placed Pablo Picasso’s Guernica 
on display during the 1937 Paris International Exhibition.125 Additionally, 
between 3,500 and 6,000 Jewish volunteers —out of a total estimate of 40,000 
men— joined the International Brigades to defend the Spanish Republic from 
the fascist coalition.126  
The ‘Nationalist’ army, on the other hand, received crucial financial 
assistance from Jewish financiers in Spanish North Africa where the military 
uprising was set in motion. Some Jews contributed to the Nationalist cause to 
honour generations-old family ties with the Army of Africa, but the majority of 
them did so to avoid retribution from the military conspirators, or were simply 
coerced at gunpoint. In any case, the treatment accorded by the rebels to Jews 
in Spanish North Africa was far from friendly. In the Spanish North-African 
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enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which were home to 6,000 Jews, the Nationalists 
carried out a systematic purge of anti-Francoist elements. Jews affiliated to 
Republican parties endured torture and public humiliation through methods 
reminiscent of the Spanish Inquisition, before being ultimately shot. 
Additionally, Jewish communities were heavily taxed, their synagogues closed, 
and dozens were sent to forced labour camps.127 
In mainland Spain, Jewish refugees from Nazism endured considerable 
distress in both zones of the war, although to a varying degree. In territories 
loyal to the Republic, such as Madrid and Barcelona, government authorities 
struggled to contain the revolutionary militias, who demanded the 
imprisonment of all German citizens whether Jewish or not.128 By April 1938, 
at least 394 German Jewish refugees had migrated from Spain with HICEM’s 
assistance, although there were many others who migrated on their own.129 
Some of the wealthiest Spanish Jewish families also left Republican Spain for 
fear that their property might be confiscated. Amongst those who stayed were 
the poorer Sephardic Jews of Balkan and Turkish origin, and a number of 
German Jews who took up arms to defend the Spanish Republic. Despite the 
wave of anticlerical violence unleashed by the leftist revolutionaries against 
Church property, however, the Barcelona synagogue continued to function. In 
territories under Nationalist control, by contrast, antisemitic persecution was 
often promoted by rebel authorities even though it was not systematically 
applied. General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, one of the most notorious 
antisemites in the rebel army, imposed a fine of 138,000 pesetas on the small 
Jewish Community of Seville. In Zaragoza, nationalist authorities confiscated 
an entire department store that had been established by Jewish refugees.130 
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Shortly after the entry of the Nationalist army in Barcelona in late January 
1939, agents of the Gestapo broke into the synagogue and vandalised its 
premises. When the Jewish Community of Barcelona sent a delegation to 
denounce these desecrations to the police, they were not only refused a hearing, 
but also threatened with the closure of Barcelona’s Jewish cemetery if they 
failed to pay a large surcharge in addition to the annual rent.131  
In the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War, German Jews remaining in 
National-Catholic Spain were automatically regarded as communists.132 At this 
point, migration was not available to many, as several German Jewish refugees 
who attempted to have their passports renewed at the German Consulate-
General in Barcelona were denounced and imprisoned by their own consular 
officials.133 The abolition of the previous republican legality also marked the 
end of religious tolerance in Spain, and the return of the 1492 Decree of 
Expulsion as the sole legal basis regulating the life of Jews in Spain. The 
synagogues in Madrid and Barcelona were closed, and the practice of Jewish 
religious rituals such as circumcision, burial, and marriage, were prohibited. 
Likewise, non-Catholics were barred from public office, and Jewish children 
were forced to study Catholic doctrine in school.134 To survive Franco’s Spain, 
many German Jewish refugees were compelled to convert to Catholicism.135 
The German Embassy warned the Spanish government of these practices, and 
offered to share details on the personal and political background of refugees.136 
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France: Internment and Persecution 
 
Despite its harsh treatment of refugees during 1938, the Daladier 
government did not hesitate to make use of France’s three million immigrants 
as the country prepared for war. A decree-law of 12 April 1939 required all male 
foreigners aged 20 to 50 to serve either in the French regular army or the 
Foreign Legion. But this policy came to an end following the outbreak of war 
on 1 September 1939. Owing to fifth-column fears, the government banned 
foreigners from serving in the regular army altogether, and dictated the mass 
internment of all Central European males aged 17 to 65.1 Redefined as ‘enemy 
aliens’, approximately 18,000 German and Austrian refugees were confined to 
eighty ‘centres de rassemblement’ throughout France, under primitive and 
unsanitary conditions, and with insufficient food provisions.2 A number of 
these camps —Argèles, Arles-sur-Tech, Barcarès, Gurs, Prats-de-Mollo, and 
Saint-Cyprien— had been hastily built earlier in 1939 to detain thousands of 
Spanish Republican refugees who fled Spain en masse following General 
Franco’s occupation of Barcelona on 26 January 1939.3  
On 21 December, owing to mounting public pressure demanding a more 
liberal refugee policy both at home and abroad, French authorities decided to 
appoint special ‘sifting commissions’ (commissions de criblage) to identify and 
release internees who proved loyal to the Allied cause, while those with Nazi 
sympathies were to remain interned. This procedure was slow and inefficient, 
and at best conducive to an uncertain and nerve-racking ‘freedom’ known as le 
régime des sursis (‘reprieves regime’). Refugees in this situation had to report to 
the police several times a week, sometimes daily, and queued up for as many 
as six hours each time in order to obtain a rubber-stamp that granted them the 
right to stay a further day, or a week, depending on the mood of the police clerk 
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behind the desk.4  
To avoid internment and this bureaucratic torture, many saw no better 
alternative than to join the French war effort for the duration of the war as 
Engagés Volontaires pour la Durée de la Guerre (EVDG). Those with national 
armies in exile —Czechs and Poles— were allowed to enlist with them. For 
those not capale of joining their national army —Germans and Austrians— the 
choice was between joining the very unpopular Foreign Legion, or enlisting for 
‘prestataire’ service in non-combatant labour brigades. These prestataire 
battalions performed various jobs related to national defence such as the 
construction of raid shelters, roads and sewers, but also worked in mining, 
lumbering, and the harvesting of crops as the situation demanded.5 By the end 
of January 1940, 60,000 Jews —half of them foreigners— had already 
‘volunteered’ for the French war effort in one way or another.6 This is not to 
say that Jews were welcome in the French military, however. On 10 January 
1940, for instance, the Foreign Legion command circulated secret orders ‘to 
refuse from now on the enlistment of Jews in the Legion under a variety of 
pretexts’.7 Antisemitic outbreaks were also common within Władysław 
Sikorski’s Polish Legion, where Jewish soldiers were often cursed and beaten 
by their non-Jewish co-nationals.8  
Following the German invasion of Luxembourg, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands on 10 May 1940, a new wave of fifth-column hysteria brought the 
previous progress to an end. The French government resorted once more to the 
mass internment of enemy nationals —for the first time including women— in 
so-called centres d’hébergement (‘lodging centers’) in Southern France.9 In doing 
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so, France also lost a great source of manpower to resist the German invasion. 
 Two days after the fall of Paris to the German army on 14 June 1940, 
Marshal Philippe Pétain assumed power and announced the cessation of 
hostilities. Following the signature of the Franco-German armistice of 22 June, 
the three departments of Alsace and Lorraine were annexed to the Third Reich, 
while the rest of metropolitan France was divided into two zones —occupied 
and unoccupied— delimited by a demarcation line that soon became a barrier 
difficult to cross by either legal or illegal means. As stipulated in article 19 of 
the armistice agreement, all German war and civil prisoners in French custody 
had to be surrendered to German authorities. During July and August, a 
German armistice commission known as Waffenstillstandskommission (WAKO) 
inspected more than ninety internment camps and organised the repatriation of 
a number of German subjects, mostly militant anti-fascists who posed a threat 
to military security. However, whilst this commission demanded to know the 
personal details and whereabouts of all German refugees in France, it showed 
no interest in the repatriation of Jewish refugees to the Third Reich. On the 
contrary, in line with the Nazi policy of forced migration, thousands of Jews 
from the newly annexed regions of Alsace and Lorraine were deported to 
unoccupied France in October 1940: 6,538 Jews from Baden-Württemburg 
were interned at Gurs, and 1,125 Jews from the Palatinate and the Saar in the 
camp at Saint-Cyprien.10 
The presence of unwanted foreigners was one of the most pressing issues 
facing the new regime of Vichy. Prior to German occupation, there were 
already 2,450,000 immigrants in France and a total Jewish population of 
330,000 —of whom 40 per cent were foreigners.11 Following Hitler’s Western 
Campaign, well over a million refugees from Belgium, Luxembourg, and the 
Netherlands poured into France —of whom at least 40,000 were Jews. Many 
refugees were released or managed to escape in the chaos that ensued the 
collapse of the French Third Republic. Since most of them had no entry visas 
nor the right to stay in France, many were thrown into miserable camps: Gurs, 
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Le Vernet, Les Milles, Rieucros (women’s camp), Rivesaltes, and Saint-
Cyprien were amongst the most crowded. By the end of 1940, the total number 
of refugees still interned in the camps of Vichy France is estimated at 40,000 to 
50,000 persons —approximately 70 per cent were Jewish.12 There were many 
who did not survive the poor hygienic conditions, undernourishment (average 
of 950-1,200 calories per day), lack of access to potable water, and the absence 
of appropriate medical facilities, and fell victim of cold and epidemics. 
Additionally, prisoners at Le Vernet had to endure six hours of forced labour 
daily, and were exposed to frequent beatings at the hands of the guards and 
punishment through solitary confinement.13 Thus, in addition to the 75,721 
Jews who were deported from France between March 1942 and August 1944 
(of whom only 2,800 survived the Holocaust), there were an estimated 3,000 
Jewish refugees who died in internment camps in Southern France.14 
In the occupied zone, German authorities introduced the first anti-Jewish 
act on 27 September 1940: an ordinance which defined who was to be 
considered Jewish —anyone who ever professed the Jewish religion or who had 
at least three Jewish grandparents— and called for a census of all Jews present 
in the occupied zone. This ordinance also required Jewish shopkeepers to place 
a yellow sign with the words ‘Jewish business’ in French and German, and 
barred all Jews who had fled to Vichy France from returning.15 The newly 
formed Pétain government, on the other hand, introduced a series of anti-
immigrant and antisemitic measures that reflected its desire to find a visible 
scapegoat for the French defeat and win the favour of the Germans 
simultaneously.16 On 17 July 1940, one of Vichy’s first laws limited 
employment in the public sector to persons born to French parents. On 22 July, 
																																																																		
12 Susan S. Zuccotti, ‘Surviving the Holocaust: The Situation in France’, in Michael 
Berenbaum, and Abraham J. Peck (eds.), The Holocaust and History: The Known, the Unknown, 
the Disputed, and the Reexamined (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press/USHMM, 1998), 
495. 
13 Arthur Koestler, Scum of  the Earth (London: Jonathan Cape, 1941), 90-146. 
14 Serge Klarsfeld, Memorial to the Jews deported from France, 1942-1944: Documentation of  the 
Deportation of  the Victims of  the Final Solution in France (New York: Beate Klarsfeld Foundation, 
1983), xxvii and 612. 
15 Zuccotti, Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 51-4. 
16 Julian T. Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
355. 
  76 
the Ministry of Justice announced that all naturalisations granted by virtue of 
the French nationality law of 10 August 1927 would be subjected to review. 
Over the next three years, a special commission examined the cases of 13,839 
French Jews, and revoked the citizenship to 7,055 of them. Finally, the law of 
3 September gave prefects the power to intern individuals considered a threat 
to national security and public order, thus laying the foundation for the physical 
exclusion of Jews and other unwanted elements.17  
Vichy published its first Statut des Juifs on 3 October 1940. Applicable to 
unoccupied France, the Statut des Juifs extended the definition of Jewish person 
to anyone with two Jewish grandparents who was also married to a Jew, and 
excluded Jews from public service, the officer corps, education, journalism, 
theatre, radio, and cinema amongst other professions. The day after the Statut 
des Juifs was introduced, a further law granted prefects the power to intern all 
foreign Jews at their discretion. Meanwhile both the Vichy government and the 
German occupation authorities continued to enlarge the list of professions 
prohibited to Jews, and introduced new economic measures of discrimination 
aimed at the complete exclusion of Jews from French economy, such as the 
‘Aryanisation’ of Jewish businesses. On 29 March 1941, Vichy authorities 
established the Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives (CGQJ), a public 
bureau that was to coordinate anti-Jewish policy in the unoccupied zone. 
Assisted by its first commissioner, Xavier Vallat, the Vichy regime introduced 
a second Statut des Juifs on 2 June 1941 that enlarged yet again the definition of 
Jewish person as well as the list of professions prohibited to Jews, and called 
for a census of all Jews in the unoccupied zone. Moreover, since the second 
Jewish status laws made no distinction between foreign and French Jews, it 
enabled prefects to intern all Jews regardless of their nationality.18 
The treatment accorded to foreign volunteers in the French army after the 
fall of France was no better. Since the terms of the Franco-German armistice 
limited the strength of the French metropolitan army to 125,000 men, Pétain’s 
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Ministry of War ruled that foreign volunteers were redundant and proceeded 
to their demobilisation. In complete disregard for their work towards the 
French war effort, foreign volunteers were denied a certificate attesting their 
years of service with the French Army, as well as the promised prime de 
démobilisation of 5,000 francs.19 Instead, Vichy’s law of 27 September 1940 ruled 
that all male foreigners aged 18 to 55 who were unable to return to their 
countries of origin were ‘superfluous to the national economy’, and were 
compelled to join the so-called Groupements de Travailleurs Étrangers (GTE).20 
Organised under the Ministry of Labour, these demilitarised companies 
endured terrible working, nourishment, and lodging conditions, under strict 
military discipline, and with minimal retribution at best. Next to thousands of 
Spanish refugees, Jews accounted for roughly a third of the 60,000 men who 
joined these formations in both French zones. In the occupied zone, the 
German Organisation Todt employed GTEs in the construction of ‘Atlantic 
Wall’ defences.21  
From late 1940, many GTE units in unoccupied France were dispatched 
to French North Africa for internment in labour camps organised by the 
Ministry of Industrial Production and Labour.22 Upon arrival to Marrakech and 
Sidi Bel Abbès, they had their heads shaven and received intensive ‘training’ at 
the hands of the criminals and thugs of the Foreign Legion, many of whom 
were Nazi sympathisers and thus gave Jews the most unpleasant duties.23 These 
included work in stone quarries and coal mines in the desert, and the 
construction of the trans-Saharan railroad that was to connect the 
Mediterranean ports of Morocco and Algeria with Sub-Saharan Africa. This 
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project had been in the minds of French policy makers for several decades but 
was never realised due to the difficulty recruiting labour force willing to work 
in Sahara’s extreme weather conditions. With thousands of ‘superfluous’ 
foreigners at its disposal, the Vichy regime saw this as the perfect opportunity 
to link the Mediterranean port of Algiers with the port of Dakar, the capital of 
French West Africa. The plan soon became central to French colonial prestige. 
Nazi Germany also supported the trans-Saharan railroad, as it recognised its 
strategic importance in facilitating the rapid deployment of Senegalese troops 
in the event of an Allied amphibious invasion, and in extending Axis influence 
closer to British colonial possessions in Africa.24 Vichy gave green light to this 
project on 22 March 1941, and instructed prefects of impending measures to 
deport any remaining ‘undesirables’ to labour camps in North Africa. 
Following mass roundups in the streets of Marseille, more than 1,500 refugees 
were herded aboard the SS Massilia to North Africa.25 It is estimated that 
between 5,000-6,000 refugees, a large percentage of whom were Central 
European Jews, were employed in the construction of this railroad across the 
Sahara Desert. With temperatures rising to 50 degrees Celsius in summer days 
and plummeting below zero during winter nights, mortality amongst these 
workers was so high that Vichy authorities saw it necessary to reinforce these 
labour battalions regularly. As noted by Tartakower and Grossmann, GTEs 
were ‘nothing but a modern version of the slave trade’, yet the only way for 
many Jewish refugees to avoid internment.26 This was especially the case after 
June 1941, when an order from the Vice-President of the Council of Ministers, 
Admiral François Darlan, informed prefects that ‘no foreigner of the Jewish 
race’ arrived in France after 10 May 1940 should henceforth be released from 
internment camps or forced labour units.27 
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Relief  and Rescue in Vichy France 
 
On 20 November 1940, various Jewish and non-Jewish relief 
organisations united forces to coordinate relief in internment camps throughout 
unoccupied France. Among many others were the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA), the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 
Secours Suisse, the Unitarian Service Committee (USC), and various national 
branches of the Red Cross. The resulting umbrella organisation, the Comité de 
Coordination pour l’Assistance dans les Camps (CCAC), became be better known as 
the Comité de Nîmes, after the town where all these groups first conferred. 
Crucially, the Nîmes Commitee was presided by an US citizen, YMCA 
delegate Donald A. Lowrie.28 Thanks in part to its American connections, the 
Nîmes Committee gave French Jewish organisations a platform from where 
they were able to obtain important concessions from the Vichy government —
which in turn welcomed their assistance in dealing with the intern population. 
Upon the Nîmes Committee’s initiative, for instance, the government of Vichy 
recognised the refugee’s right to receive mail and packages, and to have access 
to Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish chaplains. In the long run, however, the 
most crucial achievement of the Nîmes Committee involved the release of 
internees from French camps into supervised reception centres known as centres 
d’accueil. It is estimated that as many as 2,800 children were relocated to these 
reception centres, where they lived with greater comfort and dignity.29 Once 
under their, it was much easier for these relief organisations to arrange the 
emigration of hundreds of these children to the US, or to find other clandestine 
means to guarantee their survival. Because of these practices, when the first 
deportations began in the unoccupied zone towards mid-1942, few Jewish 
children remained in the camps —mainly from parents who did not allow for 
the separation of their families. 
Despite the multiplicity of relief agencies operating in Vichy France, there 
are two organisations that deserve special mention for their prominent role in 
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saving the lives of thousands of Jewish youths during the Holocaust. Founded 
in 1923, the Éclaireurs Israelites de France (EIF) was the French branch of the 
Jewish pioneer movement, a phenomenon equivalent to the Christian boy-
scout movement that flourished across Europe during the interwar years. 
Following the ideas of EIF founder Robert Gamzon, for whom loyalty to 
France and to the Zionist cause were not in conflict, the French pioneer 
movement sought to cultivate a sense of ‘Frenchness’ alongside one of 
‘Jewishness’ amongst its members. Influenced by the role of the ‘New Man’ in 
communist and fascist ideologies, EIF placed the ‘New Jew’ at the centre of its 
ideology, and sought to transform a predominantly urban and bourgeois Jewish 
youth into physically apt generation of self-sufficient men and women with a 
strong sense of collective responsibility. Whilst EIF counted no less than 2,500 
members before the German invasion, many more arrived from different parts 
of Europe during the war years. As a result, EIF slowly moved away from its 
French patriotic focus and its liberal understanding of the Jewish religion, 
towards more orthodox and Zionist tendencies. Following the French defeat 
during the summer of 1940, EIF’s headquarters moved from Paris to a Kibbutz-
like agricultural training centre at Moissac (Tarn-et-Garonne), which thereafter 
became the epicentre of the French pioneer movement. Over the next two 
years, EIF obtained Vichy’s authorisation to establish nine more agricultural 
centres across unoccupied France, where hundreds of Jewish youths found a 
safe and meaningful way of life away from the horrors of war and 
confinement.30 In December 1941, the EIF movement was integrated into the 
Union Générale des Israélites de France (UGIF), a national Jewish council created 
by the Vichy government to replace all Jewish organisations except those purely 
religious. Following the beginning of the deportations from unoccupied France 
in August 1942, Robert Gamzon and other EIF leaders decided to set up a 
parallel underground organisation to put as many Jews as possible to safety. 
Since EIF had been integrated into UGIF’s sixth section —for the youth— this 
underground organisation became known as ‘La Sixième’. From late 1942 until 
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the liberation of France in August 1944, this clandestine organisation will have 
an instrumental role in rescuing thousands of Jews of any age. Some received 
false identities, while others went into hiding thanks to a network of non-Jewish 
institutions and homes known as the ‘reseau Garel’, or fled into Switzerland and 
Spain thanks to clandestine rescue networks organised jointly with the Jewish 
resistance. 
The Œuvre de Secours aux Enfants (OSE), on the other hand, was a 
‘children’s aid society’ established in Saint Petersburg in 1912 by a group of 
Jewish physicians who came together to offer medical aid to Jewish children in 
Tsarist Russia. During the interwar period, as the OSE opened new branches 
in Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and France, its work shifted progressively 
towards the care for refugee children. By 1939, OSE administered six children’s 
homes (maison d’enfants) in France where it looked after 1,200 German, Czech, 
and Austrian children. Following the occupation of France by Nazi Germany, 
many of these children were evacuated from the cities and handed over to the 
EIF, which integrated them into their pioneer units in more remote agricultural 
communities.31 Thereafter, OSE played a pivotal role in granting medical 
assistance to Jews and other foreigners interned in the camps of Vichy France. 
From the autumn of 1940, OSE began to deploy volunteer doctors and nurses 
to provide medical assistance to the internees, understand their real needs, and 
defend their basic rights.32 Most importantly, it was thanks to the visionary 
impetus of OSE leaders Andrée Salomon and Dr Joseph Weill, in charge of 
social and medical services respectively, that the Nîmes Committee persuaded 
the authorities at Vichy to release refugee children under the age of fifteen from 
the camps of the unoccupied zone into maisons d’accueil.33 In managing these 
residences, OSE was assisted by various non-Jewish relief groups including the 
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AFSC, Secours Suisse, the Polish Red Cross, the YMCA, and the the Protestant 
Comité d’Inter-Mouvements auprès des Evacués (CIMADE).34  
At the beginning of 1941, the Vichy government decided to implement its 
policy of ‘regroupement familial’, thus turning the camps at Rivesaltes and Gurs 
into ‘accommodation centres’ (camp d’hébergement) where refugee families with 
children were to be transferred from the many other camps in the French south. 
This made of these two camps the immediate focus of the Nîmes Commitee.35 
Initially, the main aim of these initiatives was to provide medical and famine 
relief. At Rivesaltes, the Unitarians of the USC led by Renée Lang ran a 
Kindergarten with a staff of more than twenty teacher volunteers, were refugee 
children could continue their education.36 Slowly, however, the emphasis 
shifted towards rescue. At the avant-garde of these rescue activities were the 
volunteers of the OSE and the EIF, who worked under the leadership of Andrée 
Salomon, head of social service at the OSE. Salomon recalls that it was not very 
difficult to smuggle children out of Rivesaltes, since the wardens were not 
military men but civilians, and hence easily corruptible. Their usual modus 
operandi was to relocate the children to the shelters that the OSE had within 
the camp itself —which were outside the jurisdiction of camp authorities— and 
thereafter find an excuse to smuggle them out of the camp.37 In fact, there were 
instances when camp authorities showed great willingness to ‘get rid of these 
Jews’.38 Whenever camp authorities hesitated to allow the release of Jewish 
children, it was often sufficient for the medical volunteers to claim that the child 
in question had some infectious disease such as varicella, which both French 
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and German authorities were so anxious about. In this sense, the fact that some 
of Andrée Salomon’s collaborators wore either a doctor’s white coat or a Red 
Cross nurse uniform was enough to dissipate any doubts regarding the legality 
of their activities.39 Besides OSE, there were other relief groups that succeeded 
in establishing small teams of medical personnel and social workers in camps 
across unoccupied France. During the fall of 1940, Ninon Haït and other 
volunteers from the EIF headquarters in Moissac were admitted in the camp of 
Gurs in quality of representatives of the Service Social d’Aide aux Émigrants 
(SSAÉ).40 Two of the women volunteers who made children ‘disappear’ from 
the Gurs camp —Denise Lévy and Elisabeth Hirsch— were in fact instrumental 
in smuggling Jewish children into Spain in the later years of the war. Given that 
children under fifteen years of age needed no identification documents 
according to French law, these were usually sent to the children’s homes of the 
OSE.41 Those older than fifteen were provided with forged documents to 
support their new Christian identities, and were sent to the agricultural centres 
ran by EIF across unoccupied France.42 
Unlike children refugees, adult men and women had less chances of 
escaping internment and, without proper identification documents and no 
access to ration cards, to survive daily life in Vichy France. For fear of 
contravening one of the clauses of article 19 of the armistice agreement —‘The 
French Government binds itself to prevent removal of German war and civil 
prisoners from France’— camp authorities would hardly allow for release of 
Jewish refugees without explicit German consent.43 There were, nonetheless, 
several subversive efforts to free Jewish inmates from confinement, even if at 
small scale. The earliest attempts originated from Toulouse, the ‘cradle of the 
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Jewish resistance’.44 Starting in early 1941, several Jewish resistance members 
of the incipient Armée Juive (AJ) who had taken courses in medicine managed 
to infiltrate  themselves in the camps of Argèles, Récébédou, and Gurs as 
assistants to authorised physicians. Besides providing relief, their primary aim 
was to smuggle out of the camps some of the Jewish inmates, prioritising those 
who were young, able-bodied, and willing to join the Jewish resistance. They 
did so under the pretext that the inmates were sick and in need of hospital 
assistance. To justify before camp authorities why these inmates were never 
brought back, doctors would issue death certificates stating that their corpses 
had been dissected for medical purposes. At least 35 persons were freed in this 
way and provided with forged documents to support their new gentile 
identities.45  
A more numerically important rescue network was headed by Abbé 
Alexandre Glasberg, himself a Jewish-born Catholic convert of Ukrainian 
origin. Glasberg had been hiding political refugees in his Church of Notre 
Dame de Saint-Alban (Lyon) since the fall of France, and subsequently worked 
offering relief to the refugees at Gurs camp.46 Thanks to pressure from the 
Nîmes Committee, and most importantly, from Archbishop Gerlier of Lyon, 
Glasberg obtained a vaguely-worded letter from Vichy that allowed him to 
establish and supervise one centre d’accueil for every department in the 
unoccupied zone. As a result, Glasberg established the Direction des Centres 
d’Accueil (DCA), alongside Nina Gourfinkel and Dr Joseph Weill, representing 
EIF and OSE respectively.47 In November 1941, a first group of 57 foreign 
refugees from Gurs were transferred to Chansaye (Rhône). When deportations 
began in unoccupied France in August 1942, Glasberg and his team were 
already running four reception centres in Rhône, Drôme, Hautes-Alpes, and 
Cantal, and were involved in opening a fifth one in Gers. Approximately one 
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thousand adult internees —roughly two thirds of whom were Jewish— passed 
through these centres.48 
 
 
  
																																																																		
48 Zuccotti, The Holocaust, the French, and the Jews, 74-6. 
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The US Committee for the Care of  European Children 
 
Since the failure of the Wagner-Rogers bill in the summer of 1939 —which 
thwarted plans to evacuate 20,000 children refugees from Europe into the US— 
no large-scale rescue attempts had been made in the US in favour of the younger 
victims of war. To a large extent this was due primarily to the indifference of 
the American public. Thus, when the Wagner-Rogers bill failed in 1939, two-
thirds of US citizens opposed the arrival of Jewish children to their country.49 
Within the first months of the war, however, the proliferation of images 
depicting young victims of displacement and Luftwaffe bombings in the US 
media shifted US public opinion in favour of welcoming these refugee youths. 
By June 1940, 58 per cent of US citizens voted in favour of welcoming women 
and children refugees from Britain and France.50 Leveraging this shift in public 
sentiment, US First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt called a meeting on 19 June to 
explore ways to bring orphaned and unaccompanied children from Europe into 
the US.  
In early July 1940, the US Committee for the Care of European Children 
(USCOM) was established for the purpose of ‘clearing the way for the 
admission of children evacuated from war zones in large numbers’.51 Despite 
being a non-governmental agency, USCOM had Eleanor Roosevelt as its 
honorary president and received essential support from the Children’s Bureau 
of the Department of Labor, which helped coordinate the work of the new 
organisation with other government agencies and with third-party foster homes 
and orphanages. On 13 July, officials from the State, Justice, and Labor 
Departments announced a simplified procedure for the arrival of refugee 
children in groups, rather than individually. This was a similar immigration 
arrangement to that one used by the GJCA in the 1930s, which provided for 
the admission of unaccompanied children under the age of sixteen in groups —
thus waiving the need for individual affidavits for every child— and allowed for 
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50 Gallup poll of  26 June 1940. Cited in Friedman, No Haven for the Oppressed, 98. 
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their passages to be paid by an organisation.52 Despite the initial aim was to 
save Jewish children, most of the rescue efforts during the summer of 1940 
focused on evacuating British children to protect them from the bombings of 
the Luftwaffe. Although 848 British children reached the US under the care of 
the USCOM, these evacuations came to an abrupt end on 17 September, when 
the sinking of the SS City of Benares by a German U-Boat —which killed 84 
children and 174 adults— forced the USCOM to direct its efforts away from 
the dangerous waters of the North Atlantic.53 
USCOM’s first trial attempt to evacuate children from Vichy France was 
done in cooperation with the Unitarian Service Committee (USC) towards the 
end of 1940. The Unitarian relief worker Martha Sharp had spent the summer 
organising the distribution of milk amongst children refugees, and was thus in 
a perfect position to cooperate with USCOM. In mid-September, Sharp was 
authorised to begin the screening process, and by October, she had already 
identified 50 children from ‘the most distinguished families in France’ whose 
parents were ready to let them go to the US. With support from YMCA 
representative Donald A. Lowrie in Marseille and from Eleanor Roosevelt in 
Washington, Sharp managed to obtain exit visas from Vichy officials and to 
overcome the Spanish and Portuguese immigration barriers. The group left 
Marseille on 29 November and after a relatively uneventful journey through the 
Peninsula arrived in Lisbon the following day, only to find out that the 
American Export Line had not honoured the spots reserved to them on that 
evening’s sailing. This forced Martha Sharp to find temporary housing in an 
agricultural school outside Lisbon while the USC office in Lisbon desperately 
sought shipping space for the group before their Portuguese transit visas 
expired. In view of the scarcity of shipping space, the convoy was split between 
the SS Excalibur, which sailed on 5 December, and the SS Excambion, which 
departed a week later and reached New York on 23 December.54 This 
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53 Carlton Jackson, Who will take our Children?: The British Evacuation Program of  World War II 
(Rev. ed. London: McFarland & Company, 2008), 95-8. 
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experience proved that it was possible to bring children from Vichy France, 
although at a very high cost. Charles R. Joy, who had been heading the USC 
office in Lisbon since September 1940, thought that Unitarian funds would be 
better spent helping prominent intellectuals and anti-fascists escape Nazi 
persecution, rather than children, and therefore the USC dissociated itself from 
USCOM activities in the future.55 USCOM, by contrast, was enthusiastic with 
the positive results of this first experience, and began a new partnership with 
another relief organisation with extensive relief experience in Vichy France: the 
AFSC. The American Quakers knew the ways of the Peninsula thanks to their 
work during the Spanish Civil War, and had good relations with both French 
officials and the rest of relief organisations in unoccupied France.56  
From January 1941, all agencies involved began preparing the ground for 
the rescue of a first group of 100 children refugees from unoccupied France. 
AFSC was in charge of selecting the candidates for migration from amongst the 
children’s homes of the OSE, the Rothschild group, the USC, and Secours Suisse. 
Transportation would be paid for and arranged by the JDC in cooperation with 
HICEM. Within the US, GJCA would take care of the reception and care of 
the children with assistance from the National Refugee Service (NRS), while 
the Children’s Bureau of the Department of Labor would put approved foster 
homes at their disposal. Each agency played a crucial part in this operation, 
which surpassed the previous two experiences of USCOM in complexity and 
difficulty. One added hurdle that did not inhibit Martha Sharp’s previous rescue 
operation stemmed from the Immigration Act of 1924, which required that non-
quota visitors travelling to the US on temporary visas had to be able to return 
to their country of origin at the end of their stay. Unlike those from Great 
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Britain and France, it was not clear in 1941 whether children refugees from 
Germany and Poland would be able to return to their home countries once the 
war was over. This obstacle was surmounted at the end of February 1941, when 
the Belgian Embassy in Washington assured the US State Department that 
German children in unoccupied France who had fled through Belgium would 
be guaranteed readmittance into Belgium after the war.57  
Without delay, Andrée Salomon and the Quaker relief workers in 
Marseille began preparing a database to facilitate the selection process. This 
was done through questionnaires that were to be filled for each child candidate 
in order to assess the urgency and eligibility of each case. To the pile of forms 
from children cared by AFSC and OSE, they added those from submitted by 
the Rothschild group, Secours Suisse, and individual applicants. Each file 
included a description of the child’s character and aptitudes, parents’ location, 
languages spoken, physical and mental health, as well as the child’s religious 
denomination. One of the main selection criteria was the child’s potential for 
assimilation within the host society, having relatives living in the US provided 
further guarantees for a rapid integration. Likewise, the child’s physical and 
mental condition were also assessed, as months and even years living in 
internment camps under precarious living conditions meant that some children 
were less likely to endure the long transatlantic journey.58 Children whose 
parents were already in the US, as well as orphans with no relatives ‘in any 
country in the world’ were given priority over those who still had some relatives 
in Europe.59 
On 23 May 1941, a first group of 100 children arrived in Marseille, where 
they were lodged by the Salvation Army and other Catholic institutions. Over 
the following week, they underwent the medical test, received their 
identification cards in lieu of passports, and arrange their paperwork with 
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French, Spanish, and Portuguese immigration officials.60 On the early morning 
of Saturday, 31 May, the convoy of 100 USCOM children —together with their 
five escorts and 10 additional children cared for by HICEM— got on the train 
at Marseille en route to Lisbon. As the train stopped for a few minutes at 
Oloron-Sainte-Marie, some of the children were able to see their parents —who 
had been exceptionally released for that purpose from the nearby camp of 
Gurs— and say farewell for the last time. Georges Loinger, in charge of 
physical education at the centres of the OSE, has dreadful memories from that 
day:  
‘Since the children were not allowed to get off the train, nor their parents to get 
on it, they looked out of the windows even though some of the little ones could 
not recognise their parents anymore. Everyone cried. It was heartbreaking to see 
the children calling their parents, and their parents calling their children without 
being able to see each other. It was even worse whenever they managed to 
recognise each other’.61 
 
The group arrived at the Portuguese capital around the midnight of 3 June and 
sailed aboard the SS Mouzinho on 10 June.62 They arrived in New York on 21 
June 1941. After this first success, there came four more USCOM transports. 
Due to the lack of shipping space, the second group departed on two different 
sailings. A first convoy of 45 children left Lisbon aboard the SS Mouzinho on 20 
August, and reached New York on 2 September. The second group of 51 —and 
5 HICEM cases— sailed on the SS Serpa Pinto on 9 September, and, after being 
trailed for days by a German U-Boat, arrived safely to New York on 24 
September.  The  preparations for the next group took place during the spring 
of 1942. In this instance, 23 out of the 50 children in this convoy were Spanish 
orphans who had under AFSC care for years and were included in the USCOM 
scheme for fear that the Franco regime would request their extradition to Spain 
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or enact some form of retribution. To bypass Spain, this convoy sailed on 21 
May from Marseille to Casablanca aboard the SS Maréchal Lyautey; and left 
Casablanca aboard the SS Serpa Pinto on 7 June, docking at the Port of New 
York on 25 June.63 The fifth and last convoy of 35, which was organised in 
record time, sailed from Marseille aboard the SS Nyassa and reached Baltimore 
on 30 July 1942. 
During the rafles of 16 and 17 July, the French police arrested 13,152 Jews 
—including 4,100 children— and confined them to the Vélodrome d’Hiver in 
Paris, under terribly crowded and unsanitary conditions. By 9 September,  
5,000 children from both French zones had been deported from the transit camp 
at Drancy to their deaths in Auschwitz.64 Prompted by the alarming situation 
in France, USCOM representatives and the organisations represented in the 
Nîmes Committee began to devise plans for the large-scale evacuation of 
Jewish children.65 Dr Joseph Weill, chief physician at the OSE, presented their 
rescue programme to the rest of American diplomatic representatives in Vichy, 
with promising results. The legations of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, 
Mexico, and Santo Domingo, were all enthusiastic about the plans, and agreed 
to admit several hundred children each.66 The Argentinian Embassy, moreover, 
submitted a protocol to the Vichy government requesting extraterritoriality for 
a nearby park for the purpose of hosting hundreds of Jewish children in several 
pavilions, the cost of which was to be covered by the Embassy.67 When 
USCOM requested the admission of 1,000 children into the US, the US State 
Department’s response was equally generous. In addition to furnishing 
USCOM with blanket visas for the fast-track evacuation of 1,000 children from 
France, the State Department was ready to welcome up to 5,000 children if the 
removal of the first thousand proved successful.68 It was on 26 August that the 
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US Chargé d’Affaires in Vichy, Somerville Pinkney Tuck, first brought these 
plans to the attention of Pierre Laval. Faced with the complaints of the 
American representative for the deportation of Jewish children, the French 
Premier sarcastically responded whether the US would be willing to take them 
all. Pinkney Tuck interpreted Laval’s cynical response as an opening, and urged 
the State Department to counter with a formal proposal.69 After several weeks 
of negotiations, the Vichy government agreed to the US proposal for the 
evacuation of 1,000 children, as well as to simplify the bureaucracy involved in 
their migration from France, on condition that the operation ‘should not be 
made the occasion either for propaganda or demonstrations unfriendly to the 
Vichy Government or to the Germans’.70  
Unfortunately, these ambitious rescue plans were frustrated by subsequent 
events. On 7 November, a group of 28 American Quakers left the Port of 
Baltimore bound for Marseille, ready to execute the evacuation of 1,000, —
possibly 5,000— Jewish children from unoccupied France. Before daybreak the 
next day, the Allied forces launched the amphibious invasion of French North 
Africa —codenamed ‘Operation Torch’. In retaliation, German and Italian 
troops invaded Vichy France, thus thwarting any children evacuation scheme. 
But this was not the end to USCOM’s children rescue activities. The team of 
28 American Quakers joined the AFSC office in Lisbon and began to prepare 
the evacuation of Jewish and stateless children stranded in the Iberian 
Peninsula. Overall, 309 children —mostly German, Polish, and Austrian 
Jewish children, and about 40 Spanish— were rescued from unoccupied France 
by November 1942 thanks to the joint efforts of AFSC and USCOM.71 From 
early 1943 through the end of 1944, an additional 120 children were evacuated 
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from Franco’s Spain on sporadic sailings to the US.72 Following the end of the 
war until its dissolution in 1953, USCOM would also place 2,849 ‘orphaned, 
lost, abandoned, or for some reason unaccompanied’ children in homes across 
the US.73 
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Emergency Rescue 
 
Alarmed by article 19 of the Franco-German armistice, a group of 
American and German intellectuals gathered at New York’s Commodore 
Hotel on 25 June 1940 to establish the Emergency Rescue Committee (ERC or 
‘Emerescue’).74 The ERC’s mission was to save a number of scholar, artists, 
and prominent anti-fascists from persecution and an almost certain death at the 
hands of the Nazis. First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt sponsored their project and 
pressed the US State Department to put grant emergency visas at their disposal. 
The ERC chose Varian M. Fry as its European director. A Harvard-trained 
classics scholar and independent foreign affairs journalist, Fry lacked any 
experience doing relief work, but spoke fluent French and German and was 
passionate about the work of many of the artists and intellectuals whom the 
ERC wanted to rescue.75 Fry arrived in Marseille on 13 August 1940 with 
$3,000 in his pocket and a list of 200 names of painters, musicians, sculptors, 
authors, poets, and other intellectuals the ERC was interested in rescuing. From 
his room at Hotel Splendide (31 Boulevard d’Athènes), which was conveniently 
close to the city’s main railway station, the Gare de Saint-Charles, Fry began 
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the work of the Centre Américain de Secours (CAS).76  
One of Fry’s earliest and closest associates was Miriam Davenport, an 
American art student at Paris’ Sorbonne university. Through Davenport, CAS 
enlisted the support of Mary Jayne Gold, a Chicago-born heiress whose 
generous donations allowed the CAS to go beyond its original scope and to 
offer protection to a larger number of names —creating what Davenport called 
the ‘Gold list’. Another American heiress who funded Fry’s activities on several 
occasions was Peggy Guggenheim, who claimed to have payed Max Ersnt’s 
passage to America in exchange for one of his paintings.77  
In October, Fry’s team moved to 60 rue Grignan, and in January 1941, to 
larger facilities at 18 Boulevard Garibaldi.78 Meanwhile, Davenport and Gold 
rented a large villa in the neighbourhood of La Pomme, on the outskirts of 
Marseille. Villa Air-Bel hosted many of Fry’s protégés, including surrealist 
theorist André Breton, and Russian revolutionary writer Victor Serge, who 
baptised the villa Château Espère-Visa, or ‘Chateau Hoping-for-Visa’. Other 
essential collaborators in Fry’s team were the Romanian medicine student 
Marcel Verzeanu, and French resistance members Jean Gemähling, Daniel 
Bénédite, and Jacques Weisslitz. Every morning, each of the CAS team 
members interviewed separately the candidates for emigration. In the 
afternoon, they held meetings in which each of them presented the case on 
which they had worked during the morning, and discussed some practical 
considerations such as money allowances, visa applications, or ways to hide 
clients who were being searched by the French police and the Gestapo.79 Unlike 
most other relief organisations, the CAS followed a policy of ‘rescue by any 
means’. This often involved extensive cooperation with several underground 
movements and all sorts of clandestine initiatives. They helped refugees escape 
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from prison, hide from the police, bought visas on the black market, forged 
identity documents, and, most importantly, smuggled refugees across the 
Spanish border on their way to Lisbon.  
One of the routes most used by Fry’s protégés to cross the Franco-Spanish 
border is credited to German refugees Lisa and Hans Fittko, who although not 
members of the CAS resulted extremely helpful.80 The ‘F-route’, as Fry called 
it to honour the Fittkos, was based on the preexisting ‘Lister Route’, which 
borrows its name from the Spanish Republican general who accompanied his 
troops into exile at the end of the Spanish Civil War. The Fittkos had befriended 
a French hotel owner in Banyuls-sur-Mer, a small village 10 km away from the 
Franco-Spanish border, who provided cover for refugees on their way to Spain. 
Verzeanu was in charge of taking them to the hotel rooms, where they waited 
until Hans Fittko thought it a good moment to cross the Franco-Spanish border. 
Upon arrival, refugees showed their Spanish transit visas to the Spanish border 
police at Portbou and were allowed to proceed legally into Spain.81 Another 
couple who proved essential to Fry’s work were French sculptor Aristide 
Maillol and his muse and Trotskyist sympathiser Dina Vierny, who offered 
their house at Banyuls-sur-Mer as a shelter for refugees crossing the Pyrenees. 
They advised refugees on the best route and guides to reach Spain, and 
furnished them with forged identity cards and French exit visas prepared by the 
Austrian political cartoonist Wilhelm Spira —‘Bill Freier’.82  
Overall, it took several days to reach Lisbon from Marseille. There were 
two main railway routes from Marseille to Lisbon. The fastest route passed 
through Cerbère, Portbou, Barcelona and Madrid and took about 3 days. The 
second option, which usually took a day longer, ran via Toulouse and Pau, 
crossed the Pyrenees through the Canfranc international railway station, and 
continued via Zaragoza and Madrid towards Lisbon.83 
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From October 1940, legal transit through the Iberian Peninsula became 
increasingly difficult due to the introduction of immigration restrictions by the 
Lisbon and Madrid governments. Alarmed by the increasing number of 
refugees who were stranded in Portugal, the Salazarist regime instructed its 
consuls in France to stop issuing transit visas to migrants not in possession of 
valid visas for a country overseas, or with visas for territories so remote that 
they were unreachable from Lisbon —such as Siam, China, and Belgian 
Congo. At the same time, the Spanish immigration authorities stopped 
recognising the affidavit in lieu of passport that the US Consulate in Marseille 
issued to passportless refugees, thus barring legal entry into Spain to most 
stateless refugees.  
Spanish immigration controls also became more exhaustive. At the 
Portbou border control, some refugees were required to undress completely to 
prove that they did not carry any undeclared currency. Police controls aboard 
trains connecting the French border with Portugal also became more thorough, 
as did police surveillance in Spanish hotels, streets, and frontier cities.84 Those 
found in possession of forged documents or lacking stamps attesting their lawful 
entry into Spain were forced to pay substantial fines and faced imprisonment.85 
Another obstacle facing trans-Iberian migrants was the unreliability of Spanish 
border policy. During the fall of 1940, the Spanish border would close and open 
intermittently in no predictable way, and when it opened it followed no fixed 
schedule: sometimes it would let migrants through for a whole day, sometimes 
just for a few hours. The demands of Spanish border guards were equally 
incongruent.86 One well-known victim of Spain’s inconsistent border policy was 
Walter Benjamin. On 25 September 1940, Lisa Fittko accompanied the 
German philosopher and other refugees to the Spanish  town of Portbou. Upon 
arrival, the Spanish police told them that since they were stateless, they would 
be deported to France the following day. Demoralised, and not being able to 
repeat the ten-hour hike across the Pyrenees back to France, Benjamin chose to 
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end his life swallowing a handful of morphine tablets. Paradoxically, the 
Spanish police changed their minds the following day and allowed the rest of 
the group to continue their journey through Spain.87 
Towards the end of 1940, a sea route connecting Marseille with the 
French colony of Martinique became the best alternative to the land routes 
through the Iberian Peninsula. The line connecting the Port of Marseille with 
Fort-de-France had existed already, but thus far was only available to French 
citizens. The Vichy government realised that it had no interest in hindering the 
exit of refugees from France, and became more cooperative in the issuance of 
exit visas. French shipping companies, on the other hand, saw this as an 
opportunity to palliate the wartime reduction of maritime traffic and make 
excellent profit by putting old boats to work. Upon Fry’s insistence, the US 
Consulate in Marseille also minimised the formalities surrounding the granting 
of visas to the extent possible.88 To defend themselves against the speculation 
of boat tickets, the CAS would pay upfront a fixed percentage of the tickets 
made available by shipping companies. This helped minimise the 
complications arising from the fact that shipping companies only announced 
the sailing of boats with four or five days’ notice.  
Whilst the Lisbon-New York route was faster and more comfortable, the 
Marseille-Martinique route involved further waiting at the Caribbean island for 
another boat to the US, Mexico, or Cuba. On the positive side, the Martinique 
route waived the complex formalities involved in obtaining transit visas for 
Spain and Portugal. Hence, on 24 March 1941, the SS Captain Paul-Lemerle took 
André Breton, Victor Serge, and the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss en 
route to Martinique. In a similar fashion, 90 CAS protégés left aboard the SS 
Winnipeg on 25 April; 36 on the SS Mont-Viso on 9 May; and 70 more aboard 
the SS Wyoming on 17 May. Although the Martinique route was only operative 
until May 1941, this was also the most intense period of emigration of CAS 
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cases.89 
During 1941, leaving Vichy France by land became far more difficult than 
it had been during the summer. From the spring of 1941, Spanish border 
officials demanded French exit visas, in addition to a declaration from the 
Banque de France in order to import any foreign currency into Spain. Stricter 
border controls and frontier surveillance rendered Cerbère-Porbou border 
crossing increasingly dangerous, thus forcing refugees to cross the Pyrenees at 
higher altitudes.  
At this point, Fry’s contacts in the Allied underground became extremely 
handy, as it allowed CAS protégés to use clandestine routes developed by the 
Allied forces since the fall of France. In addition to helping refugee intellectuals 
and artists, Fry’s office also assisted the evacuation of Polish and British 
soldiers who were scattered in France rejoin the Allied forces in Gibraltar. This 
network was jointly organised by the British Embassy in Madrid; the Pole Józef 
Wegrzyn (‘Carlos’), who was in charge of the evacuation of Polish soldiers and 
was stationed in Andorra; and the Italian Randolfo Pacciardi (‘Dino’), who 
rose to Lieutenant Colonel while fighting with the International Brigades and 
went on to become Italy’s Minister of Defence after the war. Fry had been 
enlisted shortly after his arrival to Europe in August 1940 by the British 
Ambassador to Spain, Sir Samuel Hoare, who put $10,000 at his disposal on 
condition that he helped in this delicate rescue network.90  
Varian Fry was not the only American relief worker in the region who had 
ties to the Allied underground. This was particularly common amongst the 
Unitarians, who were unapologetically anti-fascist and, unlike most other relief 
organisations, did not hesitate to contribute to the Allied war effort through 
various underground activities. Indeed, most of USC’s top representatives in 
the region —including Robert and Elizabeth Dexter, Waitsill and Martha 
Sharp, and Noel Field— worked for the American Office of Strategic Services 
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(OSS). Naturally, they also benefited from this relationship. Cooperation 
between the Unitarians and the US secret service was so pervasive that the OSS 
channeled correspondence between the USC offices in Boston and Lisbon via 
diplomatic pouch.91  
Following Varian Fry’s departure to the US in September 1941, Daniel 
Bénédite continued the work of the CAS until June 1942.92 Amongst the 20,000 
refugees who approached Fry’s committee for emigration assistance, 4,000 
persons who fell within the scope of the ERC’s original mission received 
assistance from the CAS —a figure well above the 200 ‘first listers’. The list of 
those assisted represents much of Europe’s intelligentsia at the time: 
philosopher Hannah Arendt, artists Marc Chagall and Marcel Duchamp, 
harpsichordist Wanda Landowska, Spanish painter Remedios Varo, future 
Nobel Prize in Medicine Otto Meyerhof, and authors Leon Feuchtwanger and 
Franz Werfel, amongst many others. In addition to this rescue work, the CAS 
also gave financial assistance to about 600 persons, and assisted the emigration 
through legal or illegal means of about 1,200 civilians —most of whom were 
threatened with extradition by the Gestapo— and about 300 Allied demobilised 
soldiers.93 
Meanwhile in Washington, the Roosevelt administration also worked 
towards facilitating the evacuation of several thousand prominent refugees 
from territories vulnerable to Nazi expansionism, such as unoccupied France, 
Spain, Portugal, and Northern Africa. The organisation charged with this task 
was the President’s Advisory Committee on Political Refugees (PAC), a quasi-
governmental committee established by President Roosevelt’s initiative in the 
spring of 1938 to act as a liaison between US government agencies and private 
relief organisations. James McDonald, formerly the League of Nations’ High 
Commissioner for Refugees Coming for Germany, became  chairman of the 
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PAC. On 24 June 1940, during a meeting between PAC secretary George L. 
Warren and State Department official Robert Pell, it was decided that this new 
agency would assume direct responsibility for eminent political refugees, 
scholars, artists, and other intellectuals —many of whom were Jewish.94 Two 
days later, McDonald and Warren met with State and Justice Department 
officials to simplify the visa procedure for refugees within the mandate of this 
organisation. PAC would accept name lists from private relief organisations 
and carry out a preliminary assessment of the refugee’s eligibility for migration 
to the US. After that, their names were sent to the Justice Department officials 
for clearance. If approved, the State Department would notify US consular 
officials in Europe with instructions to issue visas within the shortest possible 
delay.95 Of the 2,975 names that PAC submitted to US consuls in Europe or the 
State Department itself by the end of 1942, 2,133 visa applicants made it to the 
United States or other havens in the Western Hemisphere.96 
For the governments at war with Nazi Germany, however, the priority 
was to send thousands of demobilised British, Belgian, Czech, Dutch, and 
Polish soldiers through the Iberian Peninsula so that they could join the Allied 
armies via British Gibraltar. A number of these escape networks across the 
Pyrenees were organised independently by each national group. The Belgians 
established the ‘Comet Line’ (Réseau Comète), the Polish operated the ‘Gallia-
Kasanga’ line, and the French had several escape routes of their own: ‘Sainte-
Jeanne’, ‘Brutus’, ‘Ajax’, ‘Franc-Tireur’ and ‘Maurice’. Cooperation across 
national groups, however, as well as with the French and Spanish Maquis, was 
common. The ‘Pat Line’, which was one of the most successful escape routes 
until it was disbanded in the spring of 1943, involved Belgian, Polish, 
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Norwegian, and even German-born secret agents.97 The British MI9 had been 
supporting this rescue network since July 1940, when it deployed secret agent 
Donald Darling (‘Sunday’) to Lisbon with the aim of establishing underground 
routes to help escapers from Dunkirk. From the British Embassy in Madrid, Sir 
Michael Creswell (‘Monday’) was in charge of smuggling evaders into 
Gibraltar, from whence they could sail to the British Isles or, after November 
1942, to Allied-controlled North Africa.98 In addition to the land routes across 
the Pyrenees, many Allied prisoners of war (PoW) and a number of civilian 
refugees managed to reach Spain thanks to clandestine sailings organised by the 
OSS from the summer of 1940. One of the secret agents in charge of these 
sailings was no other than YMCA representative Donald Lowrie, who in his 
second-hat role as OSS agent had been assigned to effect the clandestine 
removal of Czech refugees from unoccupied France. To that end, Lowrie 
mobilise a ‘phony little fleet’ consisting of one submarine, one large trawler, 
and several large fishing boats.99 In Marseille, Lowrie liaised with Vladimír 
Vochoč, Czech consular official in Marseille, who furnished undocumented 
refugees with Czech passports to facilitate their transit through the Peninsula.100 
At the Port of Barcelona, the OSS had three small vessels for the transportation 
of Allied personnel.101 Naturally, there were many refugees who benefitted from 
these routes regardless of whether they wanted to contribute to the Allied war 
effort.  
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Ships to Nowhere 
 
Following the collapse of France in June 1940, the Port of Casablanca 
became laden with some two hundred vessels of all descriptions carrying nearly 
4,000 refugees from Europe. Local authorities and relief organisations were 
stunned and unable to offer a solution. Since the port was saturated, many 
vessels were forced to lie at anchor outside the Casablanca harbour for weeks 
without water and food supply. By the time relief came —sometimes as late as 
mid-August— many passengers and seamen had to be interned in local 
infirmaries and temporary hospitalisation sheds by the dock. Although French 
refugees with sufficient funds were allowed to live in Casablanca, the majority 
of refugees were sent to internment camps in the region, or compelled to live in 
forced residence in towns across French Morocco.102 When it was announced 
that German and Italian military commissioners would supervise the 
implementation of armistice provisions in French Morocco, panic seized the 
refugee community. Many who had already suffered internment in Germany 
and France also spread fear amongst the rest of refugees, who were desperate 
to flee to the Western Hemisphere. In words of Herbert S. Goold, US Consul-
General in Casablanca, consular officials often witnessed ‘failing, hysterical, 
weeping and frantic men and women grovelling on their knees’ and frequent 
suicide threats by rejected visa applicants who had to be subdued to stop them 
from cutting their throat at the consular premises. Overwhelmed with work, the 
reduced staff of the US Consulate-General in Casablanca —comprising just 
four clerks and two officers— granted some two hundred US transit visas on 
average per day.103 
But the main obstacle to migration was the near lack of transatlantic 
transportation. Following the signature of the armistice on 22 June 1940, 
American vessels no longer called at Casablanca or Dakar, and the air service 
between Casablanca and Lisbon was also discontinued. Many refugees 
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stranded in North Africa were forced to sail to the peninsular ports of Vigo, 
Seville, and Lisbon before they could continue their transatlantic journey. 
Despite an uncertain schedule involving long delays and frequent cancellations, 
there was also the occasional Portuguese and Spanish sailing that connected 
Tangier and Casablanca with the Portuguese capital.104 But even this route was 
impaired by the attitude of the Spanish consul in Spanish-occupied Tangier, 
who would deliberately delay the granting of transit visas to refugees with 
passages booked with American Export Lines until they booked their tickets 
with a Spanish shipping company instead.105  
Due to the scarcity of steamship capacity, refugees often roamed the Port 
of Casablanca looking to pay considerable amounts of money for an extra spot 
aboard one of the ships due to sail. Some ship masters took advantage of the 
situation and earned as much as $800 for the chance to sleep in one of the 
lifeboats, or on the deck of grimy coal or oil cargo ships. One of the most 
notorious was the Hungarian Imre Horváth, shipmaster and wireless operator 
of the Panamanian SS Arena, which remained docked at the Port of Casablanca 
for the most part of the summer of 1940. Horváth, who according to US Consul-
General Goold ‘surpassed his confrères in rapacity and unreliability’, would 
discard a deal with a refugee if he thought he could make more money from 
another. When defrauded refugees claimed a reimbursement, the ship master 
would threaten to denounce them to the Gestapo, thus forcing destitute 
refugees to drop their charges. In some occasions, Horváth even demanded 
sexual favours from female refugees in addition to his exorbitant fees.106 
The transportation situation improved moderately after December 1940, 
when Vichy authorised regular sailings between Marseille and the French 
colony of Martinique, via Oran, Algiers, and Casablanca. Once in the 
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Caribbean island, refugees could easily reach New York and Mexico.107 
Although more uncertain and complicated than direct sailings to the North 
American continent, the route through Martinique was cheaper and, most 
importantly, waived refugees from the need to obtain transit visas for Portugal 
and Spain, as well as French exit visas —given that Martinique was considered 
French territory. Furthermore, since Portugal had banned the transit of refugees 
born in Russia and the Baltic states, and Spain did not grant transit visas to men 
of military age, this route represented their only chance to migrate from non-
occupied France to the Americas. Sailings took place regularly aboard several 
French vessels such as the SS Capitaine Paul-Lemerle, SS Winnipeg, SS Wyoming, 
and SS Mont Viso, and although priority was given to colonial officials and 
demobilised men, several thousand refugees stranded in non-occupied France 
and French North Africa managed to reach the Americas in this way.108  
Unfortunately, the route via Martinique came to an abrupt end on 26 May 
1941. On that day, a Dutch torpedo boat serving with the British Ministry of 
War Transport (MoWT) seized the SS Winnipeg and its cargo of 300 German 
Jewish refugees shortly before its arrival to Martinique.109 Naturally, the Vichy 
government was outraged by the capture and appropriation of the French vessel 
by the British, and ordered the immediate termination of the Martinique 
sailings. This had terrible ramifications for the nearly 700 refugees who had set 
sail earlier in May aboard the SS Mont Viso and the SS Wyoming bound for the 
Western Hemisphere. These were mostly Jewish refugees cared for by JDC and 
the HICEM, and a smaller number of political refugees jointly dependent on 
Fry’s CAS and the USC. With the exception of French nationals, who needed 
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no special permits to set foot in French Morocco, the majority were forced to 
remain aboard their ships for several weeks as these laid anchor at the Port of 
Casablanca.  Lisa Oppenheimer, who had embarked the SS Mont Viso in Algiers 
on 12 May, noted the terrible food and hygienic conditions aboard the vessel: 
‘Gurs was a sanatorium compared with it!’.110 By mid-June, French authorities 
resolved to intern them until they could arrange their emigration. Passengers 
older than seventy and with children below the age of fifteen —at least 155 
persons— were interned at Sidi-el-Ayachi.111 The rest of refugees —no less than 
240 persons— were transferred to an internment camp administered by the 
French Foreign Legion at Oued Zem, situated 160 km inland from Casablanca. 
Oued Zem consisted of several wooden huts covered with corrugate iron roofs 
and surrounded with barbed wire, four open-air latrines, and a few water taps 
that ran an uncertain number of hours per day. Adding to their dreadful 
condition, refugees at Oued Zem also endured extremely high summer 
temperatures and military discipline, and had no access to medicines or soap.112 
Following French orders, refugees at Sidi-el-Ayachi and Oued Zem would only 
be liberated once in possession of new transatlantic passages, valid destination 
and transit visas, and a ‘certificate d’hebergement’ to guarantee that they had 
resources to find lodging in the Casablanca area and would not become a public 
charge. Despite numerous complaints to the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique 
and the Société Générale de Transport Maritimes, the 3,500 francs they paid for 
their passages to Martinique was never reimbursed.113 
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The appropriation of the SS Winnipeg, however, was actually the second 
French ship carrying refugees that was captured by the British, and therefore 
just the second half to the story. The first incident had taken place on 18 January 
1941, when the British auxiliary cruiser HMS Asturias captured the French SS 
Mendoza 60 miles east of the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo, and placed it 
at the service of the British MoWT.114 In this occasion, the collateral victims 
were the 567 refugees aboard the SS Alsina, a French ship belonging to the 
Société Générale de Transport Maritimes which had left Marseille bound for Rio de 
Janeiro on 15 January, two months behind schedule. On 23 January, French 
authorities aborted the voyage of the Alsina and ordered it to put in at Dakar 
until the British granted the ship a Navicert to guarantee its safe sailing across 
the Atlantic. The British eluded any responsibility for the detention of this 
group of refugees at Dakar, and remained adamant in their decision not to grant 
Navicerts to any French vessels sailing to the Western Hemisphere.115 
Washington, on the other hand, stayed neutral in this dispute for fear of 
jeopardising US relations with the Pétain Government, and despite the views 
of Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long, who fiercely advocated the 
seizure of foreign-flag ships by the US government to make up for the heavy 
material loses of the British Royal Navy.116  
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In parallel to these fruitless negotiations between Vichy and London, the 
refugees aboard the SS Alsina were sequestered aboard this ‘sailing prison’ for 
more than five months, as the ship laid at anchor off the Port of Dakar. The 
Alsina reached the capital of French West Africa on 27 January carrying 567 
refugees from Europe: mainly German, Belgian, Polish, and Czech Jewish 
refugees, as well as 195 Spanish republican refugees.117 As told by Ilza Czapska, 
a Jewish refugee from Silesia who travelled with her three children, passengers 
were told that since their tickets only covered food and accommodation for the 
three-week voyage to Brazil they would have to pay the additional room and 
board fees. This created great agitation amongst the money-deprived refugees 
onboard, who desperately tried to find alternative and implausible ways to 
avoid ship confinement, such as reaching the nearest English colony on 
sailboats, or obtaining visas for Liberia. With the exception of French nationals, 
who were allowed to roam freely and buy goods in the city, passengers were 
only allowed ashore once a week, and even then could not go beyond the 
harbour to buy any foodstuffs. As time went on, passengers aboard the Alsina 
began to find ways to pass the time, and organised vocational workshops, 
language study groups, an ‘international’ chess tournament, and a show staged 
by Polish cinema director Zbigniew Ziembiński. Ilza’s five-year-old son, Janek, 
became so accustomed to life aboard the Alsina, that thereafter he would say 
‘going ashore’ when going to town, and would refer to the top stories of a 
building as ‘the upper deck’.118 
 The British appropriation of the SS Winnipeg on 26 May further 
convinced French authorities that the British were not willing to tolerate the 
traffic of French refugee ships across the Atlantic. Thus, for as long as the 
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British refused to grant Navicerts to French sailings, no French vessel would 
carry refugees to the Western Hemisphere. Instead, Vichy declared that it was 
the responsibility of the governments of the countries to which the refugees 
were heading —i.e. Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and the US— to charter a 
neutral ship that would take the passengers of the  SS Alsina, the SS Mont Viso, 
and the SS Wyoming to their final destination.119  
On 3 June, the Alsina was allowed to proceed to Casablanca after five long 
months waiting at the Port of Dakar. Upon arrival, the passengers of the Alsina 
faced a similar fate to the refugees aboard the SS Mont Viso, and the SS 
Wyoming. Refugees older than seventy and with children below fifteen were 
sent to the camp at Sidi-El-Ayachi, whereas the rest were taken to the camp in 
Kasbah Tadla, 50 km far from Oued Zem, at the base of the Atlas Mountains. 
Over the summer, the HICEM representative in Casablanca, Raphael Spanien, 
visited these camps to regularise the refugees’ visa situation, while the JDC 
arranged transportation to call at Casablanca. At the beginning of August 1941, 
two groups of 190 and 158 refugees formerly aboard the SS Mont Viso and SS 
Wyoming who were in possession of US visas sailed to New York aboard the 
SS Guinée and the SS Nyassa, of the Portuguese Companhia Colonial de Navegação. 
These sailings were relatively uneventful, and caused great joy amongst the 
North African refugee community, as these were the first direct sailings 
between Casablanca and New York in months.120  
But for the refugees with visas for South American countries the odyssey 
was not yet finished. Excluding Spanish refugees, who sailed at a later date, the 
majority of Jewish refugees formerly aboard the SS Alsina left Casablanca on 
two Spanish ships owned by the Sevilla-based shipping company Ybarra Line: 
the SS Cabo de Buena Esperanza, and the SS Cabo de Hornos. The first group of 
about 40 Jewish refugees set sail early in October 1941 aboard the SS Cabo de 
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Buena Esperanza, furnished with Brazilian visas that had been reissued by the 
Brazilian Consul in Casablanca upon orders from the Brazilian Ambassador in 
Vichy.121 Unfortunately, these visas were not honoured by immigration officials 
upon arrival at Rio de Janeiro on 16 October, and refugees were not allowed to 
disembark. The ship continued to Buenos Aires, where the passengers of the 
Cabo de Buena Esperanza were exceptionally allowed to stay for three months in 
the Hotel de Inmigrantes —Buenos Aires’ Ellis Island equivalent— while they 
found visas for another country. But a week later, the second group of 50 Jewish 
refugees reached Buenos Aires aboard the SS Cabo de Hornos, and Argentina’s 
Acting President Ramón Castillo changed his previous ruling and ordered the 
deportation of both groups of refugees, who were to sail back to Europe on the 
same ship. The captain of the SS Cabo de Hornos, Jose Lanz Mayro, declared he 
was unsure whether the Jewish refugees aboard his ship would ever reach 
Spain: ‘since the majority prefer suicide to the somber future awaiting them’.122 
The Paraguayan government offered to grant visas to all 85 of them, but 
Argentinian authorities refused to grant them transit visas for fear that the 
refugees would cross back into Argentina illegally shortly after arriving to 
Paraguay. The opposition of the Argentinian government went so far as to have 
the police prevent the Paraguayan Consul from boarding the Cabo de Hornos to 
stamp the visas on the refugees’ passports. The AFSC tried to find asylum for 
them in the British colony of Trinidad, but without success.123 At the very last 
instant, on 18 November 1941, the Dutch Government-in-Exile agreed to let 
the 85 Jewish refugees stay in the Dutch island of Curaçao for three months on 
condition that the JDC would cover all costs and arrange their migration to a 
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third country.124 
The last group of Alsina refugees to leave North Africa —mostly Spanish 
republican refugees and 17 German Jews— sailed from Casablanca on 29 
October aboard the SS Quanza, bound for Veracruz (Mexico) and Habana 
(Cuba), after nine degrading months of ordeal.125 Among them was Niceto 
Alcalá-Zamora, formerly President of the Spanish Republic, now sailing into 
exile in third class: ‘we felt like living debris of a sunken world; like loose 
threads of a ragged social fabric; like shipwrecked survivors of the Old continent 
floating adrift towards the New’.126 
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Iberian Transit 
 
With the outbreak of war in September 1939, an increasing number of 
refugees sought to reach Portugal in a frantic attempt to leave Europe for the 
Americas or British Palestine. This caused much concern within the Portuguese 
secret police, which had emerged as the main —if not the only— arbiter of 
Portuguese immigration policy. The head of the PVDE, Captain Agostinho 
Lourenço, urged Salazar to act in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and tighten Portugal’s visa policy even further.1 Salazar agreed to his proposal. 
On 11 November 1939, the MNE forbid Portuguese consuls abroad from 
issuing transit visas to a long list of persons without previous authorisation from 
the MNE: stateless persons; Nansen-passport holders; Russians (i.e. Soviet 
citizens); persons who ‘do not explain their motives for going to Portugal to the 
consul’s satisfaction’; persons whose passports contain ‘marking of some kind’ 
(i.e. J-stamped passports); persons unable to return freely to their country of 
origin; persons not in possession of visas for a country overseas; persons not in 
possession of plane or boat tickets to a third country; persons without sufficient 
means of support; and Jews who had been expelled from their countries of 
origin or citizenship.2  
Hence, this decree significantly restricted the entry into Portugal of two 
main refugee demographics. The first concerns refugees from the Soviet Union, 
whose entry into Portugal was practically impossible due to the regime’s fears 
of communist infiltrations. Following the Soviet invasion of the Baltic states in 
June 1940, this same anti-communist paranoia led the Salazarist regime to cut 
relations with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and stop recognising the 
passports of their citizens.3 The second refugee group most affected by this new 
decree were the Jews from the Reich, and especially thousands of Polish Jewish 
refugees whose citizenship had been rescinded by the Polish government for 
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having ‘lost the connection with the Polish State’.4 Whilst it is true that 
Salazar’s new visa policy was introduced at the instigation of the PVDE, it is 
no longer possible to excuse Portugal’s visa restrictions as mainly driven by 
foreign and domestic policy considerations: they were clearly tainted with 
antisemitic prejudice.5  
Unlike Portugal, Franco’s Spain was a country devastated by civil war 
and aligned with Nazi Germany, which did not represent an attractive travel 
option for refugees fleeing Nazism. For good measure, Franco’s decree of 11 
May 1939 had banned entry to Jews unless they had actively supported the 
Nationalist cause during the Spanish Civil War. This, of course, was difficult 
to prove, and in any case was not available to most Jewish refugees from 
Europe. On 1 May 1940, the Franco government issued a second decree that 
centralised all transit and migration decisions under the Spanish police. Prior 
to the issuance of transit visas to foreigners, Spanish consuls would have to 
obtain authorisation from the Dirección General de Seguridad (DGS) in Madrid 
—as was the case in Portugal. If transients were in possession of Portuguese 
transit visas, however, Spanish consuls were still allowed to issue transit visas 
for Spain without prior authorisation from the DGS.6  
This exception is problematic, as it seems to contradict the previous decree 
barring Jews from entering Spain. Whilst the decree of May 1940 builds upon 
the one of May 1939, it also seems to imply that Jews with Portuguese transit 
visas would be allowed to transit through Spain, thus contravening the older 
decree. It appears, however, that this was not a fortuitous loophole in Spanish 
law, but a deliberate way to render Spanish immigration policy ambiguous 
enough to allow for a lax interpretation of the law by the Spanish executive as 
it saw fitting. In fact, if there is one single feature that defines Spanish policy 
regarding the transit of Jews during this period is that of inconsistency.  
The onset of Hitler’s Western European campaign in May 1940 led to a 
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new wave of refugees seeking to leave Europe through the Iberian Peninsula. 
After the fall of France, transatlantic points of departure in Western Europe 
narrowed to Lisbon, the ports of Spain, and Marseille, and even then sailings 
from these ports were rare during the summer. On 27 June, the Wehrmacht 
reached the Franco-Spanish border on the Atlantic end of the Pyrenees, which 
separated Hendaye, in occupied France, from the Spanish town of Irún. With 
the closing of the Hendaye-Irún frontier, the influx of refugees shifted to the 
Mediterranean end of the Franco-Spanish border, which separated Cerbère, in 
Vichy France, from Portbou, in Spain. The Franco government reacted by 
reinforcing frontier surveillance to deter clandestine crossings across the 
Pyrenees —not just from refugees, but also from Allied spies and other 
unwelcome visitors.7 In view of the restrictive immigration polices of Spain and 
Portugal, how is it possible that several thousand Jews reached Portugal in the 
summer of 1940?8 
The majority of Jewish refugees who succeeded in crossing the Pyrenees 
border in the aftermath of the German occupation of France managed to do so 
thanks to transit visas issued by Aristides de Sousa Mendes, the Portuguese 
Consul-General in Bordeaux.9 Sousa Mendes had been transferred from the 
Consulate-General in Antwerp to the one in Bordeaux in 1938. The consul 
issued his first transit visas to Jews and stateless persons towards the end of 
1939, disobeying Salazar’s decree of 11 November 1939 which stipulated that 
visa applications had to be approved by the MNE in Lisbon. Although he was 
reprimanded on several occasions, Sousa Mendes continued to defy his 
superiors. Thus, between January and June 1940, Sousa Mendes issued 2,862 
visas to refugees irrespective of their nationality or political status, without 
consent from the MNE. Of that figure, no less than 1,575 were granted between 
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11 and 22 June. To that figure we should add an unkownn number of visas 
issued by Sousa Mendes during his short stays at the Portuguese consular 
missions in Bayonne and Hendaye, after the diplomat had been dismissed from 
his post in Bordeaux for breach of discipline. Alerted by the stream of refugees 
holding Portuguese consular visas, the Spanish military commander at the Irún 
border post warned the Portuguese Embassy in Madrid that unless they stopped 
that imprudent behaviour, Spain would feel obliged to stop recognising 
Portuguese visas altogether. The Portuguese ambassador in Madrid, Pedro 
Teótonio Pereira, reassured the Spanish government that all visas issued by the 
Sousa Mendes in Bordeaux had been rescinded.10  
Despite the Portuguese ambassador’s assurances, refugees continued to 
arrive to Spain in great numbers.  On 24 June, Spanish authorities decided to 
close the border leaving several thousand Jewish refugees in possession of 
Portuguese visas stranded in French territory. The Portuguese, in turn, reacted 
by closing their own border with Spain. The head of the PVDE, Captain 
Agostinho Lourenço, travelled to the Spanish-Portuguese border post in Vilar 
Formoso to try and return those refugees who had already made their way into 
Spain thanks to Sousa Mendes’ irregular practices, but Spanish authorities 
refused to consent to this insisting that Portuguese visas should be observed. In 
view of Spanish objections, the Portuguese had no choice but to allow refugees 
with visas for a country overseas to continue their way to Lisbon. After much 
insistence from the Lisbon Jewish Community, refugees not in possession of 
destination visas were confined to forced residence in several Portuguese 
towns.11 Although refugees in forced residence had every one of their steps 
surveilled by the PVDE, refugees in these designated areas fared far better than 
those of internment in southern France. Crucially, by agreeing to place Jewish 
refugees under direct police surveillance, both the Salazarist regime and the 
PVDE felt more in control of the refugee situation in Portugal, and less anxious 
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about the potential risks of having their capital overcrowded with foreigners. 
After enduring a disciplinary process, Sousa Mendes was dismissed from 
the diplomatic corps and ostracised by the Salazarist regime. Ironically, the 
Portuguese government did capitalise on the diplomat’s humanitarian 
achievements while Salazar was still in power. In 1966, Aristides de Sousa 
Mendes was the first diplomat to be recognised as Righteous Among the 
Nations by Yad Vashem, initiating a long path towards the rehabilitation of his 
memory that only cultivated after Portugal’s transition to democracy.12  
Whilst he was the most prolific in terms of the number of visas issued to 
Jews, Sousa Mendes was not the only Portuguese consul who disobeyed orders 
from Lisbon to help Jews in distress. As early as April 1934, the MNE had 
already confronted the Portuguese honorary consul in Athens, B. Lencastre e 
Meneses, for issuing over two hundred Portuguese passports to Jews in 
exchange for considerable amounts of money. The honorary consul did so 
using a legal disposition from 1913, by which the First Portuguese Republic 
(1910-26) had offered Portuguese nationality to Sephardic Jews in diaspora if 
they could prove their Portuguese roots. On 7 May 1934, the MNE dismissed 
Lencastre e Meneses and revoked the capacity of its honorary consuls to issue 
Portuguese passports altogether.13  
A similar case is that of the Portuguese Ambassador in Berlin, Alberto da 
Veiga Simões. In the aftermath of Kristallnacht, Veiga Simões was reprimanded 
for granting visas to Jews against orders from the Portuguese police. During the 
spring of 1939, moreover, Veiga Simões endorsed the irregular practices of the 
Portuguese Consul-General in Hamburg, who negotiated the resettlement of 
German Jews with the civilian governors of Azores and Madeira without the 
approval from the PVDE and the MNE. With the arrival of the German army 
to the Pyrenees in June 1940, Veiga Simões’ infractions became intolerable 
from a diplomatic point of view, and Lisbon replaced its ambassador to Berlin 
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Diplomático, 2000), also available in English. 
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with the pro-Nazi Count of Tovar.14 Unlike these diplomats, who were 
sanctioned by the Salazarist government, there were others who challenged the 
regime’s policies towards Jews without contravening the law. On 31 December 
1940, José Augusto de Magalhães chose to resign from his duties as Portuguese 
consul in Marseille to protest against a newly introduced measure by which 
consuls were no longer authorised to issue Portuguese transit visas without 
prior authorisation from the PVDE.15  
It is largely due to the strong interdependence between the various travel 
documents and visas needed to escape Vichy France through the Iberian 
Peninsula and Portugal that this was such an exhausting process for refugees. 
In order to achieve this, refugees had to obtain a a visa for a country overseas, 
a French exit visa, and transit visas for Spain and Portugal. Portuguese transit 
visas, moreover, were only granted to refugees in possession of destination visas 
to an overseas country, as well as a solid booking with air or maritime 
transportation. Adding to this bureaucratic labyrinth, the issuance of Spanish 
transit visas was also contingent on the possession of visas for Portugal, thus 
creating innumerable complications for the poor refugees. And this is assuming 
that these persons found themselves in unoccupied France. For those who were 
still in Nazi-occupied territory, the list of travel documents needed to migrate 
also included a certificate from the local police formally cancelling their 
registration as residents; one from the Ministry of Finance attesting payment of 
all emigration fines and taxes; an itemised customs declaration, and, in the case 
of Austrian Jews, an exit visa issued by German authorities.  
An additional complication was the fact that the validity period for most 
destination visas —usually four months— was often not enough time to arrange 
all other travel documents and reach the port of embarkation on time.16 If the 
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destination visa expired before the refugee managed to set sail, the ship booking 
was automatically void, and the whole process had to begin anew. Erich Maria 
Remarque called it ‘the lunacy of bureaucracy gone wild’:  
‘No residence permit, but no exit permit either. They won’t let you stay and they 
won’t let you leave. Finally you get your exit permit, but your Spanish transit visa 
has meanwhile expired. You can’t get another unless you have a Portuguese visa, 
and that’s contingent on something else again. Which means that you have to 
start all over again —your days are spent waiting outside the consulates, those 
vestibules of heaven and hell! A vicious circle of madness!’.17 
 
At the beginning of October 1940, the Franco regime decided to tighten 
its visa policy even further, possibly in preparation for the visit to Spain of 
Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who was due to arrive on 23 October 1940. 
Pressured by the DGS, which considered Spain’s border policy to be too 
permissive, the MAE issue a new decree on 8 October 1940 with the clear aim 
of increasing red-tape impediments to the issuance of transit visas. By virtue of 
these new measures, transit visa applicants had to send to Madrid the following 
list of documents: two financial affidavits signed by two Spanish citizens; 
details of their destination visas and all the transit visas necessary to reach the 
country of destination; and the name of the ship, the port, and the date when 
they intended to sail. As stated in the order, the government would issue a 
response ‘within three to six weeks’, and that is assuming that the application 
was made by telegraph rather than by regular mail, which would have led to 
even greater delays.18 The HICEM office in Lisbon noticed how this new decree 
could extend the waiting time for a Spanish transit visa for even months.19 
Varian Fry also noticed a radical change in Spanish transit visa policy after 
October 1940: Spanish authorities would no longer recognise the American 
‘affidavits in lieu of passport’, which the most common travel documents for 
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political refugees, and would refuse transit visas to Germans, Austrians, and 
Poles.20 James McDonald interpreted this decree as a way to effectively refuse 
transit visas to Jewish refugees in France without the need to implement any 
law to that end.21 Additionally, the same decree of 8 October also barred entry 
into Spain to men of military age —18 to 40— if they were nationals of a 
country at war with Nazi Germany, including French nationals, and holders of 
Palestinian certificates. This was clearly a concession to the Axis powers, as it 
prevented these young men from joining the Allied war effort against Germany. 
Cooperation on this respect, however, was not restricted to Franco’s Spain. 
From late 1940, Portugal also began to refuse entry to men in that same 
category.22 It is not clear whether these measures were the result of Madrid’s 
and Lisbon’s attempts to appease Nazi Germany, at a time when the Germans 
were still planning an invasion of the Iberian Peninsula to drive the British out 
of the Western Mediterranean.23 What is clear is that these measures 
compromised both Spain’s and Portugal’s duties as neutrals as stipulated in the 
1907 Hague Convention.  
In addition to those who crossed the Franco-Spanish border on foot, there 
was a number of Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany who reached Lisbon in 
sealed trains. It was after the German invasion of Luxembourg on 10 May 1940 
that the first sealed trains began to arrive to the Portuguese border. Without 
requesting Portugal’s approval, German occupation authorities decided to 
expel the approximately 2,500 Jews who lived in the Grand Duchy —of whom 
500 were foreigners— by sending them directly to the Spanish-Portuguese 
border. These so-called Zwangstransporte (‘forced transports’), which carried 
between 150 and 300 persons each, were escorted by the Gestapo and only 
opened upon arrival to the Spanish-Portuguese border. Naturally, when these 
train convoys began to arrive at the Portuguese border post at Vilar Formoso, 
																																																																		
20 The New Leader (25 April 1942). Cited in Tartakower and Grossman, 156-7. 
21 McDonald to Sulzberger (10 October 1940); New York Times Company Archive, Sulzberger 
Autograph File. Cited in Breitman, et al., Refugees and Rescue, 220. 
22 See letters from the Germany Embassy in Lisbon to the MNE (9 November 1940 and 30 June 
1941); AMNE, 2P-A43-M83. Cited in Pimentel, Judeus em Portugal, 200-1. 
23 Norman J. W. Goda, ‘The Riddle of  the Rock: A Reassessment of  German Motives for the 
Capture of  Gibraltar in the Second World War’, Journal of  Contemporary History 28:2 (April 
1933): 297-314. 
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Portuguese authorities refused them admission claiming that Portugal was a 
sovereign country that would not follow orders dictated by foreign authorities. 
The fact that most of these refugees were in possession of fraudulent Cuban 
visas, did not help either.  
Owing to pressure from Lisbon’s Jewish community and the president of 
the Luxembourg Jewish community, Albert Nussbaum, some two hundred 
Luxembourgish Jews were allowed to continue to Lisbon and to arrange their 
emigration to the Americas. But the majority of convoys did not encounter the 
same fortune and were sent back to Bayonne in occupied France, where most 
of them faced internment unless they were able to organise their prompt 
migration overseas. Around fifty of them managed to obtain visas for 
Dominican Republic, others managed to survive in clandestinity, while the 
least fortunate were murdered at the Nazi death camps after years of 
internment.24 These forced transports should not be mistaken for the sealed 
transports in which Jews from Greater Germany could ‘voluntarily’ migrate if 
they were in possession of visas to a country overseas. Starting in January 1941, 
this Berlin-Lisbon line transported Jewish refugees from Germany, Austria, 
and the Bohemia-Moravia Protectorate on a regular basis. Since train coaches 
were only opened upon arrival to the Portuguese capital this method of 
transportation waived the need for French and Spanish travel documents, and 
thus simplified the evacuation process.25 Unfortunately, sealed trains 
connecting Berlin with Lisbon were discontinued in October 1941, when Nazi 
authorities forbade the exit of Jews from the Reich and from Nazi-occupied 
areas in preparation for the ‘Final Solution’. 
It is no easy task to estimate the number of Jewish refugees who transited 
through the Iberian Peninsula between 1940 and 1942. The figures we have are 
asymmetric in various ways, and are exclusive of clandestine migration. The 
PVDE, who was in charge of policing Portuguese borders, stated that 43,540 
foreigners entered Portugal during the year 1940 alone.26 The AFSC 
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year 1940 left a positive difference of  6,961 foreigners in Portugal. See PVDE, ‘Movimento 
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representative in Lisbon, Philip B. Conard, estimated that a total of 85,000 
refugees passed through the Iberian Peninsula for the period 1940 to 1942.27 But 
how many of these refugees were Jews? According to JDC, 12,718 Jews sailed 
from the Iberian Peninsula during this period thanks to the joint efforts of 
HICEM and JDC, costing these two organisations $4,951,524. From that 
figure, 8,150 persons left in 1941 (on 105 different sailings) and 4,568 persons 
in 1942 (on 18 sailings).28 However, this figure does not include the number of 
Jewish persons who sailed during 1940; those who migrated on their own or 
thanks to the efforts of other relief organisations; those who were not able to 
leave the Peninsula by 1942; and those —males of military age— who left Spain 
in convoys organised by the British Embassy via Gibraltar. There are, of course, 
much higher estimates, but these two are the most authoritative. Haim Avni 
estimates the total number of Jews who reached Spain and Portugal during the 
first half of the war at 30,000.29 Bauer gives the higher figure of 40,000.30 My 
estimate is that between 15,000 and 20,000 persons left Europe through the 
Iberian Peninsula fleeing Nazi anti-semitic persecution between the outbreak 
of war through the end of 1942. 
 
  
																																																																		
pelas Fronteiras’ [31 December 1940]; Arquivo Naçional da Torre do Tombo (ANTT), Archivo 
Oliveira Salazar (AOS), CO-IN-8C, Folder 5. 
27 To be more precise, 25,000 during 1940; 44,000 during 1941; and 16,000 during 1942. Philip 
B. Conard, ‘Human Tragedy of  the European Refugee’, report-speech presented to the AFSC 
Committee and at other public meetings during February-April 1943; AFSC, Box 6, Folder 
‘Portugal: Letters from, #456-599 (2 January-26 August 1943)’. 
28 Of  the total figure, 7,562 went to the USA (59.5%); 2,569 to Cuba (20.2%); 997 to Mexico 
(7.8%); and 478 to Argentina (3.75%). See ‘Combined Summary of  Sailings arranged by JDC 
during 1940-1942’ (7 September 1944); JDC, Reel 80, Folder 369. 
29 Avni, Spain, the Jews, and Franco, 91. Avni bases his estimate of  30,000 on the internal reports 
of  HICEM, which, according to the Israeli historian, give the figure of  10,500 Jews passing 
through Portugal with HICEM’s support between the fall of  France and the end of  1942. I have 
not been able to replicate this figure based on the same HICEM reports. My understanding is 
that HICEM assisted the migration of  no less than 12,801 Jews during that period, but this 
figure includes those who sailed from the Port of  Marseille (and therefore is inconclusive as to 
peninsular sailings): 1,538 migrated between July and December 1940; 2,856 between January 
and July 1941; 3,528 between July and December 1941; and 4,879 during the year 1942. See 
‘Report on the HIAS-ICA Activities in Lisbon’ (18 December 1941); and ‘Statistiques pour 
l’Année 1942’ (undated); both in YIVO, RG-245.4, Series I, File XII, MKM-15.30. 
30 Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust, 48-9. 
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The Transportation Crisis 
 
If there is one recurring theme that permeates the experience of Jewish 
refugees seeking to migrate beyond the Iberian Peninsula, it is the scarcity and 
unreliability of transatlantic transportation. Although demand for shipping 
accommodation skyrocketed following the outbreak of war, the transportation 
crisis became most acute following the fall of France in June 1940. As their 
respective countries were drawn into the conflict, Dutch, Italian, and later 
Greek shipping companies discontinued their sailings to Lisbon. During the 
summer, most regular sailings from the Peninsula dwindled in frequency or 
were interrupted altogether. During the chaotic summer of 1940, barely 500 
Jews managed to leave Lisbon on four different sailings.31 The largest US-flag 
shipping company, the American Export Lines (AEL), was also the only one 
sailing to the Iberian Peninsula. It operated four passenger-freighters between 
Lisbon and New York: the SS Exeter, the SS Excalibur, the SS Excambion, and 
the SS Siboney. Due to the high number of US citizens going back to their home 
country, however, AEL sailings were fully booked for months and did not 
represent a viable solution for most Jews seeking to leave Europe.32 
The transportation situation improved somewhat at the beginning of 
1941, when Portuguese and Spanish sailings began taking refugees to the 
Western Hemisphere, and despite uncertain schedules, long delays, and 
frequent cancellations. From Lisbon, there were Portuguese shipping 
companies that sailed to Canada, Mexico, and the USA. One was the 
Companhia Colonial de Navegação (CCN), which operated the SS Carvalho Araújo, 
the SS Colonial, the SS Guinée, the SS Mouzinho, and the SS Serpa Pinto. The 
other one was the Companhia Nacional de Navegação (CNN), which ran the SS 
																																																																		
31 This figure is based on those who sailed with HICEM, and does not include those who 
migrated on their own. Unfortunately, accurate figures for this period are lacking due to the 
chaos that ensued the fall of  Western Europe. ‘Report on the HIAS-ICA Activities in Lisbon 
(18 December 1941); YIVO, RG-245.4, Series I, File XII, MKM-15.30, A-2. 
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Angola, the SS Quanza, the SS Lourenço Marques, the SS Nyassa, and the SS São 
Tomé. From Spain, there were three shipping companies navigating to North 
and South America. The Compañía Trasatlántica Española (CTE) connected the 
port of Bilbao with the US and Cuba, via Vigo and Lisbon, aboard the SS 
Magallanes and the SS Marqués de Comillas. The Barcelona-based Compañía 
Transmediterránea (CTM) sailed from the Catalan capital to the Americas, via 
Tangier and Lisbon, on the SS Ciudad de Sevilla, the SS Villa de Madrid, and the 
SS Isla de Tenerife. Finally, the Sevilla-based Ybarra Line (YL) operated two ships 
that sailed to South America, calling at Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo, and 
Buenos Aires. One was the SS Cabo de Hornos, which the Atlantic coast of the 
Peninsula, from Bilbao, via Vigo, Lisbon, and Cádiz, before going into high 
seas. Her sister ship, the SS Cabo de Buena Esperanza, followed the Spanish 
Mediterranean coast, from Barcelona, via Cádiz, and Lisbon, before crossing 
the Atlantic.33 
Although most of the refugee traffic out of the Iberian Peninsula 
concerned maritime transport, there were also a very limited number of air 
routes available to the wealthiest refugees. In 1937, Deutsche Lufthansa and Pan 
American Airways (PAN AM) were the first airlines to offer regular air 
transportation between Lisbon and New York. In April 1938, the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) began flying from the Portuguese capital 
to London. From 1939, PAN AM also connected Lisbon and New York on 
long-range amphibious airliners. Following the fall of France, however, the 
much coveted ‘clippers’ were practically unavailable even for US citizens, as 
most aircraft space was reserved for US government personnel and mail. 
During 1941 and 1942, PAN AM increased the frequency of these flights from 
three to seven days a week, but even then, few were the refugees who could 
afford its exorbitant prices —anywhere between $525 and $1,000.34 The 
Portuguese company Aero Portuguesa offered an air service connecting Lisbon 
with Casablanca, but this route was discontinued after the fall of France. For 
																																																																		
33 See steamline schedule and information in YIVO, RG-245.5, MKM-17.13, France II-205. 
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67.007M, Series IX, Box 70, Folder 46. US Embassy in Lisbon, ‘Information for Travellers’ (21 
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refugees in possession of tickets for one of the French ships calling at 
Casablanca, there was still a weekly airplane route between Lisbon and 
Tangier, but this service was equally hard to book as the plane had capacity for 
just eight passengers at a time. Some refugees managed to cross the Strait of 
Gibraltar on one of the a ferry steamers that connected the Spanish Port of 
Algeciras with Tangiers, from where they were able to continue to 
Casablanca.35  
Due to the scarcity of transportation facilities the Lisbon steamship 
market became full of speculators, and ship passage prices rose well above the 
official rates set by shipping companies. During the fall of 1940, there were 
refugees who paid as much as $192 for a third-class ship passage from Lisbon 
to New York. By February 1941, a similar booking could easily reach $350.36 
Chartering a whole boat was the best way to avoid speculation, but the Jewish 
agencies in Lisbon were not in a position to take such financial responsibility 
at a time when boats rarely sailed on schedule, which caused many refugees’ 
visas to expire. An exception was done on 10 July 1941, when the JDC decided 
to do a trial and charter the SS Mouzinho, which took nearly 800 Jewish refugees 
to the USA.37 HERE 
After much insistence, JDC and HICEM managed to persuade the 
Portuguese shipping companies that it was in their best interest to discourage 
speculation. This allowed the Jewish organisations to reserve several hundred 
places for each sailing to the Americas. Initially, Jewish organisations had to 
pay the total amount of the booking upfront. If the refugee could not sail for 
whatever reason (i.e visas expiring, impossibility to release them from prison) 
one half of the booking cost would be returned to them by the shipping agency, 
while the other half would be lost unless the Jewish organisations could find 
somebody else to take their spot. From early 1943, this arrangement was 
simplified in a way that benefited both parties: only half of the ship booking 
																																																																		
35 H. Earle Russell, US Consul-General in Casablanca, to Cordell Hull, US Secretary of  State, 
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36 Schaefer, Portugal e os Refugiados Judeus, 193. 
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would have to be paid in advance, an amount that would then be transferred to 
a different passenger on a different sailing if the refugee was unable to sail.38 
Another obstacle to migration was the dire financial situation of Jewish 
refugees fleeing the Reich. In 1933, German Jews could take no more than 200 
RM ($47) in foreign currency upon leaving Germany; by 1937 this amount had 
been reduced to 10 RM ($4).39 The JDC had already worked out a solution to 
this problem in the weeks following the outbreak of war in September 1939, 
when the JDC partnered with Amsterdam’s Committee for Jewish Refugees 
(Comité voor Joodsche Vluchtelingen) to provide financial assistance to Jewish 
émigrés from Greater Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, and 
Luxembourg. By 1 January 1940, this service, which became known as Service 
de Transmigration, was transferred to Brussels. Following the German invasion 
of Belgium on 10 May, this office was closed, its records were lost, and all 
emigration activities suspended for several weeks. Fortunately, the staff 
managed to transfer the remaining funds to the JDC in the US. On 21 June 
1940, the ‘Transmigration Bureau’ resumed its activities from its new office in 
New York.40 The purpose of the Transmigration Bureau was twofold: to 
administer cash deposits made by friends and relatives to cover the fares and 
travel expenses of Jewish refugees in Europe; and to put these funds at the 
disposal of the central Jewish committees in Berlin, Prague, Bratislava, and 
Danzig for that purpose.41 This was done by means of an international 
clearance arrangement. Refugees in Greater Germany deposited their 
Reichsmarks with the closest central Jewish organisation, and JDC met this 
amount with the funds made available to the Transmigration Bureau in New 
York.42  
The work of the Transmigration Bureau boomed in early 1941 
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consequence of the ‘unblocking’ of immigration quotas announced by the US 
State Department on 18 December 1940. This meant that visa applicants who 
stood high on consular waiting lists and were in possession of steamship 
bookings to the US would be allowed to take the place of candidates who 
despite ranking higher on the waiting list were unable to sail.43 A second 
aggravating factor was AEL’s mid-February announcement that the Lisbon-
New York route was solidly booked until New Year’s Eve of 1942.44 
Consequently, crowds of up to six hundred people began to queue daily outside 
the offices of the Transmigration bureau in New York carrying consular 
cablegrams stating that their friends and relatives in Europe could expect a US 
visa if they deposited the steamship passage money with this office. Between 
the last week of February and the first week of March 1941, the Transmigration 
Bureau received deposits for value of $1,250,000, that is, more than four times 
the total balance of cash deposits made to that office since it was established in 
June 1940.45  
During the month of June 1941, the US government introduced a series 
of measures that evinced a new phase in the country’s transition from active 
neutrality to war. The consequences of some of these policies on the refugees 
were devastating. On 5 June, the US State Department instructed its diplomatic 
missions in Europe to withhold visas from aliens if they had close relatives (i.e. 
parents, children, spouse, or siblings) in a country under Axis control, including 
Vichy France. This made it extremely difficult for most Jewish refugees in 
Europe to migrate to the US.46 On 14 June, Washington issued an executive 
order ‘freezing’ German and Italian assets in the US, as well as those from all 
other countries in Europe —except for Great Britain, Ireland, and Turkey— 
until the US government could verify that such funds were not beneficial to the 
Axis powers. Additionally, this order also gave the US Treasury complete 
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supervision over all funds sent from the US to the Europe, whether to help cover 
the emigration costs of refugees, or to fund the work of relief organisations. In 
practice, this meant that relief organisations could not sent funds to Europe 
without first obtaining a special US Treasury licence.47 
On 16 June, the sinking of several American vessels by German U-boats, 
together with mounting evidence that German consuls played a crucial role in 
networks of German espionage and propaganda in the US, led Washington to 
demand the closure of all German consulates in the US. In retaliation, Berlin 
ordered the closure of all US consulates in Germany and German-occupied 
territories. By mid-July, the only US consulates that remained operative in 
continental Europe where those in Unoccupied France, Spain, Portugal, and 
Switzerland —an ‘island refuge’. This meant that persons in countries under 
Nazi control had to reach one of those neutral territories in order to apply for 
—or renew their— US visas. But for the majority of refugees in Nazi-occupied 
Europe this was an impossible task. Let us take, for instance, the case of 
Amsterdam resident Otto Frank, German businessman and father of celebrated 
diarist Anne Frank. In order to obtain visas for the US, Frank would have had 
to obtain an exit visa for the Netherlands; transit visas for Belgium, occupied, 
and non-occupied France; and reach the Iberian Peninsula with his whole 
family, or else his application would have been rejected by US consular 
authorities on the ground that he had close relatives in Nazi-controlled 
territory.48  
Furthermore, in the last week of June the US State Department 
announced that —beginning on 1 July— all immigration quotas were to be 
centralised and handled by the US State Department, which meant that all visa 
applications had to be sent to Washington for preliminary approval before they 
were referred to the consuls in Europe, who still had the last word on the 
issuance of visas. In Washington, visa applications were placed before an 
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interdepartmental committee composed of representatives from the Visa 
Division of the Department of State; the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service of the Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); 
the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department; and the Office of 
Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. Additionally, visa applicants also 
had to submit, besides all previously required documentation, a biographical 
statement and two affidavits —of support and sponsorship— that had to be 
completed by a US citizen or permanent resident in the US before a notary.49 
Although the US State Department maintained that these new 
immigration regulations were not intended to cut down immigration, their 
practical implementation often posed serious obstacles to refugees desirous to 
leave Europe. In Barcelona, for instance, US Consul-General Arthur C. Frost 
was criticised for demanding that Jewish refugees submit solid proof that they 
had no close relatives in Axis-controlled territory, such as family books. For 
this reason, only 27 of the nearly 300 Jews who reached Barcelona in September 
1941 were granted US visas, even though the interdepartmental committee in 
Washington had already given its preliminary approval.50 Dr Samuel Sequerra, 
who represented the JDC in Barcelona, accused Frost of creating a ‘vicious 
circle’ by refusing to grant Washington-approved US visas to Jews unless they 
first obtained Portuguese transit visas: ‘He thus creates a vicious circle, since 
Portugal, just as every other country in the world, will not grant a transit visa 
before the end visa has been issued’.51 Many refugees in Nazi-occupied territory 
tried to circumvent this bureaucratic maze by paying high sums of money for 
fraudulent visas to Costa Rica, Cuba, Siam, or Curaçao, with the sole purpose 
of reaching Portugal’s safety.52 According to Jewish scholar Mark Wischnitzer, 
US consulates in Nazi territory issued as many as 15,000 Cuban visas to Jews 
from Greater Germany between July and October 1941, of whom as many as 
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3,500 may have been able to reach Portugal.53 Notwithstanding the need to 
renew their permits every month, live in forced residence, and being constantly 
surveilled by the PVDE, they succeeded in saving their lives. But for the 
majority of Jewish persons under Nazi jurisdiction, the US immigration 
regulations of June 1941 had a calamitous effect. When compared to the first 
six months of 1941, the number of quota immigrants reaching the US between 
July and December 1941 dropped from 18,734 to 9,158 —a figure which 
includes those who obtained US visas prior to the momentous visa policy 
changes of the summer.54 
The affair of the SS Navemar is a perfect example of the agony and 
desperation that characterised the experience of Jewish refugees in the second 
half of 1941. In mid-June 1941 —possibly in reaction to the first changes to US 
visa policy in early June— Portuguese authorities suddenly stopped issuing 
transit visas to Jewish refugees in France. Since many of their protégés in 
France had US visas that neared the expiration date, HICEM booked 300 
passages on the Spanish cargo ship SS Navemar, of the Compañía Española de 
Navegación Marítima (CENM) at the high price of $366 for USA, and $525 for 
Cuba. Despite CENM’s assurances to HICEM that the ship, which had been 
reconverted for passenger use, would sail with no more than 600 passengers on 
board, the shipping company sold  and additional 880 places to JDC for 
refugees coming from Nazi-occupied territories. This brought the the number 
of refugees who had bookings on the Navemar to 1,180. If we consider that the 
5,301-tonnage freighter, which had a theoretical capacity for no more than 28 
passengers, was ready to accommodate some 400 persons after being 
refurbished for the occasion, we can imagine the level of despair that permeated 
the air.55 With the new US immigration regulations looming over the refugees, 
many saw the Spanish freighter as their last opportunity to sail to the Americas 
while their visas were still in force. James Bernstein, who represented HICEM 
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in Lisbon, put it this way:  
‘having no other sailing opportunity, tired out with the heat and bad food, with 
the impending danger of an epidemic, terrified also with the prospects of being 
sent to a Spanish concentration camp where detained emigrants are shot by 
groups every night for no other reason than the shortage of food, there was not 
one emigrant among the 1,100 who would have refused to sail’.56 
 
Next came the preparations. Initially, the Navemar was due to sail from 
the Port of Cadiz on 10 July and call on Lisbon four days later. But shortly 
before the sailing, with the refugees already in Cádiz, the Spanish government 
informed the shipping company that the Navemar would have to sail from 
Bilbao instead, and later from Seville, thus resulting in a three-week delay, 
expenses for value of more than $8,000 to be covered by the Jewish 
organisations, and the expiration of 219 US visas.57 After consultation with 
Washington, these visas would be renewed during the eight days that the ship 
lay at anchor off the Port of Lisbon. Since passengers were not allowed ashore, 
any US visas expiring while at the port of Lisbon were accepted as having 
expired on the journey.58 
The 48-day-long voyage of the Navemar began on 7 August 1941, when 
the Spanish freighter left Seville bound for New York and Havana. After a brief 
stopover in Cádiz, the Navemar reached Lisbon on 8 August, where it was held 
for eight days to allow US consular officials in Lisbon to renew nearly 250 
expired visas to refugees onboard. To speed up the process, the US consulate 
in Lisbon even mobilised a large number of American diplomats who had 
recently been expelled from Nazi-occupied countries and were waiting for new 
assignments at the Portuguese capital.59 Despite the terrible food and hygienic 
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conditions onboard, the Portuguese police refused to allow any passenger on 
their soil other than for the purpose of renewing their expired visas. Owing to 
the dire scarcity of goods and in post-civil war Spain, ship operators had not 
been able to secure basic goods such as drinking water, foodstuffs, and toilet 
and washing supplies. Certainly not enough to cope with the needs of the 
Navemar’s 1,180 passengers, whom a news correspondent in Lisbon described 
as ‘hollow-eyed broken men and women, and listless, feverish children lying in 
stifling heat’.60 To alleviate the situation, the HICEM and JDC representatives 
in Lisbon persuaded the steamer’s operators to allow local ship peddlers to 
approach the Navemar to sell bread, sardines, chocolate, and fruit to the half-
starved passengers, while local lighter boats discharged drinking water into the 
ship’s tanks in preparation for its long transatlantic journey.61  
Overcrowding and the poor hygienic situation on board were the most 
pressing issues. Since deck space available was so limited, most passengers were 
forced to remain most of the time in four huge unventilated dormitories that 
had been improvised in the cargo ship’s holds below deck. These comprised 
row after row of double-tiered bunks, with no portholes, and a single deck hatch 
as only source of ventilation. The Berlin-born  refugee and future Princeton 
literature professor, Victor Brombert, described it in this way: ‘caught between 
the relentless bright sun above, and the damp, airless stench below, we were 
like restless souls moving up and down a floating underworld’.62 The luckiest 
refugees were those who managed to appropriate the lifeboats on the main 
deck, where they could sleep with relative comfort. In the absence of 
refrigeration facilities, a stall had to be built on the afterdeck to accommodate 
six live oxen that would be the main source of nutrition for the duration of the 
trip. Naturally, sickness spread uncontrollably in those unsanitary conditions. 
Virtually none of the Navemar passengers escaped an attack of dysentery at 
some point during the trip, and six persons died of disease while on high seas. 
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‘When the story of the Navemar is all told —wrote the Yiddish-language author 
Zalman Shneur aboard the infamous ship— it will sound like something out of 
the Dark Ages’.63 On 7 September, the Navemar reached Cuba, where about 360 
refugees holding cuban visas were admitted. On the way to the US, a few 
critically-ill passengers were hospitalised at Bermuda.64 At last, on 12 
September, the remaining 787 refugees reached New York, where the freighter 
—such must have been the situation on board— was put in quarantine. It took 
five hours to the doctors of the US Public Health Service to give passengers, 
crew, and ship, ‘one of the most thorough examinations ever undertaken in the 
port of New York’.65 Naturally, the terrible experience of the SS Navemar 
prompted significant public and media attention. Time magazine nicknamed it 
‘SS Nevermore’.66 Some of its passengers referred to it as ‘schnorrer-ship’ 
(‘schnorrer’: Yiddish for tramp or beggar). Others borrowed the term coined 
coined by the European director of the JDC office in Lisbon, Dr. Joseph 
Schwartz, who described the ship as a ‘floating concentration camp’.67 No 
wonder then that 593 Navemar passengers filed claims for refund against the 
Spanish shipping company for value of $3,477,629, accounting for ticket 
refunds, and personal and property damage.68  
To prevent legal action against them on similar grounds, Spanish and 
Portuguese shipping companies serving transatlantic sailings began to require 
that all passengers sign a mandatory document stating that they had examined 
the conditions aboard the ship and were perfectly satisfied with them —
ironically, before the passengers were allowed onboard.69 In retaliation for the 
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lawsuit against the Navemar, the Spanish government forbid Spanish shipping 
companies from selling tickets to the US and Cuba to ‘individuals of the Jewish 
race’, under threat of heavy fines.70 It is not clear for how long did this 
prohibition apply, or to what extent was it enforced.71  
The best way to measure its real impact is by looking at the comprehensive 
sailing statistics of the JDC, which account for all sailings arranged by JDC and 
HICEM from the Iberian Peninsula. Thus, in the nearly ten months that 
spanned between 1 January and the order of 23 October 1941, there were at 
least 2,519 Jews who left the Iberian Peninsula on Spanish vessels. By contrast, 
only 142 Jews sailed with Spanish shipping companies in the fourteen months 
that passed between the ban was issued through the end of 1942, representing 
a reduction of 94.7 per cent —or 96 per cent after adjusting the time scale. It 
follows that the Francoist order, whilst not flawlessly applied, greatly reduced 
the transport possibilities available to Jewish refugees in the Iberian Peninsula.72 
For the sake of comparison, it is worth noting that Portuguese shipping 
companies, which in the year 1941 removed 4,745 Jews from the Peninsula, 
sailed with no less than 4,506 during 1942, hence showing no significant 
reduction.73  
A second and equally important question relates to the timing of the 
Spanish ban of 23 October 1941. The fact that the Franco regime barred 
‘individuals of the Jewish race’ from its ships on the same day that the Nazi 
regime banned the exit of Jews from German-occupied territory, raises 
questions as to whether the Spanish prohibition was merely a retaliatory 
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measure against the SS Navemar lawsuit, or whether was it resulted from 
concerted collaboration with Nazi Germany in preparation for the ‘Final 
Solution’. 
On that same day of 23 October 1941, Himmler ordered the immediate 
end to Jewish migration from Nazi-occupied Europe.74 This decision marked 
the end to Berlin’s policy of forcing the emigration of Jews from all areas under 
German influence, which had been an implicit aim of Nazi anti-Jewish policy 
since 1933, and a goal explicitly enforced following the annexation of Austria 
and the Sudetenland in 1938. This policy of forced migration was first amended 
on 20 May 1941, when —‘given the Final Solution (Endlösung der Judenfrage) 
which will undoubtedly come about’— Göring ordered the immediate halt to 
Jewish migration from Belgium and France. This act, which aimed at 
accelerating the exit of Jews from the Reich, had a lot to do with the shortage 
of transportation from the Iberian Peninsula: ‘as there are currently insufficient 
possibilities of emigration even for the Jews in the area of the Reich, largely via 
Spain and Portugal, emigration of Jews from France and Belgium would mean 
renewed curtailment of such possibilities’.75 Over the summer, the Final 
Solution began to take shape. The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 
June marked the beginning of a stage of Nazi anti-Jewish violence: the mass 
shooting of the Jews of Eastern Europe by mobile killing squads 
(Einsatzgruppen). On 31 July 1941, Reichsmarschall Göring trusted Heydrich with 
‘making all the necessary preparations with regard to organizational, practical, 
and financial aspects for an overall solution (Gesamtlösung) of the Jewish 
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question in the German sphere of influence in Europe’.76 As suggested by recent 
scholarship, the decision to systematically murder every Jew within German 
reach was reached sometime between late September and early October 1941.77 
In the same month of October, the SS decided to deport more than 22,000 Jews 
to the ghettos of Warsaw, Łódź, Lubliń, and the former Soviet cities of Riga and 
Minsk, where they would face death by starvation.78 On 25 November, with the 
Nazi death machine already running, the Nazi government issued the 11th 
supplementary decree to the Nuremberg Laws of 1935, which empowered the 
German Reich to automatically confiscate the property of all Jews who were 
no longer residents of the Reich —whether due to flight or deportation— and 
stripped them of their nationality.79 
Against the backdrop of Nazi extermination plans, the situation of the 
now stateless Jewish refugees in the Iberian Peninsula was also aggravated 
following the US declaration of war on 8 December 1941. The AEL suspended 
its sailings to the Iberian Peninsula altogether. The Spanish government by 
suspending all Spanish sailings to the US —from now on they would only call 
at the ports of Latin America.80 In Portugal, the PVDE arrested a number of 
Jewish refugees, who were left incommunicado for no apparent reason. 
Amongst them were several refugees who volunteered at the Lisbon offices of 
HICEM, USC, and JDC, including the head of the Jewish Community of 
Luxembourg, Albert Nussbaum.81 According to Elizabeth Dexter, there were 
also several instances in which the Gestapo arrested refugees at Caldas da 
Rainha who were allegedly Nazi opponents.82 By mid-1942, however, relations 
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with the Portuguese police had improved substantially.83 
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The Iberian Peninsula and the Axis 
 
Despite the many similarities between Salazarist Portugal and Francoist 
Spain —both were deeply Catholic, authoritarian, and conservative regimes 
that opposed liberal-democratic and communist ideologies— it would be a 
great mistake to assume that the would behave similarly during World War II. 
Officially, neither of the two governments joined the war on either side, and 
yet, their attitude during the conflict was largely influenced by their opposing 
political allegiances. Whilst Salazar’s Portugal remained hopeful that the Allies 
would prevail, the Francoists were as convinced of the inevitability of an Axis 
victory as they yearned to be part of this new fascist European order. This 
dichotomy has led some scholars to describe Portugal as an ‘Allied neutral’, 
and Spain as an ‘Axis neutral’.84 While that assessment of Portugal is rather 
accurate, that of Spain is somewhat problematic, not least because the Franco 
regime was not neutral but ‘non-belligerent’ during the crucial period of June 
1940 to October 1943.85  
Much of the explanation why Spain never formally declared war can be 
credited to Salazar’s efforts to keep the Iberian Peninsula neutral.86 Possibly due 
to his neighbour’s bellicosity —after all, Franco’s ‘New Spain’ had been born 
out of the flames of a brutal civil war— Salazar’s attitudes towards the Franco 
regime oscillated between fears of a Spanish invasion, and sympathies for the 
its authoritarianism and anti-communism.87 In view of the impending 
European conflict,  however, both governments agreed that it was in their best 
interest to safeguard the integrity of the Iberian Peninsula while consolidating 
their regimes internally. On 17 March 1939, the two governments signed the 
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Luso-Spanish Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression —also known as the 
‘Iberian Pact’— by which both sides pledged to respect and protect each other’s 
territory, and to sign no pact or alliance that would lead to aggression against 
the other. Following the Franco-German armistice, and with the German army 
on the other side of the Pyrenees, both regimes felt apprehensive about the 
possibility of a German invasion of the Peninsula. The Franco government 
attempted to bring Portugal closer to the Axis sphere —and away from 
Britain— by making her join the anti-Comintern pact, but Salazar wanted 
nothing but Iberian neutrality.88 As a result, the Salazarist and Francoist 
governments signed an Additional Protocol to the existing ‘Iberian Pact’ on 29 
July 1940, which, although vaguely worded, was interpreted by both sides of 
the war as a sign that Spain and Portugal would defend themselves in the event 
of a foreign invasion.89 Although fears of a German offensive against the 
Peninsula dissipated in June 1941, when the Axis armies marched against the 
Soviet Union; the Allied North African landings of November 1942, and the 
subsequent takeover of Vichy France by the Germans, left the Franco regime 
in particularly difficult position. Seeking to guarantee its survival by distancing 
itself from the Axis, the Franco government urged its Portuguese counterpart 
to form an ‘Iberian Bloc’ to defend the Peninsula. This alliance, which 
recognised the ‘mutual friendship and everlasting peace’ between the two 
Iberian states, was interpreted by the Allies as a sign that Spain no longer posed 
a threat to them, and that the Iberian Peninsula would remain neutral in the 
conflict.90 
Portugal’s neutrality, as well as its sympathies for the Allied cause, had 
been unequivocal from the beginning of the war. On 2 September 1939, the 
Portuguese press published an official declaration signed by António de 
Oliveira Salazar in which the head of state declared Portugal’s neutrality, while 
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promising to observe ‘the duties imposed by our alliance with England’.91 The 
Anglo-Portuguese alliance, which may well be the oldest-standing in history, 
was first established in 1373 by King Edward III of England and King 
Ferdinand and Queen Eleanor of Portugal, and was subsequently ratified in 
numerous occasions through more than five hundred years.92 Indeed, it was on 
the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1373 that the Winston Churchill 
approached Lisbon to request the establishment of air and naval military bases 
in the Azores archipelago in August 1943, and that the Salazar government 
agreed to their proposal.93 Situated 1,500 km west of Portugal, the Azores 
islands gave the Allies an enormous strategic advantage in the Battle of the 
Atlantic. Thanks to the extended air coverage that the Azores provided, the 
Allies were finally able to defend troop and supply shippings sailing through 
the mid-Atlantic from the deadly ‘wolfpack’ formations (Wolfsrudel) of German 
U-boats.94 
Francoist Spain, on the other hand, was morally and economically 
indebted to Nazi Germany for its crucial assistance during the Spanish Civil 
War, which came with a bill of 470,014,955 RM.95 Spain’s partnership with the 
Axis was formalised within days of the Nationalist victory over the Spanish 
Republican government on 1 April 1939. On 27 and 30 March respectively, 
Franco’s Spain joined the Anti-Comintern Pact of 1936, and signed a Treaty of 
Friendship with Nazi Germany by which both governments pledged to ‘avoid 
anything in the political, military and economic fields that might be 
disadvantageous to its treaty partner or of advantage to its opponent’.96 On 8 
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May, the Franco government followed the example of his German and Italian 
counterparts and announced its withdrawal from the League of Nations; and 
on 22 May, it joined the Italo-German Pact of Steel. Following the outbreak of 
war in September 1939, Spain declared neutrality. On 13 June 1940, three days 
after Italy’s declaration of war, the Franco regime shifted from neutrality to 
‘non-belligerency’ —a term previously used by Mussolini’s Italy to denote a 
state of pre-belligerency. Spain’s new bellicose status was demonstrated the 
following day, when Franco’s Moroccan corps occupied the International Zone 
of Tangier under the pretext that this was the best way to protect Tangier’s 
neutrality in the conflict.97  
Next, the Franco regime began negotiating the terms of Spain’s 
declaration of war with Nazi Germany. These discussions reached an 
anticlimax on 23 October 1940, during the meeting between Franco and Hitler 
at the Franco-Spanish border in Hendaye. Despite nine hours of conversation 
between the two heads of state, the question of Spain’s entry into the war 
remained unsolved. Whilst Spanish colonial ambitions in North Africa were 
irreconcilable with those of the French, Spain’s weaker economic and military 
status convinced Hitler that Spanish belligerence was simply not worth 
alienating the France of Vichy. But Hendaye’s disappointment did not thwart 
friendly relations between the two totalitarian regimes. Even though Francoist 
Spain never formally declared war, it remained Nazi Germany’s de facto ally 
through the end of World War II.98 The most tangible example of Francoist 
Spain’s collaboration with the Axis was the Spanish Volunteer Division, also 
known as the ‘Blue Division’ (División Azul) after the blue shirt worn by the 
Spanish fascists of the Falange. Consisting of more than 47,000 Spanish 
volunteers integrated in the Wehrmacht’s 250th Infantry Division, the Blue 
Division was deployed to the Russian front shortly after the onset of ‘Operation 
Barbarossa’ in June 1941, and fought in several battles including the siege of 
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Leningrad and the battle of Krasny Bor. Owing to mounting pressure from the 
Allied governments, the Franco regime ordered the withdrawal of the Blue 
Division in the autumn of 1943, although some refused to return and joined the 
German regular army or the Waffen-SS. These were mainly hard-line 
Falangistas, who believed that the war that had begun on Spanish soil in July 
1936 would not reach conclusion until the complete annihilation of Soviet 
communism.99 
From amongst the various groups that composed the Nationalist faction 
during the Spanish Civil War —e.g. the military, the Catholic Church, the 
CEDA, and the Monarchists— the Falange emerged as one of the most 
important pillars of the ‘New Spain’. The Falange was the only political force 
tolerated in Franco’s one-party Spain, and permeated almost every aspect of 
Spanish life: from censorship, propaganda, and national recreation, to the 
control of trade unions, and the repression of political dissidents.100 Even the 
regime’s main welfare organisation, Auxilio Social, depended on Falange’s 
Women’s Section, the Sección Femenina. Against this backdrop, it does not come 
as a surprise that the president of Falange’s executive committee, Ramón 
Serrano Súñer was one of the most powerful men in National-Catholic Spain. 
Serrano Súñer —who also happened to be Franco’s brother-in-law— had been 
Minister of the Interior since January 1938, and Minister of Public Order since 
August 1939. British Ambassador Sir Samuel Hoare saw Serrano Súñer as ‘a 
fanatic in bad health’.101 US Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes described him as 
‘cleverer and less principled’ than Franco, ‘a weather-vane of the fortunes of 
the war’.102 The leader of the Falange was also one of the most ardent Hitler 
admirers within the Spanish government, and led the negotiations between the 
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two countries in regards to war. In September 1940, before he formally became 
Franco’s Minister of Foreign Affairs on 17 October 1940, Serrano Súñer 
travelled to Berlin to pave the way for the Hendaye meeting. While in the 
German capital, the chief of the Falange also invited Reichsführer-SS Heinrich 
Himmler to visit Spain and advise the Franco regime on the modernisation of 
the Spanish police.103 
Spanish-German police cooperation had formally begun during the 
Spanish Civil War. In November 1937, following Franco’s wishes, the German 
government sent a team of experts headed by SS Colonel Heinz Jost —later 
commander of Einsatzgruppe A in the Baltic region— to share with the Spanish 
police the latest practices in the eradication of communist elements from 
Spanish society.104 In April 1938, Himmler suggested widening collaboration 
between the two police forces. By virtue of the secret police agreement of 31 
July 1938, the German and Spanish governments consented to the mutual 
exchange of information regarding the activities of ‘communists, anarchists and 
émigrés’ both within and outside their national territories; and pledged to 
cooperate in the extradition of dangerous individuals without the need for 
diplomatic mediation —in a ‘direct, systematic, and speedy manner’.105 
Himmler was the first to exploit these treaty provisions, as the Gestapo initiated 
a hunt for German volunteers of the International Brigades who had fallen in 
Franco’s hands. To carry out interrogations and arrange their repatriation to 
Germany, Himmler deployed special security agents throughout rebel Spain, 
who in turn, offered to train the Spanish police in the latest techniques 
developed in Nazi Germany to deal with the enemies of the state.106 In 
September 1939, Ramón Serrano Súñer appointed his close friend José Finat y 
Escrivá de Romaní, Count of Mayalde, as chief of the DGS. One of Mayalde’s 
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first acts as chief of the police was to establish an Armed Police Corps —known 
as ‘los Grises’ for their grey uniform— to repress and persecute the enemies of 
the state. For the purpose of studying police organisation, the Count of 
Mayalde visited Berlin in late August 1940, where he had several exchanges 
with the highest-ranking security officials in Nazi Germany: Kurt Daluege 
(Ordnungspolizei), Arthur Nebe (Kriminalpolizei), Reinhard Heydrich 
(Sicherheitsdienst, or SD), and Heinrich Himmler (Schutzstaffel, or SS). In 
gratitude for the treatment accorded to Mayalde, the chief of the SS was invited 
to visit Spain. 
Himmler was welcomed with the highest pomp and circumstance in 
Madrid on 21 October 1940, two days prior to the meeting between Hitler and 
Franco at Hendaye. Besides attending a bullfight and visiting Madrid’s 
archeological museum, Himmler’s visit also served to establish closer police 
collaboration between the two fascist regimes. To please the Germans, the 
Franco government allowed agents of the Gestapo and the SD to be stationed 
in German diplomatic missions across Spain, and virtually gave them carte 
blanche to arrest, interrogate, and forcibly repatriate from Spanish territory any 
German citizen if they so desired. In return for such privileged status, German 
security forces agreed to assist Franco in the extradition of Spanish Republican 
leaders who had fled to France after the Republic’s defeat. Disinterested in the 
fate of thousands of Spanish refugees who were still interned in camps across 
unoccupied France, Madrid authorised the German Organisation Todt to use 
between 35,000 and 50,000 Spanish prisoners in the construction of the 
‘Atlantic Wall’ defences along the French coast. In addition to those coerced 
into forced-labour units, an additional 7,288 Spaniards were sent to the 
concentration camp  in Mauthausen. Of that number, at least 4,676 —64 per 
cent— were worked to death in Mauthausen’s SS-owned granite quarries.107  
Spanish and German intelligence services also cooperated very closely, 
much to the benefit of the Nazis. Thanks to Falange Exterior —Falange’s 
intelligence network in Spain and Latin America— agents of the Spanish fascist 
party provided crucial supplies to German U-boats throughout the war; 
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distributed pro-Axis propaganda in the Western Hemisphere; sabotaged Allied 
shipping; and submitted intelligence reports, for instance, on Allied ship 
movements across the Gibraltar Strait. Ironically, the same shipping companies 
that took hundreds of Jewish refugees to safety also served as Hitler’s main 
avenue for spies and saboteurs bound for the Americas, and thus reinforced 
fifth-column fears in the US. In addition to smuggling Gestapo agents into the 
US, Spanish shipping agencies also assisted the German war effort by exporting 
war materials that were embargoed under the US Neutrality Act. On 15 
December 1941, for instance, agents of the FBI seized the SS Isla de Tenerife as 
it was about to sail from the Port of New York with a cargo of more than 100 
fifty-gallon drums of lubricating oil, $30,000 worth of airplane silk, and a large 
number of radio parts. The materials were confiscated, the company was fined 
$22,000, and the ship’s captain and radio operator —Marcelino García and 
Manuel Díaz— were arrested.108 As it turned out, these two men were not only 
agents of the Compañía Trasatlántica Española (CTE) in the US, and thus two of 
the most powerful men in Spanish-American shipping; they were also in charge 
of the flagship branch of the Falange Exterior in the US: Casa de España. Based at 
New York’s Park Central Hotel, Casa de España had been a hub of Spanish 
fascist activity since the Spanish Civil War, in charge of distributing  fascist 
propaganda and raising support for Franco’s cause in the US. These activities 
had first come to the attention of the US Senate in May 1937, when Senator 
Gerald P. Nye denounced García and Díaz, rightly so, of being General 
Franco’s spies and violating US neutrality in the Spanish conflict by exporting 
war material.109 The two ship-owners rationalised these accusations in the 
following way: ‘The press, in its majority Jewish, is rather hostile to our cause 
and while it advances the lies of the Reds (they make enormous propaganda) it 
makes efforts to belittle the success of our glorious army’.110 
Meanwhile, the Count of Mayalde also sought police collaboration with 
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the newly-born government of Vichy. On 2 August 1940, Mayalde invited the 
French government to cooperate in the ‘regular exchange of information and 
the search for suspicious persons’.111 The French Minister of the Interior, 
Marcel Peyrouton, received Mayalde’s proposal in enthusiastic terms and 
invited the Spanish chief of police to travel to Vichy to discuss the matter. ‘He 
sees nothing but advantages’, wrote the French ambassador to Spain, François 
Piétri.112 It is not clear whether the Pierre Laval administration ever signed any 
written agreement with the Spanish police, or whether their cooperation took 
place informally. In August 1941, the London-based Gaullist newspaper France 
published the text of a secret police agreement allegedly signed between the 
Laval and the Franco governments. According to this text, Spain pledged to 
assist in the suppression of Gaullist activities in Portugal in exchange for the 
right to station up to thirty Spanish agents across French territory —a bargain 
suspiciously similar to that obtained by Himmler during this visit to Spain.113 
In any case, it seems that the Franco regime attempted to deploy such agents to 
its consulates in Marseille, Perpignan, and Toulouse. Bewildered, the 
government of François Darlan claimed not to be aware of any Franco-Spanish 
police agreement signed by its predecessor, and protested for such breach of 
French national sovereignty.114 In spite of this misunderstanding, the two 
governments reached an agreement in December 1941  concerning the 
extradition of irregular refugees. From then on, any undocumented person 
arrested by the police within five kilometres of the Franco-Spanish border 
would be returned to the authorities of the country of departure. As far as Spain 
is concerned, extraditions to France were carried out from any point in Spain’s 
geography, sometimes when refugees were a few kilometres from reaching the 
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Portuguese border.115 The Czech Jewish refugee Hilda Klein, for instance, 
reached Spanish territory on 9 October 1940, and was deported back to France 
on 14 October 1940 after five days in the prison of Figueras (Gerona).116 
Likewise, Jacob Lewin, born in Chișinău (Romania), was interned at the Irún 
prison on 28 August 1940, and ‘deported from the national territory’ three days 
later.117  
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The Persecution of  Jews in the Iberian Peninsula 
 
At the beginning of 1940, the Spanish DGS sent instructions to all Civil 
Governors in the country requesting detailed reports of all German Jews living 
in each Spanish province, with the aim of assessing whether arrest and 
expulsion were necessary.118 After the fall of France, a most intense period of 
arrests and expulsions began at the hands of the Spanish police. These measures 
affected Jews from German, Austrian, Polish, and Czech origin who had found 
asylum in Spain during the 1930s, as well as some non-Jewish German 
dissidents. Rather than arresting them publicly, the DGS sent telegrams to all 
male Jewish refugees requesting them to travel to Madrid to report to the DGS 
headquarters, allegedly for the purpose of renewing their residence permit. 
Upon arrival to the Spanish capital, they were arrested, imprisoned, and given 
several days to arrange their emigration from Spain. Since this was nearly an 
impossible task at the time due to the lack of transportation facilities and the 
many bureaucratic obstacles to migration, the majority of them were thrown 
into the concentration camp at Miranda de Ebro (Burgos), or were repatriated 
to Germany. The US Consul-General in Barcelona, Arthur C. Frost, learnt 
through the lawyer of one of the victims that: 
‘Spanish authorities are resolved to expel all Jews living in Spain, that those who 
cannot be deported for lack of visas are to be put in concentration camps, and 
that the instigators of this movement are German members of the Gestapo who 
are personally directing it … Other Jews, who have not been molested as yet, are 
said to live in constant fear of detention and to be attempting frantically to obtain 
visas for countries on the American continent’.119 
 
Thanks to the refugee case files of the AFSC, it has been possible to 
identify some of the victims of this policy. The professional violinist Siegfried 
Goldenkranz was arrested on 17 June 1940 and spent two years and seven 
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months at the concentration camp at Miranda de Ebro.120 The surgeon 
Hermann Grünbaum spent more than two years in Spanish gaols in Madrid 
and Barcelona, as well as at Miranda de Ebro.121 The artist and architect Peter 
Kainer, on the other hand, was interned in the Miranda camp in September 
1940, and extradited to Germany in August 1941. After enduring torture and 
several years of forced labour, Kainer was deported to the east and never 
returned.122 
While their husbands, fathers, brothers, and sons were interned at 
Miranda de Ebro, their wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters, as well as the 
youngest males in the family, also endured persecution at the hands of the 
Spanish police. Women of Polish, Russian, and Czech origin were also called 
to regularise their residence status in Madrid, and were sent to the Women’s 
Prison in Barcelona, where they spent months and even years sleeping on damp 
concrete floors.123 Some German Jewish women from the Mallorca colony —
particularly those whose husbands  were on the run from the Gestapo— were 
allowed to remain in freedom for as long as their funds held out, after which 
they were also sent to prison. Meanwhile, they endured constant inquisition 
from the Spanish and German police, who demanded details about their 
husbands’ whereabouts. In words of Clara Isaacsen, a Jewish refugee from 
Hamburg who had found refuge in Barcelona:  
‘Since the victory of General Franco in Spain [1939] began our persecution by 
the Gestapo. We had domiciliary visits by the police and were bereaved of our 
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German nationality. On July 1st, 1940 we were expelled from Spain and 
threatened with [internment in a] concentration camp if not leaving Spain. We 
succeeded in postponing this order [un]til the end of last February [1941], but 
on February 24th [1941] I was arrested and [put] in prison [un]til the day of our 
departure from Spain’.124  
 
Owing to German wishes, German ‘Aryan’ women in ‘mixed’ (mischling) 
marriages whose Jewish husbands were in prison were offered to return to 
Germany if they renounced to their Jewish husbands and pledged to raise their 
children as ‘Aryans’.125 This was the case of Eva Maria and her sixteen-year-
old son Hans, whose husband and father, Alfred Kauffmann, was interned in 
Miranda de Ebro for most of the war.126 Other cases of ‘Aryan’ wives who were 
pressed to desert their Jewish husbands at Miranda and return to Germany 
include Irene Maison, married to the architect Hans Maison; and Alice (née 
Weitzen) Goldenkranz, wife of the aforementioned Siegfried Goldenkranz.127 
In addition to collaborating in the persecution of foreign Jewish refugees, 
Francoist authorities also took steps to register all Jews living under Franco’s 
jurisdiction into the so-called ‘Archivo Judaico’ (‘Judaic Archive’). On 5 May 
1941, the Count of Mayalde, acting in his capacity as chief of the DGS, 
distributed amongst all Civil Governors an order requesting detailed reports of 
all Jews —whether of Spanish or foreign nationality— living in each Spanish 
province. Amongst other aspects they were asked to report on the following: 
personal details, political affiliation, means of subsistence, commercial 
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activities, ‘degree of dangerousness’, personality, and all sects, trade unions, 
and parties to which they belong. Moreover, the document also emphasised the 
need to pay special attention to Sephardic Jews living in Spain, since ‘owing to 
their capacity to adapt to their environment and their similar temperament to 
ours, are more likely to conceal their origins and even go unnoticed, without it 
being possible to restrict the extent of their disturbing manipulations’.128 The 
extent to which the Archivo Judaico served the Franco regime to persecute Jews 
is difficult to estimate on the basis of the material currently available in Spanish 
archives. Rather than centralised in a single collection, its case files are mixed 
with thousands of other non-Jewish cases handled by the DGS. Furthermore, 
the fact that most of the files stamped with the Archivo Judaico logo contain no 
information suggests that Francoist authorities may have emptied the 
documents in an attempt to destroy evidence of collaboration in the 
Holocaust.129 
Spanish authorities also proved very cooperative in the extradition of 
Jewish refugees from Spain, in fact, as the case of Carl and Aline Furtmüller 
demonstrates, more cooperative than it was required of them. The Viennese 
pedagogue and psychologist Prof Carl Furtmüller, of Jewish origin, was one of 
the founders of the Austrian Schulreform, a pedagogical movement based in the 
principles of Alfred Adler’s individual psychology. Carl’s wife, Dr Aline 
Furtmüller, was a social-democrat politician and French linguist of Russian 
origin. They both fled to Spain in 1940 thanks to the efforts of Fry’s CAS. 
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Although they had crossed the border legally —they had US visas, French exit 
visas, and Spanish transit visas— they were arrested by Spanish authorities 
because they thought that the Gestapo ‘would be interested in these refugees’. 
But this was not the case. When the Spanish police handed them over to the 
Germans they showed no interest in the couple. After being robbed of their 
money and belongings by the Spanish police, Carl was interned at Miranda de 
Ebro, and Aline was sent to prison in Figueras (Lérida) despite the fact that she 
was severely ill with Leukemia. After several months of confinement, the 
couple was released thanks to the efforts of the USC Lisbon office, and arrived 
in New York in March 1941. As cancer was taking her life, Alina wrote: ‘it 
takes all my store of patience, courage, and moral strength to put up with this 
state of being out of life, aside it, just when I came here to get in it’. Alina died 
in December 1941.130 
Ernst Scheuer and Rosi Moses-Scheuer, on the other hand, managed to 
reach Spain clandestinely after suffering internment at the Gurs camp. Upon 
arrival to Spain, they were arrested and imprisoned separately for five months. 
On 15 February 1941, they were taken by Gestapo officials to Hendaye, in 
Germany-occupied France and were later discharged for an unknown reason. 
Thanks to the efforts of Fry’s CAS, they managed to arrange all necessary 
documentation and flee for a second time to Spain, just in time to sail to New 
York aboard the SS Navemar in early August 1941.131 On 30 July 1941, the sub-
director of the branch of Crédit Lyonnais in Barcelona Louis Hayem, received 
from the DGS an order to abandon Spain within a month. As the French 
Consul-General pointed out in a letter to the French Ambassador to Spain, 
Hayem’s Jewish origin was the only possible reason for such expulsion, as the 
French banker was never involved in political activities and was highly reputed 
within the French colony of Barcelona for his community and charity work. 
Despite Pietri’s appeals to the DGS, Hayem was expelled to France and sailed 
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to the US from Lisbon at the end of October 1941.132 Ernesto Levi, a shopkeeper 
born in Frankfurt, was imprisoned in Vigo (Prisión del Partido) on 31 October 
1942, the same month that Spain theoretically transitioned towards ‘neutrality’. 
His penitentiary file leaves no doubt as to the nature of the arrest, ‘crime: 
unknown (religion: Jewish)’.133 
Franco’s Spain was not only hostile to Jewish refugees. As Spain prepared 
to enter the war during the fall of 1940, the Spanish police did not make any 
distinction between races or nationalities. In September 1940, Hoare reported 
that ‘British subjects are being arrested without any reason’ and given 
‘expulsion orders at a moment’s notice’.134 Likewise, there were instances in 
which foreign nationals were arrested simply because they had called on the 
British Consulate in Barcelona.135 In October 1940, James McDonald noted 
how the Gestapo had ‘taken over control of the Spanish police in certain key 
cities’ and gave the example of Zaragoza, where the local police had disobeyed 
the Spanish Foreign Minister’s order to release Ignacy Paderewski, head of the 
Polish parliament-in-exile, in order to satisfy German demands. After much 
insistence from the Spanish government and McDonald himself, Paderewski 
was permitted to continue to Lisbon.136  
The extent of Spanish antisemitism can also be seen through the case of 
Tangier. Upon the Spanish occupation of Tangier on 14 June 1940, Francoist 
authorities deemed the Jewish Community’s council illegal through the 
abrogation of the Ẓahīr of 15 February 1925. The rabbinic tribunal and its 
constitutions were equally dissolved, and the Jewish community lost all 
subsidies and its right to elect communal leaders, who thereafter would be 
appointed by Spanish authorities from among the candidates presented by the 
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community.137 Arrests ensued. In July, the Spanish police arrested a Syrian Jew 
of French nationality, Malik, on the ground that he was a spy. Malik was 
extradited to French Morocco where he faced forced labour at the Missour 
camp, but owing to the beatings he had received, the French deemed him ‘inapt’ 
for work and transferred him to the refugee camp in Sidi-el-Ayachi.138 But the 
persecution of the Jews of Tangier was not limited to the earlier months of the 
war. On the contrary, the Allied amphibious invasion of French North Africa 
in November 1942 led to a new wave of antisemitic violence in the formerly-
international enclave. In the last days of 1942 and beginning of 1943, the 
Spanish police raided the synagogue during religious services, raided many 
Jewish homes, and arrested 55 Jews who were accused of ‘communist 
activities’ without any such evidence. At the end of May 1943, more than 200 
Jewish and Arab youths who had registered at the French consulate for labour 
service in French Morocco were rounded up by the Spanish police and flogged. 
Thirty of them were deported to Tetouan. The British Consul-General in 
Tangier, Sir Alvary Gascoigne, immediately protested to Spanish military 
governor, General Jenaro Uriarte, who promised an investigation. On June 3, 
the governor informed the representatives of the Jewish community that the 
boys would be ‘pardoned’.139 Although Spanish authorities later admitted that 
the only reason for their punishment was that the youths had chosen to 
volunteer for the Allies and not for Axis, the British Consul-General had a 
slightly different version of the facts: 
‘In January, and again in May 1943, the Spanish authorities, acting, no doubt, 
under pressure form the local Axis representatives, carried out numerous arrests 
of Jews. The arrests executed in May were on a large scale. Ostensibly, they were 
carried out for the alleged reason that these young Moroccan Jews had enlisted 
in the French forces by enrolling themselves at the French Consulate-General. 
This enrolment, the Spaniards argued, was contrary to the neutral status of the 
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Tangier zone. The arrest, which amounted to some 250 in all, were carried out 
with the callous brutality which is so typical of the Spaniard. It was later proved 
that the vast majority of the Jewish youths arrested had taken no steps 
whatsoever to enrol themselves in the French forces, and it became clear that the 
action of the Spanish authorities had been carried out mainly for the purpose of 
persecuting allied sympathisers and Jews’.140  
 
Whilst local Jews were persecuted, European refugees were not welcome 
either. Prior to Spanish occupation, the US Consul estimated the number of 
refuges in Tangier at 3,000 —mainly Jews— of whom 1,000 managed to 
migrate shortly after. Following the Spanish takeover, however, no refugees 
were allowed to enter Tangier, nor Spanish Morocco. The border was strictly 
controlled, and intruders faced internment in forced labour camps in the region. 
Refugees already in Tangier were barely tolerated, some were expelled.141  
At the beginning of 1943, Spanish authorities threatened Rose Stern and 
other four Hungarian Jews with deportation to a concentration camp in Spain 
unless they could obtain a visa and leave for a third country. It was only through 
the action of the British Consul-General in Tangier, that Spanish authorities 
dropped the charges against these refugees.142 But in June 1943, Gascoigne 
informed that the ‘German-paid Spanish police’ had issued expulsion orders 
again to Hungarian and Polish Jews. When approached to counteract this 
order, High Commissioner in Spanish Morocco General Luis Orgaz stated that 
this concession to the Germans was of small importance, as he was countering 
more important German demands.143 Thanks to funds provided by JDC, the 
Jewish Community of Tangier established a small refugee committee that fed 
250 refugees daily, paid the rent for families in need, and maintained four large 
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apartments to lodge homeless refugees.144 By November 1942, the Jewish 
Community provided financial assistance to 400 of the 800-1,000 German, 
Austrian, Polish, and Czech refugees who remained in Tangier, and assisted 
them with food, lodging, and medical aid.145  
Unlike Spain, Portugal was much less vulnerable to Nazi pressure 
regarding the persecution of racial and political refugees, and did not even allow 
the Wehrmacht or the SS men to walk the streets of Lisbon in uniform. In the 
absence of a formal police agreement with the German police, the Portuguese 
PVDE cooperation informally. There are at least three documented cases of 
PVDE agents who were on German payroll and who received special ‘training’ 
from the Gestapo. With his reputedly brutal methods, PVDE agent José 
Correia de Almeida turned over a number of German Jewish refugees and 
Gaullist agents to the Germans. One of his victims was the Jewish pacifist 
Berthold Jacob, who reached Lisbon in 1941 thanks to Varian Fry’s 
organisation.146 Jacob was kidnapped as he returned to his hotel from visiting 
the USC office in Lisbon, handed over to the Spanish police, and extradited to 
Berlin, where he died after three years of torture and starvation at the hands of 
the Gestapo.147 Besides Jacob’s case, however, there is no other known instance 
of Jewish refugees being handed over to the Germans by Portugal. In strict 
observance of its duties as a neutral, any extradition request from the German 
Embassy in Lisbon was always met with a negative response from the MNE. 
Moreover, when the RSHA queried the German consulate in Lisbon regarding 
the possibility of requesting from the Salazar government the halt to Jewish 
emigration from Portugal, as well as the extradition of the Jews who were still 
there, Consul Hollberg responded: 
‘The Portuguese government, which acts according to humanitarian principles, 
would never restrict Jews, whichever their nationality, from emigrating to 
countries overseas. It would be futile to request from this government the 
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extradition of Jews from Germany or German-occupied territories. In the same 
way, it would be futile to attempt the repatriation of the Jews presently in 
Portugal by means of the existing connections between the two [Portuguese and 
German] police.’.148 
 
The treatment accorded to Jewish refugees in Portugal was relatively 
more humane than the one they received in neighbouring Spain. In principle, 
the Salazarist regime avoided at all cost the establishment of foreigners on their 
soil —whether Jewish or not— and attempted to force their emigration 
whenever possible. In some instances, the PVDE even forced Portuguese 
shipping companies to include refugees whose visas were about to expire in 
their first outgoing sailing —some saw this with positive eyes.149 Those who 
were left stranded in Portugal due to the expiration of their visas, the lack of 
transportation, or simply due to the fact that no country overseas was willing 
to take them in, were permitted to live in forced residences at the expense of 
Jewish organisations. Similarly, refugees who succeeded in entering Portugal 
clandestinely were —after a short period of arrest— allowed to legalise their 
status and placed in forced residence. There were several towns that served as 
forced residence for refugees: Coimbra, Peniche, Praia das Maças, Costa da 
Caparica, and Curia each hosted small groups of refugees, but the two most 
populous were two coastal towns near Lisbon: Caldas da Rainha and 
Ericeira.150 Jewish refugees in forced residence could not work or leave the town 
without authorisation from the PVDE, but were free to move and to choose 
their residence within its limits. They elected their own representatives to voice 
the needs of the refugee community, and the police listened to their needs. 
Refugee children were allowed to attend school provided that a relief agency 
covered their tuition fees. Religious activities were permitted in two small 
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synagogues opened to such end in Ericeira and Caldas. Recreational and 
vocational group activities were permitted after HERE approval from the 
PVDE.151 For the refugees in forced residence, the main problem was one of 
‘forced inactivity’, as relief organisations struggled to help them become self-
sufficient.152 Some refugees engaged in irregular work, whether teaching 
languages, manufacturing clothes, or selling food and other goods to the rest of 
refugees. Refugees were still obliged to renew their residence permits every 
thirty days, but these permits were always granted by the PVDE.153 In April 
1942, Charles R. Joy, head of the USC office in Lisbon summarised his views 
on their conditions in forced residence like this: 
‘Their life at Caldas da Rainha is very interesting and revealing. Almost all of 
them spend their entire day in the little square, either in the cafés drinking coffee 
and swapping rumors or walking around the square … The country round 
about is beautiful; it is a pleasure resort for the Portuguese; but the refugees never 
leave the center of the town. While they get excited about the rumors, many of 
them are quite content with life at Caldas da Rainha … Some of them are living 
better than they ever lived before … Recent letters have come back from Cuba 
expressing regret on the part of the writers that they ever left Caldas, and saying 
that life in Portugal was very much more comfortable than their present life in 
Cuba. In our own work I have had to take very drastic measures with a few 
families to force them out of Portugal when they simply did not want to go’.154 
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The Organisation of  Relief  in Franco’s Spain 
 
Throughout the war, the Franco regime refused to allow any foreign relief 
agency to operate on Spanish soil and was hostile to foreign relief workers. If 
they were Jewish, this was even more the case. The expulsion of the British 
Quakers Alfred and Norma Jacobs is an illustrative example of this attitude. 
The Jacobs were representatives in Spain of the Friends Relief Service (FRS), 
the relief arm of London’s Religious Society of Friends. Since 1928, they had 
led the FRS office in Barcelona (Servicio Internacional de los Amigos Cuáqueros) 
and worked in several areas of relief. During the Spanish Civil War, they 
established children’s colonies away from the cities to protect Spanish children 
from air raids and the war.155 But the fact that civil war caught them in 
Republican Spain meant that they were immediately suspicious from the point 
of view of the Francoists. On 7 August 1940, Alfred Jacobs —and by extension 
also his wife— received their expulsion order from the Barcelona chief of 
police. Their internal police file states: ‘it has not been possible to ascertain the 
kind of political activities in which this individual has been involved during the 
period of Marxist domination [republican territory during the Spanish Civil 
War] but, in view of his Jewish background, it appears that he was a great 
supporter of the Marxist cause’.156 The Jacobs left the same month of August, 
and the Barcelona office of the FRS was closed for good. Considering the fact 
that the British Quakers had been actively offering relief to both sides of the 
civil war, this example elicits the lack of sense of humanitarianism and concern 
for the plight of refugees in Francoist Spain. 
Ironically, the Spanish government was quick to request foreign relief 
assistance in the late summer of 1940, when a disastrously bad harvest 
aggravated the already delicate national situation that resulted from nearly 
three years of civil war.157 From September 1940, the Spanish government 
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expressed its desire to obtain foodstuffs and other commodities from the USA 
to meet the serious shortage in Spain. The US State Department saw this as an 
opportunity to promote good relations with the most moderate elements within 
Franco’s government in an attempt to secure Spanish neutrality. One key point 
of contact in the negotiations was Franco’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel 
Juan Luís Beigbeder, who was most anxious to keep Spain out of the conflict. 
On 17 October 1940, however, Beigbeder was replaced by Serrano Súñer at the 
MAE, who had just returned from Berlin and Rome precisely to draw Spain 
closer to the Axis. Due to the little prospect of influencing the Spanish 
government, the US State Department considered that the basis which had 
justified offering emergency assistance to Spain through the shipment of 
foodstuffs no longer existed. But the British disagreed with the view of the 
Americans. On 8 December, the British Embassy in Madrid submitted a 
memorandum to the US ambassador which indicated that London was very 
keen to offer the Spanish government large quantities of wheat from its own 
stocks in Argentina and Canada, and urged the US government to do the same. 
On 16 December, US ambassador to Spain, Alexander W. Weddell, sent a 
statement to President Roosevelt: ‘In view of British insistence in the matter we 
have now reconsidered our position’. Three days later, the White House gave 
green light to the project.158  
The distribution of wheat, flour, milk, vitamin supplements, and medical 
supplies to Spain, was to be carried out by the American Red Cross (ARC). The 
ARC relief programme for Spain began in early 1941 and ended with the 
Spanish harvest of 1941. This agreement with the Spanish government was 
reached on four conditions: that no wheat or flour be exported during that 
period; that the Anglo-American relief initiative be publicised within Spain; 
that Spanish authorities prioritise those in most need and do not charge for 
these services; and that the distribution of  relief supplies within Spain was 
supervised by the ARC in cooperation with the Spanish Red Cross (SRC).159 
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When the ARC special commission arrived in Madrid at the end of January 
1941, however, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramón Serrano Súñer, did not 
stand by his word: the distribution of relief supplies in Spain was to be 
supervised by Auxilio Social (‘Social Aid’) and not by the ARC.160 Auxilio Social 
was the largest relief organisation in Franco’s Spain, and since it was 
administered by Falange’s Women’s Section (Sección Femenina), it fell within 
the jurisdiction of the leader of Falange, Serrano Súñer.161 By the time the ARC 
commission left Spain in the Autumn, the Franco regime had received very 
generous very donations. The SS Cold Harbor brought to Spain 4,500 tons of 
wheat flour, 250 tons of powdered milk, 250 tons of condensed milk, and 30 
trucks for distribution of relief. The SS Capulín transported more than 10,000 
tons of foodstuffs and medical supplies. The SS Navemar brought 3,000 tons of 
foodstuffs, and 171 crates of medicines. The SS Motormar carried 425 tons of 
wheat flour, and 50 tons of soap. Finally, the SS Artigas brought 300 tons of 
flour.162 
Despite the generous Anglo-American donation to Spain, Auxilio Social 
adopted an arrogant and intransigent position in regards to the distribution of 
ARC relief supplies within Spain. Despite grave charges of mismanagement 
and misappropriation of funds by high officials within the Falange-run 
organisation, Auxilio Social remained adamant that it was able to meet all relief 
needs in all parts of Spain, and refused cooperation from the Americans.163 
Philip A. Conard, in charge of the AFSC office in Lisbon, described it like this:  
																																																																		
160 Weddell to Hull (7 February 1941); NARA, RG-59, Box 5244. 
161 Auxilio Social only acquired that name after the Unification Decree of  1937. When it was 
first established in October 1936, it had been named Auxilio de Invierno (‘Winter Relief ’) after 
the Nazis’ Winterhilfswerk, upon which it was modelled. See Markus Höffer-Mehlmer, 
Modernisierung und Sozialarbeit in Spanien (Bremen: Europäischer Hochschulverlag, 2009), 62-5. 
162 See Ernest J. Swift, ARC Vice-Chairman, to Hull (17 January 1941); and Weddell to Hull 
(21 March 1941); NARA, RG-59, Box 5244. 
163 Alexander W. Weddell, US Ambassador in Madrid, to US DS (22 January 1940); NARA, 
RG-59, Box 5243. 
  162 
‘They say they have all the facts about every family and every person, such as 
nobody else has or can have; that they know with certainty where help is needed 
and how much; that if anybody wants to help intelligently, the way to do it is to 
turn over to the “Auxilio Social” the means and materials for such help and it 
will be distributed where it will do the most good’.164 
 
The conditions in which Auxilio Social distributed relief were hardly driven 
by humanitarian principles, and conditional on strict adherence to the practice 
of Catholicism and to the tenets of Falange. Yet, for many parents, this was the 
only way to feed their children in post-civil war Spain.165 The least fortunate 
children were those who, in addition to having lost their parents during the war, 
grew up in the sinister ‘children’s homes’ (hogares) administered by Auxilio 
Social. In addition to being forced to pray upon waking up and before going to 
bed, and before and after every meal; they were also required to sing the 
Falange anthem daily and were effectively subject to military discipline.166 
Moreover, if their carers knew —or suspected— that these were orphans of 
Spanish Republican parents, their experience was even more terrifying: 
‘Some of the nuns had lost their brothers, uncles, or fathers. Some fell victims to 
bombings, others died at the hands of Republicans, “the damned Reds!” as they 
said. And for these poor women we were also damned Reds. At the slightest 
provocation we were pinched, beaten, and punished long hours with our knees 
on the ground. There was constant hysterical screaming around us. We didn’t 
know how to defend ourselves. We breathed an air of resentment around us, 
and that rancour scared us because we couldn’t do anything to nullify it. We 
knew we were guilty, but we didn’t know what we had done wrong. When the 
classes ended —which consisted exclusively of reading the lives of saints— they 
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would stand us up, and we would sing the Cara al Sol [Falange’s anthem] with 
our arms extended’.167 
 
In such unwelcoming environment, Jewish organisations struggled to offer relief 
to Jewish refugees in Spain. In most parts of Europe, JDC had been able to do so by 
funding local Jewish communities, many of which were already engaged in relief 
activities of their own. But in Franco’s Spain this was not possible. Jews were barely 
tolerated, and any Jewish association was quickly suppressed by the government. Dr 
Wertheimer, for example, who was the former president of  the Jewish 
Community of  Berlin as well as naturalised Spaniard, was only allowed to 
remain in Spain thanks to the intervention of  an influential Spanish friend and 
the promise to abstain from all collaboration with Jewish institutions in Spain 
in the future.168 This attitude, combined with the Francoist refusal to authorise any 
foreign relief agency on Spanish soil, proved a true nightmare for relief workers and 
refugees alike. In fact, the only way in which private relief organisations managed to 
circumvent these obstacles successfully was by seeking the protection of the Allied 
diplomatic missions in Spain, and especially of the US Embassy in Madrid. 
The first person to defy the Spanish chauvinistic attitudes to relief was the wife of 
the US Ambassador to Spain, Virginia C. S. Weddell, whom Sir Samuel Hoare 
described as ‘the soul of human kindness’.169 In October 1940, several months before 
the beginning of its official relief programme for Spain, the ARC sent $5,000 to Virginia 
Weddell for the purchase of food and medical supplies, and requested that she form a 
local relief committee in cooperation with the SRC. Weddell accepted the proposal, and 
formed a committee together with other Embassy staff and the SRC.170 Soon, Weddell 
began to fund her own relief activities, and to receive further donations from AFSC —
initially, for value of $1000. Within weeks, ARC showed satisfaction with Weddell’s 
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work: ‘she is doing a good job and will competently administer whatever resources can 
be placed at her disposal’.171 She visited military hospitals and distributed clothing to the 
wounded, distributed vaccines and medicines, and set up a small orphanage with a 
group of American women to take care of homeless children of the civil war —later 
turned over to Auxilio Social. Once she had gained the favour of Spanish authorities, 
Weddell began directing her efforts towards hundreds of refugees who had fled Nazi 
terror and now populated prisons and camps across Spain.172 
In February 1941, Joseph Schwartz, head of the JDC office in Lisbon, 
heard about Virginia Weddell’s relief activities. Immediately, the JDC began to 
subsidise her committee with $500 per month. With these funds, Weddell 
brought food and clothing amongst Jewish internees at Miranda, distributed 
cash grants to their wives and children on the outside, and assisted their 
migration whenever possible. That same month of February, Weddell managed 
to successfully release Jewish refugees from Miranda for the first time —the 
father and son of the Gans family— and arrange their emigration to 
Argentina.173 Emma Ratin, a Russian Jewish refugee who had been expelled 
from Mallorca, offered herself as a volunteer, and began to administer the US 
Embassy’s Jewish relief service.174 During 1941, as migration from the 
Peninsula became increasingly difficult —due, for instance, to the new US visa 
requirements— the Jewish refugee situation in Spain also became more acute. 
In view of the growing number of refugees in need, the JDC increased its 
monthly contribution from $500 to $1,000 in November, and to $1,500 from 
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December 1941.175 Virginia Weddell’s relief activities in Spain were so 
impressive relative to the size of her small team, that Serrano Súñer himself 
praised her as Washington’s ‘second ambassador’ to Spain.176 
Partnership between JDC and Virginia Weddell’s relief committee 
continued through June 1942, when it was suddenly discontinued. Back in 
March 1942, Washington had forbidden all US citizens from communicating 
with enemy countries, Axis-occupied countries, or persons formerly nationals 
of ‘enemy’ countries. Upon receiving such news, Mrs Weddell consulted with 
the US State Department, whose ambiguous response sufficed to allow the 
continuation of her relief activities as long as these remained independent from 
the US Embassy. Although technically against US Government censorship 
regulations, the Embassy’s relief work was transferred to the hands of Dorsey 
‘Zora’ Stephens, Weddell’s right-hand on relief matters, and wife of Lieutenant-
Colonel Stephens, Military Attaché at the US Embassy in Madrid. After 
consultation with JDC New York, Joseph Schwartz gave green light in behalf 
of JDC.177 Unfortunately, the frail health of US Ambassador Alexander 
Weddell meant that he had to be relieved from his post in Madrid in the late 
spring. On 16 May 1942, the new US ambassador to Spain, Carlton J. H. 
Hayes, landed in Madrid. It did not take Hayes very long to raise his objections 
regarding Dorsey Stephens’ relief activities. In Hayes’ view, and rightly so, the 
arrangement achieved between Mrs Weddell and Mrs Stephens still violated 
the ruling of their government that no US citizen should communicate with 
enemy nationals or persons formerly members of enemy nationality. 
Concerned with damaging the already delicate diplomatic relations between 
the US and the Franco government, Hayes ordered the immediate cessation of 
such relief activities, as well as the Embassy’s partnership with the JDC. 
Indeed, the ambassador was right. Virginia Weddell’s relief committee was not 
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seen sympathetically by the Franco regime, which had so far tolerated her relief 
activities because of her official status, and despite their view that all charitable 
initiatives would be better administer by Auxilio Social.178  
In a letter to Joseph Schwartz, Hayes clarified that his decision to 
terminate the Embassy’s work with Jewish refugees had been motivated 
entirely by his desire to adhere to the policy of the US State Department. 
Furthermore, the ambassador confessed to be aware the plight of the refugees, 
and promised Schwartz: ‘I wish to do everything in my power to aid you and 
the JDC’.179 Indeed, in parallel to serving as Professor of European History at 
Columbia University for many years, Hayes was also Catholic co-chairman at 
the interfaith National Conference of Christians and Jews (NCCJ), and was 
considered ‘one of the most liberal of prominent American Catholics’.180 Since 
the JDC had already transferred the funds for the month of June, Hayes allowed 
Dorsey Stephens to continue distributing relief during the month of June 1942, 
and suggested that the JDC should find somebody to replace her thereafter who 
was neither an US citizen nor connected to the US Embassy. 
The person who took over Stephens’ activities was a Spanish woman 
named Luisa, who continued to distribute JDC funds to a ‘Jewish list’ of about 
250 Miranda internees through September 1942. In doing so, Stephens and 
Schwartz also disobeyed the ambassador’s ruling. Each month, Schwartz 
would set aside 1,000 Portuguese escudos for Stephens, who would then 
reimburse Luisa with an equivalent amount in pesetas. As such, this 
arrangement was ‘strictly under the hat’, and was not known to Ambassador 
Hayes. For lying to the ambassador, Stephens said she felt obliged to confess 
every week —‘which is very frequent for a liberal Catholic like me’.181 
Ultimately, Schwartz admitted the truth to Hayes during a visit to Madrid in 
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December 1942. Despite not being welcoming to the truth at first, the 
ambassador acknowledged the desperate situation of Jewish refugees, and took 
it upon himself to establish a permanent relief office in Spain.182 
Meanwhile, the JDC had also exploited other avenues to offer relief to 
Jewish refugees in Franco’s Spain. Since the beginning of 1941, JDC 
cooperated with Fred Max Oberländer, a Jewish merchant in the fountain pen 
business who had a shop in Barcelona. There is little we know about this man, 
other that he had been sent by Vienna’s Orthodox Jewish community —the 
Israelitische Kultusgemeinde (IKG)— and that he looked after Jewish refugees in 
Barcelona and Miranda thanks to funds from JDC. But his situation was 
precarious, and he felt obliged to migrate in September 1941.183  
That same month, the JDC found a better solution. Since Portuguese 
citizens were allowed to work in Spain owing to reciprocal labour provisions 
between the Franco and the Salazar regimes, Schwartz convinced Dr Samuel 
Sequerra, of the Lisbon Jewish Community, to work as the unofficial JDC 
representative in Barcelona. Evidently, they had to find a cover to circumvent 
the Francoist aversion to foreign relief agencies. Officially, Sequerra travelled 
to Barcelona in quality of representative of the Portuguese Red Cross (PRC), 
and discreetly began his work as JDC representative. Given the undercover 
nature of this arrangement, Sequerra’s initial activities in behalf of the JDC 
were humble in scope. Since the JDC was not authorised to distribute funds 
directly to refugees in Spain, the British Consulate in Barcelona acted as an 
intermediary: they would distribute funds amongst refugees in need —either 
towards migration or assistance— and the JDC would reimburse them for the 
expenses.184 
Initially, Sequerra’s JDC ‘office’ was based at Barcelona’s Hotel Bristol, 
very close to the US, the British, and French —but also the German— 
consulates. Despite its modest beginnings, Sequerra’s organisation grew 
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rapidly, and soon counted twelve staff members working from eight hotel 
rooms.185 In Madrid, where there was no official JDC representation, Sequerra 
liaised with Moshe Eisen, a Polish Jewish refugee aged twenty-one who earned 
his living as doorman to Madrid’s Hotel Mediodía a refugee-laden hotel 
opposite Madrid’s main train station of Atocha. Eisen’s task was to look after 
JDC cases in the capital —providing lodging and money allowances— and to 
report to Sequerra on these activities. The young Moshe did all of this from the 
hotel lobby, and thus faced great risk. With the increased refugee influx of late 
1942, Eisen was not able to deal with the number of help-seeking refugees —
often more than 100 at a time— and Sequerra began to look for a more 
organised solution. It was then that Maurice Kranz, another refugee, offered to 
lease two rooms at Hotel Medíodia and established the JDC ‘office’ in Madrid. 
Kranz continued to care for JDC cases in the Madrid region, and provided 
refugees with migration advice. Despite having Sequerra’s authorisation to do 
so, Kranz’s bureau in Madrid was not sanctioned by neither of the JDC offices 
in New York or in Lisbon, which evinces the fragile position of the JDC —
otherwise the most powerful Jewish relief agency— in Francoist Spain.186 
In addition to the contrasting level of organisation, another major 
difference between the work of the JDC in Portugal and Spain concerns police 
attitudes towards relief organisations. The Spanish police barely tolerated the 
JDC’s work in Spain, and found numerous ways of troubling Sequerra’s work. 
They questioned Sequerra about certain refugees, extorted fines from his 
organisation, and physically threatened his own staff. Early in August 1942, the 
police assaulted and vandalised Sequerra’s office at Hotel Bristol, and arrested 
one of his assistants. A few weeks after this event, Sequerra wrote still in shock:  
‘The Spanish police is controlled by the Gestapo. In spite of the fact that they 
know of the humanitarian work that we do, they do not stop torturing us. 
During the month of August they took away all our files and papers and 
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returned them only after almost a month, and then only a part … The Jewish 
organisations in Portugal are simply admitted to function, and we are barely 
tolerated’.187 
 
With the onset of the deportations from France during the summer of 
1942, the refugee crisis in Spain intensified. By virtue of new immigration rules, 
Vichy suspended the issuance of new exit visas to Jews, and all exit permits 
already issued to Jews had to be reconfirmed by Vichy’s authorities —this last 
measure did not apply to Jews of French, Belgian, and Dutch nationality.188 
Consequently, many Jewish refugees were forced to cross the Franco-Spanish 
border illegally, and Spanish authorities reacted by reinforcing border 
surveillance, thus compromising Sequerra’s work: 
‘On the one hand the refugees ask us to save them, on the other the Spanish 
police demands of us that we give them the names of those who seek our help. 
If we so denounced them, they would be immediately arrested. I have, naturally, 
refused to accede to this demand’.189 
 
Possibly the most tragic side to this story is the fact that, despite the 
attitude of Francoist authorities, there were many foreign relief workers 
desirous to assist refugees in Franco’s Spain who were barred from doing so for 
no compelling reason. From their Lisbon office, AFSC had been trying to offer 
relief to Jewish refugees in Spain throughout 1941.190 In February 1942, they 
even donated an important sum of money to Madrid’s Casa de las Mercedes, were 
orphans of army officials were cared for, in an attempt ‘to grease the palms of 
Spanish officials’.191 The Unitarians also tried to send an USC representative to 
Spain to offer relief to refugees in prison or unable to migrate.192 But to no avail.  
																																																																		
187 Sequerra, ‘Memorandum on the situation in Spain’ (ca. 2 October 1942); JDC, Reel 69, 
Folder 914. 
188 Schwartz, JDC Lisbon, to JDC New York (11 August 1942); JDC, Reel 69, Folder 914. 
189 Sequerra, ‘Memorandum on the situation in Spain’ (ca. 2 October 1942); JDC, Reel 69, 
Folder 914. 
190 Conard, ‘A Long Week-End in Spain; Report of  a Visit to Madrid’ (19-28 July 1941); AFSC, 
Box 3, Folder 3. 
191 Conard, ‘Notes on a Visit to Spain’ (10 August 1942); AFSC, Box 4, Folder 6. 
192 Dexter to Hooper (23 Sept 41); Dexter papers, Box 1, folder 14. 
  170 
Lisbon: Europe’s Refugee Capital 
 
In sharp contrast with Franco’s Spain, where neither Jews nor foreign 
relief organisations were welcome, Lisbon proved to be one of Europe’s main 
refugee and relief hubs. This owes both to its political and geographical 
situation in relation to the rest of the continent. On the one hand, Lisbon was 
the European capital least touched by the conflict, and enjoyed relatively 
normal life and tranquility away from the horrors of war.193 On the other hand, 
the Portuguese capital had also privileged access to the Atlantic Ocean and was 
one of the busiest ports for wartime Europe. In Koestler’s rhetoric: ‘Lisbon was 
the bottleneck of Europe, the last open gate of a concentration camp extending 
over the greater part of the Continent’s surface’.194 In this context, some of the 
most active private agencies in Europe —AFSC, JDC, HICEM, and USC— 
moved their European headquarters to the Portuguese capital within the first 
months of war.195 In regards to Jewish relief and rescue, the presence of an 
important Lisbon Jewish Community —not in size, but in deed— proved 
decisive for Lisbon’s success. Owing to its good relations with Portuguese 
officials, for instance, the Jewish Community of Lisbon was able to obtain 
concessions from the Salazar regime regarding the treatment of Jewish 
refugees, bargain with Portuguese shipping companies, and support the work 
of foreign relief organisations operating from the capital. 
The Lisbon Jewish Community comprised about 400 Sephardic Jews who 
constituted the nucleus of the city’s Jewish life before the war, and an additional 
500 Ashkenazi Jews who migrated from Poland during the 1920s, and from 
Germany since 1933. The majority of Sephardim worked in the liberal 
professions, with some very wealthy merchants amongst them. By contrast, 
Lisbon’s Ashkenazim worked mainly as tradesmen and peddlers, or in the 
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manufacture of knitted and leather goods. This disparity in economic status 
explains why there were very few Ashkenazi Jews in the community’s 
executive committee, which was dominated by the Sephardim.196 The 
Community was presided by Moisés Bensabat Amzalak, a polemic personality, 
above all due to his close friendship with Salazar, whom he befriended during 
their college years at the University of Coimbra. Amzalak was both a published 
economics scholar, and a public figure engaged in political activity. In his role 
as academic, he was professor at Lisbon’s Technical University, as well as dean 
of the Institute of Higher Economic Studies since 1931. In regard to his public 
activity, he was co-director of O Século, one of the main daily newspapers in 
Portugal.197 In addition to his leadership position within the Lisbon Jewish 
community, Amzalak also cultivated friendship with non-Jews amongst the 
Portuguese elite, the most notable being, of course, the dictator himself. As a 
conservative and anti-Republican, Amzalak was a loyal supported of Salazar’s 
authoritarian regime.198 In an interview he gave for the Israeli newspaper 
Haaretz on 28 July 1978, the Jewish community leader attributed Salazar’s 
sympathy for the refugees to his friendship with the dictator.199 Contemporary 
accounts, however, depict Amzalak as a self-centred personality with 
narcissistic tendencies. As seen by James H. Mann, Assistant Executive 
Director of the War Refugee Board (WRB), Amzalak ‘hadn’t the slightest 
interest in rescuing Jews from occupied territory’. Rabbi Disendruck, a linguist 
who also worked towards the relief activities of Lisbon’s Jewish community, 
described its president as ‘a man who was not interested in either religious or 
welfare work, but was interested only in adding to the prestige of Amzalak’.200 
The relief branch of the Lisbon Jewish Community was the Comissão 
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Portuguesa de Assistência aos Judeus Refugiados (‘Portuguese Relief Committee for 
Jewish Refugees’), and had its main offices at Rua Rosa Araújo 35. 
COMASSIS, for short, was established upon the initiative of Professor Adolfo 
Benarus in early 1933 to assist the first refugees from Nazism. Benarus’ prestige 
amongst both Jews and non-Jews helped advance the committee’s causes.201 
With the increased influx of refugees that ensued the Anschluss of 1938, Benarus’ 
advanced age —he had turned 75 that year— forced him to step down as 
president of COMASSIS. The man who to took over his role was Dr Augusto 
d’Esaguy, who had been the committee’s Secretary-General since its 
foundation in 1933, and continued as COMASSIS’ president through 1945. A 
published physician, Dr d’Esaguy had developed a great interest in Ashkenazic 
culture, the languages of Eastern European Jews, and was a fervent supporter 
of the Zionist cause. Although operating on a small budget, COMASSIS 
provided European refugees with medical and psychological care, and voiced 
their needs with the Portuguese government and the PVDE in relation, for 
instance, to the issuance of residence and work permits. Additionally, 
COMASSIS also ran a community kitchen at 21 Travessa do Noronha, not far 
from its main offices.  
Following the fall of France in June 1940, COMASSIS became 
overwhelmed with the number of Jewish refugees seeking assistance. In less 
than  four weeks, the committee’s monthly budget rose from $400, to 
$10,000.202 To face the wave of refugees fleeing France, COMASSIS hired 
additional staff to provide extra accommodation, and more than two hundred 
daily meals at its community kitchen. Likewise, the increased budget meant 
that the Lisbon committee became almost entirely dependent on funds from 
JDC and HICEM. With these funds, COMASSIS was able to renovate its 
public kitchen and provide a basic living allowance to refugees. During the 
summer of 1940, COMASSIS struggled to convince the PVDE to grant transit 
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permits to Jews stranded above the Pyrenees, and negotiated the release of Jews 
detained at seaports, airports, and the Spanish-Portuguese border. COMASSIS 
also acted on behalf of the Luxembourgish Jews whom the Germans deported 
from Luxembourg aboard the Zwangstransporte. Thanks to d’Esaguy’s 
intervention, two of these groups were released from detention and made their 
way into Portugal in late 1940. They were allowed to stay in Lisbon until the 
could arrange their migration overseas. In parallel to these activities, 
COMASSIS also established a mission in the city of Porto in cooperation with 
its local Jewish community. The mission was headed by Hans Warmbrunn, a 
refugee from Frankfurt who had made a living in Porto representing chemical 
and metal firms. When refugees began to pour into Porto, Warmbrunn 
distributed relief funds amongst refugees, arranged travel permits with the 
PVDE to allow them to reach the port of Lisbon, and provided with the 
liturgical needs of Hasidic Jews, amongst other initiatives.203 
During the summer of 1940, JDC and HICEM, the two main Jewish 
organisations offering relief and migration assistance to Jewish refugees in 
Europe, were forced relocate their European headquarters from Paris to Lisbon. 
From the Portuguese capital, d’Esaguy lobbied the authorities to recognise 
HICEM and JDC, and to allow them to operate in Portugal. Additionally, 
COMASSIS also provided the infrastructure for their rescue activities. Joseph 
J. Schwartz, the JDC’s European director, moved to Lisbon on 14 June 1940. 
Schwartz opened offices at 242 Rua Áurea, in the middle of the commercial 
and banking district, and within walking distance from COMASSIS’ main 
office. It would be impossible to list here the number of relief activities which 
the JDC office coordinated from Lisbon. Possibly one of its earliest and most 
tangible achievements relates to the ‘transmigration’ of Jewish refuges from the 
Reich. From late 1940, JDC and COMASSIS acted as a liaison for thousands 
of refugees who migrated from Nazi-occupied territories in sealed trains that 
connected Berlin with the Port of Lisbon. Transports arrived regularly with 
more than 50 persons each, usually a day or two before their sailing was due. 
Upon arrival, the staff of COMASSIS and JDC accommodated refugees in 
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hotels and boarding-houses; stored their luggage; checked the validity of their 
visas; helped them take the medical examination; and acted with shipping 
companies and the PVDE on their behalf. Within the first three months of 1941, 
1,603 Jewish refugees passed through Lisbon in this way.204 Another important 
achievement of Schwartz’s JDC office was to persuade shipping companies to 
include Casablanca in their routes between Lisbon and the Western 
Hemisphere, thus permitting thousands of stranded refugees there to be 
evacuated.205 Similarly, with the toughening of US visa requirements during the 
summer of 1941, Schwartz sought for alternative routes to Brazil and 
Argentine. Later that year, he also persuaded the CCN, in charge of the SS 
Serpa Pinto, to make a special stop in Santo Domingo so that refugees did not 
need a Cuban transit visa in order to go to the Dominican Republic.206 
The German invasion of Belgium on 10 May 1940 forced HICEM to close 
down its offices in Brussels and Paris, and to look for a new centre of 
operations. As the emblematic leader of the Belgian Jewish Community, Max 
Gottschalk, put it: ‘This place for the time being can only be Lisbon’.207 
Although the bulk of its European activities were directed from Lisbon, 
HICEM also opened two branch offices in Marseille (425 Rue Paradis) and 
Algiers (2 Impasse Bresnier). The Marseille office, however, was dissolved on 
29 November 1941 by virtue of the same French law that established UGIF. In 
Lisbon, Dr James Bernstein and Ilya Dijour headed the HICEM office at 12 
Rua Braamcamp, just two blocks away from COMASSIS’ headquarters and in 
the vicinity of the US and the Spanish consulates. HICEM’s main contribution 
was to assist the emigration of refugees, not just from the Iberian Peninsula, but 
from unoccupied France as well. This included, amongst other tasks, the 
promotion of visa applications with officials of potential host countries, and the 
search for friends and relatives of emigration candidates in those countries to 
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maximise their chances of admission. If refugees had no economic means or 
relatives who could assist them financially, HICEM also covered the costs of 
their migration. 
One of the first non-Jewish committees to settle in Lisbon was the USC. 
The relief activities of the American Unitarian Association (AUA) began in 
early 1939, when the Unitarians joined forces with the AFSC to send a relief 
commission to Czechoslovakia. This mission was headed by Rev. Waitstill H. 
Sharp and Martha Sharp. The Sharps had planned to open USC’s headquarters 
on French soil, but in view of the German invasion they opted for Lisbon 
instead. Waitstill Sharp spend most of the summer of 1940 setting the Lisbon 
office of the USC in motion. As it was already common practice, he chose to 
establish the USC office at 103 Rua Rodrigo da Fonseca, in the proximity to 
the other relief committees.208 Martha Sharp, on the other hand, worked 
primarily from the USC office in Marseille, and in late 1940, organised 
USCOM’s first Jewish children convoy from unoccupied France. Besides their 
work with children refugees, one distinguishing feature of the Unitarians is that 
they prioritised the rescue of —as USC founder Robert C. Dexter put it— 
‘worthwhile’ cases.209 Owing to their philosophy, the Unitarians became Varian 
Fry’s closest partners. From their Lisbon office, they directed hundreds of 
intellectuals through the Iberian Peninsula towards the Western Hemisphere. 
In words of Charles R. Joy, who took over the USC office in Lisbon in 
September 1940:  
‘Few people, therefore, realize the magnitude and the significance of that river 
of life. It was not made up of ordinary people. It was composed of the leaders 
in art, science, literature, and politics. It was our self-appointed task to help those 
whose gifts of heart and mind could be ill spared by the world. We were making 
channels for a mighty river of culture that flowed out of Europe to the West’.210 
 
 
																																																																		
208 In November 1941, USC moved its Lisbon office to 15 Rua Castilho, even closer to 
COMASSIS and the other relief agencies. 
209 Dexter to Hooper (1 September 1941); Dexter Papers, Box 1, Folder 14. 
210 Joy, ‘For the Future in the Distance: the Unitarian Service Committee in World War II’ 
  176 
In addition to rescuing Europe’s most reputed intellectuals, the Unitarians were 
also invested in saving the leadership of democratic Europe. In contrast to the law-
abiding Jewish relief committees and the pacifist and pro-neutrality approach of the 
Quakers, the Unitarians were vigorous supporters of the Allied cause and were ready to 
risk the displeasure of the governments of Vichy, Madrid, and Lisbon.211 As 
summarised by Elizabeth A. Dexter, the USC was ‘positively not neutral, and were glad 
to run the risk’.212 For this reason, it became common practice for the other relief 
committees in Lisbon to hand over to the USC the cases of political refugees: pacifists, 
anti-fascist activists, Spanish Republicans, democrat leaders, and others on the Nazis’ 
‘black list’. In return, HICEM handled a good deal of the transportation arrangements 
for USC protégés, who often shared sailings with the JDC and AFSC cases. 
Additionally, USC Lisbon also organised an extensive package service that sent small 
parcels of food from to Spain and France, and acted as agent in Lisbon for several other 
organisations, including the International Migration Service (IMS), and the 
International Rescue and Relief Committee (IRRC).213 
The next major relief organisation to move to Lisbon were the Quakers of 
the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). Although unofficially, 
AFSC relief activities in the Peninsula began months before the official 
establishment of the AFSC office in Lisbon, in May 1941. The volunteer who 
first distributed relief in behalf of the AFSC was Dina A. Moore-Bowden, a 
well-to-do California-born English lady who had been resident of Mallorca 
years before the war  and was fluent in English, German, French, and Spanish. 
Moore-Bowden was well known to the refugee community in Mallorca, as she 
ran a recreation and activities centre for children of the island’s international 
colony.214 On 22 June 1940, one of her friends wrote to her in despair that their 
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male Jewish friends in Mallorca had been ‘taken away from their homes’ to the 
camp at Miranda de Ebro.215 The letter came from Erna Klepper, a Protestant 
refugee from Germany and mother of three who was also being harassed by the 
Gestapo.216 For some time, Moore-Bowden managed to provide aid —from her 
own money— to Erna and other refugee families in Mallorca, who had been 
left in freedom until their savings ran out. Soon, demand for help increased, 
and Moore-Bowden felt obliged to request assistance from two relief 
organisations: the FRS, represented by Alfred Jacobs in Barcelona; and —
through Virginia Weddell’s relief committee in Madrid— the JDC office in 
Lisbon. After the expulsion of Alfred and Norma Jacobs in early August 1940, 
the Jacobs referred Moore-Bowden to the American Quakers in Philadelphia, 
and the AFSC began funding her relief work in the Peninsula. Moore-Bowden, 
who refused to leave for the US in view of the situation of her friends in 
Mallorca, moved to Lisbon to continue her relief activities. From Philadelphia, 
the staff of AFSC proved most cooperative, and even signed affidavits to 
support the emigration to the US of some of the refugee families in Mallorca. 
In view of the great demand for relief, AFSC sent Marjorie Page 
Schauffler, of AFSC’s Refugee Section, to study the refugee situation in the 
Iberian Peninsula. Schauffler arrived in Lisbon on 7 February 1941, and 
remained there for six weeks during which she made contacts and paved the 
way for the formal opening of the AFSC office. In addition, Schauffler also 
looked for potential children candidates for the USCOM programme in Lisbon. 
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Upon quitting Lisbon, Schauffler had left two of her collaborators temporarily 
in charge of AFSC activities: Dina A. Moore-Bowden, and Lise Lindbaek, a 
Norwegian citizen also engaged in relief activities.217 Philip A. Conard, the 
official AFSC representative, arrived on 11 May 1941 to begin the official work 
of AFSC in Lisbon. Conard had just retired from the YMCA’s international 
committee after 35 years as delegate in South America, in fact, he sailed to 
Lisbon from Montevideo. Initially, Conard, Moore-Bowden, and Lindbaek 
worked from Lisbon’s Hotel Borges, blocks away from the JDC office. Every 
morning, refugees lined up in the hotel corridor outside their rooms, and were 
interviewed at the rate of 50 to 60 per day. Progressively, they hired more hotel 
rooms and personnel to deal with the demand for assistance. Once it became 
too expensive, they began looking for a long-term solution. On 27 June 1941, 
they moved from Hotel Borges to the new AFSC office at 7 Rua Dom Pedro 
V.218  
Unlike the Unitarians, the Quakers did not emphasise the productivity 
and achievements of the refugees they assisted. Rather, AFSC prioritised 
refugees in greatest need, whatever their status, and particularly those who were 
not eligible for assistance from any of the other committees. They helped 
legalise the status of undocumented refugees who had been imprisoned by the 
PVDE, and provided them with financial support and emigration assistance. In 
this sense, the Quakers developed good rapport with the PVDE, and in 
particular with the head of prisons, Captain Gaspar de Oliveira, and the head 
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of the visa division, Captain João Amado.219 They also cooperated with JDC 
in arranging the transportation of the children convoys evacuated from France 
by USCOM. This included looking after them from the moment they crossed 
the Franco-Spanish border until they embarked from Lisbon. They purchased 
food for child-feeding programmes in France, and cooperated in the 
distribution of ARC food and medical supplies to Franco’s Spain. AFSC also 
effected money transfers from relatives in the US, Canada, and South American 
countries, for refugees stranded in Portugal. Lastly, the AFSC office in Lisbon 
also provided financial assistance to ‘transmigrants’ from Germany, who 
reached Portugal with a mere 10 RM ($4) each, and thus could not pay for their 
expenses while in Lisbon nor for the expensive transatlantic passages. 
Maintenance would be given for a few days or weeks until they could embark. 
At times, one single expired document would leave refugees stranded for 
years.220  
The AFSC office in Lisbon also assisted the emigration of refugees 
referred to them by AFSC delegates across Europe. Since ship bookings were 
essential to obtain transit visas for Portugal, and these in turn to obtain transit 
visas for Spain, AFSC would book shipping passages in their behalf and thus 
break that bureaucratic vicious circle. Given that shipping companies used to 
sell all places available months ahead of the actual sailing, almost every ship 
left Lisbon with some empty spaces due to frequent last-minute cancellations. 
Hence, AFSC was often able to get tickets at the eleventh hour. From the 
official opening of the AFSC Lisbon office in May until the end of 1941, AFSC 
assisted the emigration of 150 Jewish refugees —who represented a third of 
their total casework. During 1942, AFSC Lisbon assisted sent a total of 83 
Jewish persons —from 260 migration cases. These are small figures when 
compared to the thousands who migrated thanks to the efforts of the Jewish 
organisations, but their work was nonetheless crucial considering that those 
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were some of the most entrenched cases whom the other relief committees were 
unable to assist for one or another reason.221 
Without doubt, the Lisbon relief committees would not have been able to 
act efficiently without mutual cooperation. All Lisbon-based committees 
benefited greatly from the excellent information bulletins prepared by the 
National Refugee Service (NRS). These included reports and statistical studies 
including factual information about US  immigration laws, new government 
regulations, the refugee situation internationally, and any other information 
that might impact the lives of refugees and the work of those helping them.222 
Every four to six weeks, all relief organisations in Lisbon held a conference to 
discuss common problems and plans for cooperation. Often, cases would pass 
from one committee to another if they thought this benefited refugees. 
Sometimes, relief agencies would need to reinforce the financial assistance 
given to a particular refugee family. But it was in regards to transnational 
migration that cooperation proved most crucial. Fry’s CAS, for instance, relied 
heavily on the Lisbon offices of HICEM and USC. Without these two 
committees, Fry’s initiative would not have been able to achieve the emigration 
of their 1,500 protégés. As recounted by Elizabeth Dexter: 
‘There was no hard and fast division among the Jewish agencies, the Quakers, 
and the Unitarians, about what cases each one would handle, and our clients 
changed too rapidly to make a confidential exchange feasible. We reduced 
overlapping to a minimum, however, by keeping in close personal touch. In 
some cases which more than one agency helped, there was a division of effort, 
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and we came to know what each agency could do best’.223 
 
There are numerous cases in which relief agencies surmounted obstacles 
imposed by the context of war and government bureaucracies. Following the 
entry of the US in the war in December 1941, the JDC and HICEM had to 
reorganise themselves in order to remain operative in neutral Portugal, as relief 
funds could no longer be made available to US accounts without special US 
Treasury licence. Under the initiative of its leader Moisés Amzalak, the Lisbon 
Jewish Community created its Refugee Relief Department, the Secção de 
Assistência aos Refugiados da Comunidade Israelita de Lisboa. This was a proxy 
organisation that allowed JDC and HICEM to make deposits in the 
Community’s account, and thus continue their work under the protection of 
the Lisbon Jewish Community. Thanks to this arrangement, both HICEM and 
JDC were able to continue their previous work with refugees.224 
Likewise, relief agencies were also able to optimise their work through 
cooperation with other non-profit organisations, as well as with government 
officials. At the beginning of 1942, there were two issues related to 
transportation that hindered the issuance of US visas to refugees in Europe. The 
first problem was the lack of space on boats, which made the US State 
Department more conservative regarding the granting of visas. The second 
issue was the need for faster communications between the US and South-
Western Europe over possibilities of transportation. In view of the war 
emergency, the cable censor wished to reduce the number of communications 
being sent abroad, and suggested centralising all cables regarding visa 
applications and possibilities of transportation at the JDC’s European 
headquarters in Lisbon. Thus, from February 1942, the Lisbon office of the 
JDC channelled all transatlantic communication regarding the advisory 
approval of US visas and sailings in behalf of the other relief organisations 
																																																																		
223 Elizabeth A. Dexter, Last Port to Freedom (Unpublished draft, [1943]), 85; in Dexter Papers, 
Box 2, File 4. 
224 [Bernstein], ‘Report on the HIAS-ICA Activities in Lisbon (18 December 1941); YIVO, RG-
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operating in the region.225 The only exception was HICEM, which handled a 
considerable number of migration cases, and continued to send cables of its 
own. By virtue of this arrangement, each of the partnering agencies would 
prepare their own immigration cases and send the final application information 
to the JDC office in Lisbon, which would update the agency in question on 
transportation opportunities and visa decisions from Washington. If the US 
Visa Section’s response was positive, JDC Lisbon would then refer the decision 
both to the relief agency in question, and to the US consulate concerned. This 
agreement proved extremely practical for the refugees, for the US State 
Department, as well as for the steamship lines, which now had greater financial 
guarantees that their ships would be booked in full and with less cancellations. 
By the same token, this solution also spared the JDC from taking too many 
financial risks with shipping companies, by booking passages for visa applicants 
before Washington gave their definitive approval.226  
  
																																																																		
225 Amongst the agencies that agreed to cooperate with the JDC in this manner were the 
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226 Memorandum (21 March 1942); JDC, Reel 79, Folder 364. 
  183 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Four: 
The Allied Response, 1943-44 
 
  
  184 
Franco’s Spain: The Stumbling Block 
 
On 8 November 1942, the Anglo-American Allies launched the first 
offensive operation of World War II, thus opening a second front in the West 
Mediterranean. Vowing to bring the torch of freedom to French North Africa, 
‘Operation Torch’ consisted of a series of simultaneous amphibious attacks on 
five separate beaches of French Morocco (Safi, Fedhala, and Port Lyautey) and 
Algeria (Oran, and Algiers). Although not as decisively as the Allies had 
desired, this operation was successful in its three main goals: to relieve pressure 
from the Soviet front by opening a second front, to drive the Axis forces out of 
North Africa, and to bring France back into the Allied camp.1 First, while Axis 
forces directed their attention at Tunisia, the Soviet launched a massive 
counteroffensive (‘Operation Uranus’) of pivotal importance for the Battle of 
Stalingrad. Second, following the Axis surrendered in Tunisia on 13 May 1943, 
North Africa came under Allied control. Third, and despite initial resistance, 
the French gradually became more active in the Allied war effort and 
challenged the legitimacy of the Vichy regime through the creation, on 3 June, 
of the Comité Français de Libération Nationale (CFLN). As Churchill aptly put it: 
‘this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, 
the end of the beginning’.2 
Three days after the beginning of the Allied military landings in North 
Africa, the Axis powers retaliated by occupying Vichy France (‘Case Anton’): 
while the Italians seized the island of Corsica and the French riviera until the 
river Rhone, the Germans took over the rest of France. In words of Jewish 
scholar Mark Wischnitzer, it was ‘as if a death-trap had snapped shut on the 
Jews of Europe’.3 Unlike Vichy France thus far, German occupiers were   keen 
																																																																		
1 On the consequences of  the ‘Operation Torch’, see for instance George F. Howe, Northwest 
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Speeches (Boston: Little, 1943), 266. 
3 Wischnitzer, To Dwell in Safety, 245. 
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to stop a new wave of youths (e.g. disbanded French soldiers, Allied PoWs, 
and pilots) from escaping across the Franco-Spanish border. To prevent as 
many of them from joining the Allied war effort in North Africa, frontier 
surveillance increased dramatically. In addition to the French Gendarmerie, the 
Germans deployed about 2,000 men alongside the 500km frontier between 
France and Spain, including frontier patrols with  trained dogs (Grenzschutz), 
specialised alpine corps from Bavaria and the Austrian Tyrol (Gebirgsjäger), and 
the Wehrmacht’s armed police (Feldgendarmerie).4 By agreement between 
German and Spanish authorities, any person found within 25km of the 
Pyrenees without a special safe conduct would be immediately arrested.5 
Against this background, the role of the Iberian Peninsula in the Jewish 
refugee crisis shifted dramatically. Since the French government was now a 
puppet regime under German command, Vichy stopped issuing exit visas to 
persons leaving France. This left thousands of stateless refugees and PoWs with 
no other alternative than to cross the Pyrenees into Spain illegally, whilst the 
transit of Jewish refugees through Portugal diminished dramatically. By late 
December, the British ambassador to Spain, Sir Samuel Hoare, warned the 
British FO that ‘hundreds arrive every day’.6 In the early days of 1943, the 
AFSC delegate in Lisbon, Philip Conard, reported that refugees arrived in 
Spain at a rate of 80 to 100 daily, and further advised: ‘We must reorient our 
thinking and turn our thought to Spain’.7 By the the late spring of 1943, the 
Catalan prisons in Lerida, Gerona, and Figueras, in north-west Spain, were still 
overcrowded with two to three times their nominal capacity.8 Both Joseph 
Schwartz, of the JDC, and Sir Herbert Emerson, High Commissioner for 
Refugees, estimated at 5,000 the number of Jewish refugees who reached Spain 
by December 1942.9 Naturally, this meant that demand for relief in Spain also 
																																																																		
4 Émilienne Eychenne, Les Pyrénées de la Liberté: 1939-1945: Le Franchissement Clandestin des 
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skyrocketed. If the JDC’s monthly budget for Spain was $1,500 during most of 
1942, by April 1943 this figured had reached $80,000 —a 53-fold increase.10 In 
sharp contrast with the situation in Spain, the Jewish refugee population in 
Portugal remained almost the same throughout the year 1943 —300 persons in 
Caldas, and 200 in Ericeira.11 This explains why, by the spring of 1944, AFSC 
was spending no less than $86,100 per month in Spain, and just $16,800 for 
relief in Portugal.12 Whilst its role in the Jewish refugee crisis had been crucial 
up to this point,  following the events of November 1942, Francoist Spain 
became a true ‘stumbling block’ to Iberian migration.13  
The attitudes of the Franco government towards this new wave of refugees 
during this period was inevitably linked to Spain’s slow move from non-
belligerence to neutrality. In early September 1942, Franco had appointed a 
new MAE, the Anglophile Francisco Gómez-Jordana, to replace the Falangista 
Ramón Serrano Súñer. To US Ambassador to Spain, Carlton Hayes, this had 
a very definite meaning:  
 This means, to everybody here, the replacement of a petty, intriguing, and very 
slippery politician, troubled with stomach-ulcers and delusions of grandeur, by 
a gentleman who belongs to the nobility and the army and is honest, 
dependable, hard working, and endowed with good health and a sense of 
humor. To us, it means more —the replacement of a militantly pro-Axis man, 
by a man who is pro-Spanish first and then more sympathetic with the Allies 
than with the Axis’.14 
 
Indeed, within weeks of ‘Operation Torch’, Jordana reassured the US 
ambassador that, despite the pro-Axis Falange, the Franco government was 
																																																																		
1942); TNA, FO-371/32700; and Emerson, ‘Refugee Statistics’ (22 December 1942); TNA, 
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determined to pursue a policy of ‘impartiality’ towards the two sets of 
belligerents.15 However, since the Spanish regime was now more than ever 
threatened by the Axis —on the north— and the Allies —on the south— 
Spanish ‘impartiality’ involved the balanced granting of concessions to both 
sides of the war in order to guarantee the survival of the Francoist regime. Thus, 
as seen by ambassador Hoare, the appointment of the Germanophile José 
María Doussinague as the MAE’s Director of Foreign Policy —second highest 
rank within the ministry— was a way to appease the Germans for Jordana’s 
appointment, which was widely perceived as a change of policy favourable to 
the Allies. Despite Jordana’s efforts to stir the country towards neutrality, 
Doussinague’s appointments had catastrophic consequences for the refugees. 
Despite the great interest of Allied government and relief organisations alike to 
tackle the dire refugee situation in Spain, Doussinague’s policy opposed the 
release of escaped POWs and civilians whether of military age or not. In words 
of Sir Samuel Hoare, this intolerant policy contributed to making the situation 
‘far worse than it had been under Sr. Serrano Súñer’. If, by 8 November 1942, 
the population of the camp of Miranda de Ebro —which had been built to hold 
a maximum of 1,000 people— was 1,149; by Christmas day 1942, it held well 
over 3,000 internees, most of whom without sufficient food or blankets to 
survive the deep winter. When Hoare pressed Doussinague to release these 
men, the Spanish official responded in rather cynical terms that the Germans 
were protesting very strongly against the release of men going to fight them, 
and that the Spanish government had to consider the demands of both sides.16 
The attitude of the Spanish government towards refugees, however, was 
not simply driven by foreign policy considerations: the Francoists were equally 
anxious that Republican exiles, Maquis fighters, and other ‘undesirables’ would 
cross into Spain. Thus, on 25 March 1943, the Spanish government notified the 
US and British ambassadors in Madrid that, in view of the constant clandestine 
crossing of the Pyrenees frontier and the impossibility of the state to attend to 
the needs of escapees, Spanish authorities ‘have found themselves obliged to 
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16 Hoare, ‘Annual Report 1942’ [December 1942-January 1943]; Templewood Papers, 
XIII:22(50). 
  188 
order the absolute closing of the frontier in question to all those who are not in 
possession of their legal documents, and instructions have [been] issued to the 
Governmental authorities severely to repress all infringement of this order’.17 
More specifically, the Gerona Civil Governor and the Irún Military 
Governor both received instructions from the DGS in Madrid that ‘from now 
onwards all foreigners entering Spain clandestinely are to be sent back to France 
where they will be handed over to the German authorities’.18 Infuriated by the 
news, ambassador Hayes, who had already confronted the minister over 
Spain’s refugee policy on several occasions, demanded an explanation from 
Jordana and condemned the DGS’ policy of returning refugees to Nazi-
occupied France.19 Ambassador Hoare, on the other hand, believed that such 
decision was not the initiative of MAE, but of the Ministries of Interior and 
War. This view was favoured by Jordana himself, who insisted that he —as 
well as his ministry— opposed the refoulement of refugees, and that the 
decision to close the border had been taken, behind the MAE’s back, by 
elements within Franco’s government ‘who did not share that opinion’.20 
However, this was not the case. The day before the closure of the Spanish 
frontier was effected, Jordana had sent to his ambassadors in Vichy and Berlin 
a message that leaves little doubt as to the MAE’s connivance: 
‘The clandestine crossing of the Pyrenees by persons of Axis-enemy nationality 
is becoming a more serious problem each day, owing to its rapid growth in 
volume, and constant complications with the embassies of both sides. Please 
inform those authorities [Berlin and Vichy] that it is essential that [German] 
occupation authorities intensify frontier surveillance to the fullest, and that they 
make it as efficient and effective as possible. Even if Spain is willing to cooperate 
as much as possible in this service, it would be inadmissible for us to bear, not 
just the effort, but also the inevitable unpopularity of such repressive measures; 
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especially since it is the occupiers’ inescapable responsibility to prevent the exit 
[from France], much more than it is our responsibility to hinder the entrance 
[into Spain]. For your own information, I discreetly disclose that the 
Government is willing to return to France persons arriving to Spain 
clandestinely, judging that this is the only method to halt the growing influx of 
refugees, and despite strong protests from the Allied countries —whose 
economic sanctions on Spain could have very grave consequences to our 
economy. Please treat this utmost important matter with urgency.21 
 
Indeed, as Jordana prognosticated, the response of the Allied governments was 
both unilateral and unforgiving. Ambassador Hoare warned the Spanish government 
that the closing of the frontier would ‘leave a stain on Spain’s good name that the years 
will not remove’.22 Simultaneously, Winston Churchill made ‘strong representations’ to 
the Spanish ambassador in London, the Duke of Alba, and made it clear that handing 
over refugees and POWs to the Germans would bring the ‘destruction of good relations’ 
between Spain and Great Britain.23 In a similar fashion, Breckinridge Long, from the 
US State Department, also brought this to the attention of the Spanish ambassador in 
Washington, Juan Francisco de Cárdenas.24 Even the Portuguese ambassador in 
Madrid made it clear that Salazar ‘strongly disapproved of the closing of the frontier … 
and particularly the instructions to surrender prisoners and refugees to the Germans’; 
and warned that ‘this dualism in the Spanish Government was having a bad effect on 
Spanish-Portuguese relations’.25 
Under such pressure, it did not take more than a week for the Spanish government 
to revoke its previous order. By 1 April, both the British Consul in San Sebastián and the 
British Consul-General in Barcelona had reported that local authorities had received 
orders from Madrid with instructions not to return refugees at the border.26 Meanwhile, 
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Hayes was ‘confidentially informed’ that the MAE urged the German Embassy in 
Madrid to prevent refugees from crossing the frontier.27 The Germans, in turn, pressed 
the Franco government to enforce the secret agreement between the Spanish and 
German police of July 1938, which stipulated that both states would reciprocally deliver 
to each other persons wanted by the police of the other country. As reported by the US 
ambassador, when Jordana indicated to the Germany Embassy that the refugees 
crossing into Spain were not guilty of any crime and were therefore not returnable, the 
German ambassador’s response was that ‘totalitarian countries did not have to go 
through the procedure of convicting persons by courts, and that the police were 
thoroughly capably of determining whether persons should be returned to another 
country’.28 It is quite possible this was another of Jordana’s attempts to downplay his 
own responsibility, but judging by the tone and kind of demand, it is equally possible 
that his recollection of the conversation with the Germans was genuine.  
After the fall of Mussolini’s regime in July 1943, Spanish non-belligerence in the 
conflict seemed no longer justified. On 26 September, Madrid announced the 
withdrawal of the Blue Division, and on 1 October, General Franco gave a speech to 
Falange’s National Council in which the dictator described Spain’s position as one of 
‘vigilant neutrality’.29 This was the first time that the Generalísimo spoke of neutrality 
since Italy’s declaration of war more than three years before. As ambassador Hayes 
noted, it was the first time that Franco attacked communism but defended capitalism —
formerly he had attacked both communism and capitalism.30 One of the first symptoms 
that the Franco regime was at last adopting the role of a neutral was the Allied-Axis 
prisoner exchange that took place in Barcelona on 26 October 1943 —indeed, this was 
the first POW exchange between both sides of the war. The German ships SS Aquilea 
and SS Djenne sailed from Marseille to take 1,000 German soldiers and personnel: 
mainly Afrikakorps and sailors captured in the Mediterranean war. The Allied ships SS 
Cuba and SS Tairea, in turn, took 1,083 Allied soldiers: including 512 Australians, 383 
New Zealanders, and a smaller number of South Africans, British, and Indians who 
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had fought in Greece and Crete. The two Allied ships continued to Port Said (Egypt) 
from whence the convalescent soldiers were repatriated home. The German and British 
ambassadors to Spain were present, and so were Spanish authorities, and the SRC.31 On 
17 May 1944 there was a second POW exchange in Barcelona. This time, the Swedish 
SS Gripsholm brought 713 German prisoners to Barcelona (including 375 women and 
children), and continued to Marseille on the SS Gradisca. In return, the SS Gradisca 
brought to Barcelona a group of 919 Allied POW who had been captured in Italy, and 
who continued on the SS Gripsholm to French North Africa.32 
However, at the same time the Spanish government cultivated this external image 
of neutrality, there were elements within the Franco regime who were rather slow to 
come to terms with this new policy. The most problematic group was doubtlessly the 
Falange. On 12 September 1943, a ‘brawl’ took place in Barcelona between a group of 
Falangistas —including demobilised members of the Blue Division— and 21 French 
refugees whom the Civil Governor had recently threatened with deportation to France. 
It was only through the rapid intervention of the US and British Consul-Generals in that 
city that the refugees were spared from the beatings, and were instead imprisoned by 
local authorities. At 2am the following day, the group of Falangistas sought revenge by 
raiding Barcelona’s Pension Roma (10 Plaza Real) where many refugees were housed. 
At gunpoint, 21 refugees were dragged out of their rooms in their underclothing and 
beaten in the middle of the square with iron rods, four men being badly injured. As 
reported by the British Embassy, a similar aggression occurred simultaneously in 
Madrid.33 The Civil Governor of Barcelona tried to excuse the incident as a 
spontaneous and personal affair. But for the US Consul-General, the governor’s defence 
was ‘obviously far-fetched’: ‘by every account it was a well-organised proceeding in 
which approximately 150 Falangists took part. The chiefs drove up in automobiles and 
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gave the signal for action to their men hidden behind the arcades of the Plaza Real’.34 
A similar concerted attack took place at 7 pm on 29 October, when two mobs of 
Falangistas simultaneously raided the headquarters of the French Red Cross (FRC) in 
Barcelona, and the office of the French Mission at Madrid’s 21 Calle San Bernardo —
the relief committee looking after French refugees. Suspiciously enough, the two guards 
usually stationed outside the San Bernado office were absent between 7 and 7:30 pm. 
The events were described by the US ambassador, who claimed that there was evidence 
of German support in the operation: ‘Those in [the] waiting room were ordered to face 
the wall and put their hands up. Files in the office were ransacked and fifteen hundred 
exit passes, which had recently been granted to the refugees interned in the Malaga 
bullring, were burned’.35 But this is not the only example of Falange’s anti-refugee 
savagery. On 18 July 1944, coinciding with the anniversary of Franco’s 1936 coup, a 
further attack was perpetrated against the premises of the JDC in Barcelona. This was 
the second one directed against Sequerra’s staff since August 1942. In this instance, a 
crowd of thirty armed Falangistas, including again some former ‘Blue Divisionaries’, 
forced entry into the JDC office in Barcelona’s Hotel Bristol. Although nobody was 
injured —luckily, it was a national holiday— the gang of Falangistas stole about 4,000 
dossiers containing vital information of JDC refugee cases, causing unmeasurable 
trouble to Sequerra’s organisation and their relief activities. Doussinague condemned 
the attack in name of the MAE, and said that aggressors would be punished. However, 
although two of the perpetrators —aged twenty-one and twenty-two— were arrested 
and judged, Sequerra refused to ask for compensation.36 
Whilst the fanatics of the Falange were free to perpetrate their assaults with little 
to no retribution, the Spanish government continued to return Jewish refugees to the 
Germans until the summer of 1944. Paradoxically, as the war came to a close, the 
number of these cases augmented, rather than diminished. In words of American 
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Quaker Philip Conard, this was a problem ‘which required endless work and untold 
patience, and which can sometimes be solved and sometimes cannot’. Such was the case 
of the German Jew Arno Geyer Zitmann and his wife Marie Louise Tournier Lacaver 
de Geyer, of French nationality. The couple came to Spain in 1921 and had five children 
born in Spain. Over the years, the whole family acquired Spanish nationality. Arno 
owned an electric power plant in Cólliga (Cuenca), and, during the Spanish Civil War, 
served as captain in the Republican army. Following the Nationalist victory, he 
remained imprisoned between 1939 and 44. Meanwhile, in 1942, Arno’s oldest son was 
taken away by the Germans for ‘military service’ and never returned. On 20 June 1944, 
the DGS issued Arno Geyer with an expulsion order. The Representation in Spain of 
American Relief Organisations (RSARO), a relief committee set up by the US Embassy 
in Madrid, intervened in Arno’s favour, but the DGS resolved not to stop ‘the expulsion 
of these foreigners from the country’. On 20 July 1944, Marie Louise was arrested, and 
a week later  —with the Allied army already in Normandy— the couple was delivered 
to the Germans at the Irún-Hendaye border post.37  
Another case is that of Josef Lukaschewitsh, a Jewish farmer native of Susanine, 
in the Crimean Peninsula, who was forced to work for the Wehrmacht in September 
1941. In early 1943, he managed to escape and reach a unit of the Spanish Blue 
Division, which was 30km away from his position, and began working as a cook for 
them. When the Blue Division returned to Spain, he managed to sneak across the 
border in one of their uniforms and lived in hiding in Spain. In March 1944, he was was 
arrested by the Spanish police, and on 15 June, Lukaschewitsh was handed over to the 
Germans at the Irún-Hendaye border.38 Leon Hoffmann, a Jewish refugee from 
Luxembourg, was arrested in Spanish Morocco and accused of espionage activities. He 
was sent to prison in Madrid (Prison Porlier), and on 11 April 1943, was transferred to 
the Prison in San Sebastián, from where he was deported to France. ‘Federico Pablo 
Hilke’, a German Jewish refugee who migrated to Spain in June 1933 on a regular visa, 
was arrested eight days after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War by the rebels, and 
endured internment in several prisons and camps between 1936 and 1941. He was 
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liberated from the Vitoria prison in September 1941, only to be arrested again on the 
train ride to Madrid for lacking proper documentation. On 9 July 1943, RSARO 
managed to liberate Hilke from the Valladolid prison. On 1 November, however, 
RSARO received a desperate telegram sent by Hilke himself in which the German 
refugee said that he was being taken to the Irún border for deportation, and begged for 
assistance. RSARO requested the intervention of the delegates of the SRC and the FRC 
in San Sebastián, who managed to obtain the promise from the Military Commander 
at Irún, as well as from the MAE, that Hilke would not be deported. Despite the 
assurances, Hilke was deported to France on 10 November 1943.39 
The US ambassador in Madrid complained to the MAE in numerous occasions, 
claiming that these refugees were protected under international law and should not be 
turned over to the Germans, although to no avail.40 Hayes tried pressing Spain to 
implement its declaration of neutrality, which was conditional on terminating ‘once and 
for all the close cooperation between the Spanish police and German official and 
unofficial agents’. Without the abolition of the ‘Himmler Agreement’, as Hayes called 
it, the ambassador warned that Spain’s neutrality ‘will not have the effect it was doubtless 
intended to have’.41 Despite continued pressure from the Allied governments, however, 
and reiterated assurances from the MAE that such practices would stop, the US 
Embassy continued to receive ‘disturbing’ reports indicating that German deserters and 
refugees arriving to Spain ‘have been delivered by Spanish police officials to the custody 
of German police and Gestapo agents’. The MAE, in turn, dismissed these accusations 
as false.42  
When comparing Spanish refugee policies with those of Portugal during the same 
period, it is difficult not to notice the discrepancies. When, on 23 March 1944, President 
Roosevelt issued his statement condemning Nazi atrocities, Portuguese newspapers 
such as Diario de Noticias, and Journal do Comercio eulogised the ‘high political and moral 
significance’ of the US President’s statement in their front-page editorials.43 As seen by 
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ambassador Hoare, the Portuguese government ‘with whom we have been in constant 
touch, are behaving extremely well and are expediting visas provided that the refugees 
do not remain in Portugal’.44 
  
																																																																		
I, Reel 26, Folder 1. 
44 Hoare to Eleanore Rathbone, Parliamentary Committee on Refugees (3 May 1943); 
Templewood Papers, XIII:5(14). 
  196 
The Embassy of  the Stateless 
 
Following the German occupation of Vichy France in November 1942, 
Spain was in desperate need of a comprehensive relief solution. Faced with this 
new wave of undocumented refugees and the obstructive border policy of the 
Spanish government, the reaction of the Lisbon-based relief organisations and 
the US Embassy in Madrid was immediate. On the morning of 9 November 
1942, only one day after the onset of ‘Operation Torch’, Joseph Schwartz 
cabled the JDC headquarters in New York regarding the alarming refugee 
situation in Spain. Refugees crossed into Spain illegally by the hundreds, and 
since most of them lacked proper documentation, at least ten persons were sent 
back to France on that morning alone.45 It was then that Hayes, fulfilling the 
promise he had made to Schwartz during the summer, began to explore the 
possibility of allowing the JDC and the AFSC to offer assistance to refugees in 
Spain under the sponsorship of the US Embassy in Madrid.  
This possibility had been on the table since 5 November, when the US 
State Department gave its preliminary consent to allow US relief organisations 
to operate in Spain if they could secure permission from the Spanish 
Government —possibly in anticipation to the North African landings.46 On 7 
December 1942, Hayes and Schwartz met in Madrid to discuss the matter. The 
US ambassador strongly favoured ‘the unification of their operations through a 
single directive agency’, as the co-existence between several relief organisations 
‘would inevitably result in confusion and duplication of effort’. Schwartz 
acceded. Within days, this agency received the name of Representation in 
Spain of American Relief Organizations (RSARO). Thereafter, it would be the 
policy of the US Embassy in Madrid that any American organisation wishing 
to conduct relief work in Spain had to do so through RSARO —a policy that 
was also preferred by the Spanish government.47 
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Meanwhile, ambassador Hayes sought official support from Washington. 
In a telegram to President Roosevelt dated 14 December 1942, the former 
University of Columbia Professor explained Spain’s dire refugee situation. He 
also stressed how crucial it was to expedite the transit of refugees through the 
Pyrenees to allow them to join the Allied forces in North Africa. In addition, 
he also emphasised that there were already several thousand French and other 
Axis refugees interned in Spanish concentration camps and prisons, and that 
there were more arriving from France every day, most of them illegally. 
Although the British Embassy was at that time caring for 2,500 refugees at 
Miranda, the problem was far too overwhelming for them alone, and Hayes 
proposed that the US Embassy find a way ‘to give relief en masse’.48  
Both President Roosevelt and the US State Department were persuaded. 
On 5 February 1943, the President’s Emergency Fund allocated $100,000 to 
fund Hayes’ relief programme for Spain, on condition that ‘no distinction of 
race, colour, or religion is to be made between refugees so that Jewish refugees 
will not be the responsibility of the Joint Distribution Committee while the sum 
in question lasts’.49 As stipulated by the US Government, Hayes would report 
on the Embassy’s relief activities to Herbert H. Lehman, director of the recently 
created Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (OFRRO) —a 
precursor to UNRRA.50 
Hayes’ relief programme for Spain was only made possible by the shifting 
balance of power in the region and Madrid’s promised ‘impartiality’ towards 
the two sets of belligerents. The first gesture of propitiation from the Spanish 
government in this sense came on Christmas Eve of 1942, when the Franco 
government announced it would release from Spanish camps and prisons all 
refugees who had funds to maintain themselves, with the exception of men of 
military age from belligerent countries.51 Not content with the promises made 
by the Franco government, Hayes urged Washington to remind Juan Francisco 
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de Cárdenas, the Spanish ambassador to the US, that Spain would not be 
treated as neutral unless it granted Allied refugees ‘as favourable treatment as 
that given to Axis refugees’. In particular, Hayes made reference to Spain’s 
cooperation with the German and Italian armistice commissions providing 
assistance to Axis escapees.52 Furthermore, Franco’s Spain also acted as the 
protecting power for Germany and Italy, which meant that the Spanish 
government was responsible for looking after the interests of German and 
Italian refugees in Palestine, Algeria, South Africa, and other territories without 
Axis diplomatic representation, through the mediation of the International Red 
Cross (IRC). Indeed, when contextualised within the camp situation across 
Europe, the request made by some Wehrmacht POWs seem rather 
extraordinary. In the POW camp at Latrun (British Palestine), for instance, 
German prisoners denounced the lack of electricity, cinema, and radio, as a 
breach of the Hague Convention of 1907.53 
While Hayes championed RSARO’s enterprise with both Washington 
and Madrid, Schwartz and Conard had been seeking for the right person to lead 
the office. Their choice was David Blickenstaff, an US citizen barely twenty-
seven years old at the time of his appointment. Blickenstaff was born in 1915 in 
Pasadena (California), but grew up and went to school in India where his father 
was in charge of finances for the United Board of Missions, a Christian relief 
organisation. Blickenstaff himself was a member of the Church of the 
Brethren.54 In November 1937, upon graduating in International Relations 
from Northwestern University, the AFSC sent him as delegate of the Brethren 
Service Committee (BSC) to work for the Quaker relief programme in civil war 
Spain with headquarters in Bilbao —behind Nationalist lines. In 1940-41, he 
worked as AFSC delegate in unoccupied France, and married Janine 
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Ybargoyen, daughter of the Uruguayan Consul in Marseille. Between June and 
October 1942, the Blickenstaffs directed the BSC’s civilian public service camp 
in Puerto Rico. In November, David and Janine sailed to Europe as BSC-AFSC 
delegates to unoccupied France, but before they reached their destination Vichy 
France was taken by the Nazis. Since both were fluent in Spanish and French, 
and David had previously worked in Nationalist territory during the Spanish 
Civil War, they represented the perfect fit for this position and were offered to 
head the RSARO office in Madrid. 
David and Janine Blickenstaff arrived in Spain on 27 January 1943 in 
quality of AFSC representatives as far as visas were concerned, even though 
they would spend most of their time and energy looking after JDC cases. At 
first, they worked from the premises of the US Embassy in Madrid and several 
hotels —Hotel Nacional and Hotel Gaylord. On 10 April 1943, the Spanish 
MAE authorised the opening of a separate office owned by the American 
Embassy at 20 Eduardo Dato, which was equidistant from the US Embassy 
and the headquarters of the SRC. By that time, the USC had already established 
partnership with RSARO, and the National Catholic Welfare Committee 
(NCWC) was negotiating its participation. ‘Here it is almost as if every 
committee under your roof were rolled into one under a single direction, but 
with the controlling committees far away’, explained an RSARO member of 
staff to the British Quakers of London’s Bloomsbury House.55 By January 1944, 
RSARO had grown into a staff of 18, and provided material assistance to 1,600 
stateless refugees in Spain.56 
Upon its establishment in late January 1943, RSARO’s most pressing 
tasks were to organise relief for the approximately 3,600 refugees interned at 
Miranda de Ebro, and to negotiate their release.57 The majority of Miranda’s 
population were male refugees of military age who had entered Spain 
clandestinely fleeing the Nazis, a ‘veritable Noah’s Ark of every species of 
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refugee’, as ambassador Hoare put it.58 As most Jewish refugees at Miranda 
were stateless they were in a much less favourable position than those of Allied 
nationality, who receive food packages distributed by the British Embassy via 
Gibraltar. In this sense, Miranda was different to the camps in Southern France 
because Allied governments had much interest in looking after their nationals 
interned there, and sent large quantities of supplies and money to them. During 
1943, there were an average of 16,000 pesetas being poured every day into 
Miranda by embassies and legations, and that is excluding food parcels.59 But 
the majority of stateless Jews had no source of support, and thus were in a 
hopeless situation. The representative of the Jewish-stateless prisoners at 
Miranda, Dr Georges Outman, described the situation of his peers in this way: 
‘Our morale is very low. The conditions in which we live are worse than 
anything you could imagine. We sleep on the floor, without mattress, without 
pillow, tortured by innumerable flies and bedbugs. Everything is covered with a 
thick stratum of dust which, when raised by the wind, penetrates everywhere 
and especially in the food. The most terrible thing is the almost complete lack of 
water. There are just a few faucets and three showers which function only from 
10 to 12:30 for the entire camp … They must stay in line for hours, in the burning 
sun, in order to get a shower and some food at the canteen’.60 
 
Internment conditions at Miranda were so appalling —owing to 
overcrowding, terrible hygiene, undernourishment, and harsh weather 
conditions— that nearly all of the camp’s 3,500 inmates participated in a week-
long hunger strike in January 1943. Another reason why RSARO prioritised 
the release of internees from Spanish camps and prisons is because, since 
Spanish authorities gave them no facilities to reach consulates, shipping 
agencies, or relief committees, they had no means of arranging their 
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documentation and emigration. In fact, there were many instances of refugees 
who had been granted visas for a country overseas and were not able to migrate 
simply because they could not reach the relevant consulate.  
Since foreigners had little chances of obtaining working permits, the 
release of refugees was conditional on RSARO taking financial responsibility 
for these persons once they were liberated. Every new release added $50-60 per 
month to their budget. To finance such spending, the AFSC headquarters in 
Philadelphia received a US Treasury licence in April 1943, to transfer regular 
remittances to RSARO Madrid.  
But RSARO also looked after the wellbeing of refugees inside Miranda, 
and more specifically of Jews. Following the liberation of France in August 
1944, hundreds of German border patrols at the Pyrenees fled into Spain and 
ended up in Miranda, alongside Jewish refugees. In view that some Jews 
suffered physical and verbal violence at the hands of Nazi deserters, RSARO 
acted in their behalf and obtained the separation of both groups.61 
Initially, the British Embassy took care of British and Canadian refugees. 
Following the Allied landings in  French North Africa, they began to look after 
Belgian, Luxembourg, and Yugoslav nationals as well.62 At the close of 1942, 
the British Embassy was supporting 2,569 refugees at Miranda with weekly 
allowances and food, and 438 more in prisons throughout the country.63 By that 
time, Hoare already recognised that his ‘minute staff’ could hardly deal with 
the influx of refugees into Spain, and urged the US government to take care of 
French nationals —the largest group— in addition to US and stateless 
refugees.64 The unofficial representatives of the Czech and Polish governments-
in-exile, on the other hand, worked closely with RSARO to look after their 
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nationals.65 The is evidence, however, that the Polish legation in Spain hindered 
the release of Jewish men and women of Polish nationality, as it considered 
them to be ‘in a very different category’ to non-Jewish Poles, so they were 
considered de facto ‘stateless’ and assisted by RSARO.66 In any case, the 
‘bestowal’ of nationalities by camp authorities at Miranda de Ebro was more or 
less arbitrary, since many refugees and POWs often claimed the nationality 
they wanted upon arrival to Spain. Given that the British Embassy was the only 
source of relief for Miranda internees before the creation of RSARO, many 
escapees claimed Canadian nationality to receive British protection. For this 
reason, there were hundreds of  French-speaking internees at Miranda who 
were registered as ‘Canadian-Yugoslavs’, ‘Canadian-Czechs’, and so on. After the 
establishment of RSARO, however, the status of stateless refugees in Spain 
improved significantly in terms of relief and release opportunities. 
It is no coincidence that RSARO became known as ‘the embassy of the 
stateless’. Nominally, the official body in charge of the interests of stateless 
persons in Spain was the Spanish Red Cross (SRC). In practice, it was 
Blickenstaff’s office that represented and offered relief to persons who had no 
diplomatic protection in Spain. This included all Jews from Germany and 
German-occupied territories, as well as many non-Jewish persons from 
Germany, Austria, former Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Smooth 
cooperation between RSARO and the Spanish Red Cross owed much to the 
good nature of the director and only staff member of the SRC, Juan Manuel de 
Agrela y Pardo, Count of La Granja, whom Herbert Katzki described as 
‘humane and most anxious to serve’.67 Thanks to his cachet, the Count of La 
Granja helped advance RSARO’s goals with the Madrid government 
particularly at the beginning of its relief activities. During the first week of 
February 1943, for instance, the Count of la Granja persuaded the three 
government branches with jurisdiction over Miranda de Ebro —the Army, the 
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DGS, and the Ministry of the Interior— to authorise the release of men above 
military age or unfit for military service, on condition that RSARO would take 
care of their maintenance and organise their emigration from Spain.68 In this 
sense, liberations were made in the name of the SRC but had to be effected by 
RSARO personnel. Although the first release from Miranda took place on 18 
February, large scale liberations began only towards mid-March. By the end of 
April, Blickenstaff and Sequerra had jointly liberated 349 stateless Jewish 
refugees from Miranda. Additionally, they also liberated internees of several 
other nationalities. If, at the beginning of 1943 there were 3,600 internees at 
Miranda, this number was reduced by two thirds by May 1943. But their work 
was far from finished. Ongoing clandestine arrivals to Spain, as well as the 
policy of the Franco government of ‘cleaning out’ refugees in forced residence 
by sending them to Miranda, increased the camp’s population in 1,200 persons 
during the first two weeks of June alone.69  
The policy of the Spanish government towards refugees in general evolved 
in parallel to the development of RSARO. On 9 February, as a result of the 
Count of La Granja’s successful negotiations with Spanish officials, the MAE 
issued, with consent from the Ministries of War and the Interior, a first set of 
rules regarding the treatment to be accorded to refugees in Spain. Male refugees 
of Military age —defined here as 20 to 40 years old— were to be interned in 
Miranda and other camps under military authority. Male refugees not of 
military age, as well as all citizens of neutral nationality, were to be released 
provided that that they could be provided for by relief organisations. Civilians 
of belligerent states, women, and children crossing the Pyrenees clandestinely 
would be able to avoid imprisonment if they could provide evidence of means 
of self-support within Spain. In such cases, refugees were to be allowed to reside 
temporarily in Spain in regime of ‘surveilled residence’ (residencia vigilada) 
under the authority of the relevant Civil Governor, until they could arrange 
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their papers for departure.70 These ‘surveilled residences’ could be either 
pensions located in towns, or the so-called ‘balnearios’ (‘spas’) in areas far from 
the city, such as Jaraba, Alhama de Aragón (Zaragoza), Sobrón (Álava), 
Molinar de Carranza, and Urberuaga de Ubilla (Vizcaya). Conditions at these 
‘balnearios’ was variable. Some were in good shape, some others were horrible. 
In some cases guards were respectful and kind, in others cruel and brutal. 
Almost all of them, however, were populated with stateless refugees, including 
women and children.71 
Upon obtaining release from Spanish camps or prisons, refugees were 
required to present themselves in Madrid to report to the headquarters of the 
DGS —which had lists with the names of all refugees set free— and to roam 
the offices of the various official and unofficial diplomatic representations until 
they found a suitable authority to support them financially and to organise their 
evacuation from Spain. When refugees arrived at Blickenstaff’s office, the first 
question was that of nationality. If they could claim citizenship of a country 
with diplomatic representation in Spain, refugees were redirected to the 
relevant national representation. If refugees proven to be stateless, their case 
was then taken up by one of the relief committees represented by RSARO.72 
Blickenstaff’s ‘clientele’ consisted of two main demographics: refugees fleeing 
racial and political persecution, and young men seeking to volunteer for the 
Allied armies. RSARO was more concerned with the former group, even 
though these categories frequently overlapped. As Hayes concluded after the 
first year of RSARO activity, Blickenstaff’s organisation ‘effectively filled what 
might otherwise have been a serious gap in the Allied program of refugee relief 
in Spain’.73  
Blickenstaff’s office was a modest space consisting of eight small rooms 
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filled with second-hand furniture and a rather international team of relief 
workers. In addition to David and Janine, who interviewed new refugee cases, 
the rest of RSARO’s staff consisted mainly of refugee-volunteers. George W. 
Lackenbacher was amongst the first group of refugees liberated from Miranda, 
and became David’s right-hand man.74 Werner Michalski and Samuel 
Federmann handled payments and monthly cash allowances and maintained 
correspondence with refugees in camps, prisons, and forced residence. Knut 
Behr was in charge of money transfers and prepared food parcels that were 
distributed every fortnight. Dr Maurice Ghelber kept medical files of all 
refugees receiving medical assistance, and visited refugees at their homes to 
advise on medical questions, though technically as a refugee-physician he could 
not officially practice medicine. Richard Moering and Herbert Hirschfeld 
worked in the records room, and kept dossiers and a central card index up to 
date. Serge Mouravieff was in charge of outgoing mail, and sent money postal 
orders. Lastly, the young Wolf Bruckstein acted as an errand boy and was also 
in charge of opening the door and wrapping packages.75  
As the only body officially recognised by the Spanish government to grant 
relief in Spain, RSARO’s frenetic activity was arguably greater than any other 
relief committee operating in the Iberian Peninsula at any point during the war. 
This was at least the opinion of the Quaker Philip Conard: ‘David’s office has 
much more movement than we ever had in Lisbon, even in our busiest epoch 
… They receive [visits] in the mornings only, and have from 50 to 75 people to 
interview every morning on the average. One morning while I was there there 
were 244 callers’.76 In view of the great service that RSARO was doing with 
refugees, Blickenstaff progressively gained the confidence of the Spanish 
government to the point that he was given privileged access to officials at the 
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MAE and other ministries. Thanks to RSARO’s status, Blickenstaff was also 
able to obtain special concessions from Madrid that would have been 
unthinkable merely a year before. In December 1943, for instance, RSARO 
obtained the Franco government’s consent to send Christmas parcels to all 
refugees confined in forced residence and prisons across Spain. These included 
raisins, masse pain, biscuits, marmalade, nougat, nuts, chocolate, and 
cigarettes.77 
Despite the great service that RSARO did, not just for the refugees, but 
also for the Franco government, Spanish officials were not always sympathetic 
to their work. As seen by AFSC relief worker Lois K. Jessup, the DGS was 
without doubt the section of the Spanish government that posed more obstacles 
to RSARO: ‘it is, in everything we attempt, a constant pressure of opposition 
and in some matters a concrete obstacle blocking our way’. Another issue facing 
Blickenstaff’s office was the difficult task of finding Spanish personnel to join 
RSARO: ‘Spanish workers who are Falangists are of course not acceptable, and 
those who are not Falangists run some personal risk in accepting this kind of 
work’.78 These were no exaggerations on his part. As reported by Conard, of 
the AFSC office in Lisbon, the US Embassy in Madrid was under constant 
surveillance from two Spanish armed guards who were stationed at all times 
outside its door. Sometimes, as many as fifteen of them could gather without 
notice and for no particular reason. Blickenstaff himself reported he was 
constantly ‘shadowed’ by police agents in plainclothes, and had every one of 
his moves observed by a ‘plant’ —i.e. informer— among the refugees.79 In sharp 
contrast, Conard found the Portuguese PVDE to be very cordial and friendly: 
‘We have had but little relation with Portuguese authorities except the 
International Police [PVDE]. Consultations with the Foreign Office [MNE] 
and with the Export Control were only once each during this period’.80  
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To a large extent, RSARO’s success was made possible thanks to the 
efficient cooperation between various relief committees. From the beginning, 
RSARO was fuelled especially by the AFSC and the JDC. In addition to 
establishing the Madrid committee in early 1943, the AFSC and JDC offices in 
Lisbon also provided most of its funds during the first months of 1943. From 
the autumn of 1943, two more relief agencies started to share the costs of 
RSARO: the BSC and the USC. The Brethren, additionally, assumed travelling 
expenses for the Blickenstaff couple. By the spring of 1944, the HICEM and 
NCWC also began contributing towards RSARO’s expenses. Throughout the 
war, however, JDC remained the largest contributor to RSARO’s bills —from 
50 per cent in early 1943, down to 40 per cent towards the end of the war. 
Besides sharing the Madrid committee’s expenses, the relief agencies operative 
in the Peninsula also contributed enormously with RSARO. The head of the 
AFSC office in Lisbon, for instance, reported having constant exchange with 
RSARO in Madrid, and three to six daily telephone calls the Lisbon offices of 
HICEM, JDC, and COMASSIS.81  
Cooperation between Blickenstaff’s RSARO in Madrid and Sequerra’s 
JDC office in Barcelona, on the other hand, began before the two relief workers 
first met in March 1943. Despite some initial overlap between the two 
organisations, by the summer of 1943 they agreed to each focus on a different 
geography: from Barcelona, Sequerra was to care for the Catalan region in the 
North-West of Spain; whereas Blickenstaff, from Madrid, would care for the 
rest of Spain including the Atlantic end of the Franco-Spanish border. 
Additionally, the head of the JDC office in Barcelona, who had no official 
status, stayed in close touch with Blickenstaff and the US Embassy whenever 
he had any troubles with the Spanish police.82 Likewise, the delegate of the FRC 
in San Sebastián, André Mattei, obtained standing authorisation to grant relief 
in Blickenstaff’s name to any refugee reaching Spain through the Irún-Hendaye 
border even before Blickenstaff himself had the time to screen the refugee or 
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negotiate their release from prison with the competent authorities.83 
However, there was at least one relief agency who felt left out of the 
RSARO relief project for Spain: the USC. For months, the Unitarians tried to 
obtain Hayes’ approval to open an USC office in Barcelona, the most ‘needy 
spot’ due to its proximity to the Franco-Spanish border. Ambassador Hayes, 
however, remained adamant that all US private relief should be centralised in 
RSARO, under his close supervision. According to the ambassador, this 
simplified communications with the Spanish government and avoided the 
confusion created by the multiplicity of relief agencies in Lisbon, which Spanish 
authorities were not likely to tolerate. Hayes did invite, however, the USC to 
become full cooperating organisation of RSARO, alongside AFSC and the 
Joint. Thus, in September 1943, USC agreed to contribute $2,000 per month to 
RSARO’s overhead costs. In return, RSARO would recommend to the USC 
potential refugee cases of their interest, and distribute $15,000 in funds for the 
care of USC cases within Spain.84 
But the USC was still desirous to send a delegate to join Blickenstaff’s 
team, and proposed Celine Rott de Neufville as USC representative for Spain.85 
Neufville’s candidacy was soon dismissed, however, since her work with 
Spanish republicans during the Spanish Civil War made her persona non grata 
with the Spanish government and thus put RSARO’s own existence at risk.86 
The Unitarians then proposed USC Associate Director, Rev. Howard Brooks, 
to join Blickenstaff’s team, but his candidacy was again rejected by the US 
ambassador when he learnt that Brooks intended to publicise the work of the 
USC in the US gathering stories that would ‘vividly explain the [USC’s] work 
for refugees abroad’. Beside this official explanation, another aspect that might 
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have influenced the ambassador’s decision was the USC’s close ties with 
partisan organisations that were out of favour with the US Department of State, 
such as the International Rescue and Relief Committee (IRRC), the Jewish 
Anti-Fascist Committee (JAFC), and the French underground. In fact, five of 
USC’s executive board members —including Robert and Elizabeth Dexter, 
Noel Field, Charles Joy, and Rev. Howard Brooks himself— were involved in 
OSS espionage activities by 1943.87  
In contrast with the USC’s proactively anti-fascist stance, the pacifist 
neutrality of the American Quakers of the AFSC earned them greater support 
from the US government in matters of relief than the USC could have ever 
enjoyed. Although the Unitarians recognised that the complexity of the refugee 
crisis demanded the close and efficient cooperation between all relief 
committees, the philosophical and practical differences between the USC and 
the AFSC gave rise to competition and rivalry between them. Unitarian 
resentment towards the AFSC only increased when Hayes gave green light to 
AFSC relier worker Lawrence L. Parrish to join the RSARO staff in Madrid —
though not in capacity of AFSC representative— only a few weeks after 
rejecting two Unitarian candidates for that same position. Disappointed, the 
Unitarians felt like ‘picking up crumbs from under the Quaker table’.88 Besides 
Parrish, however, the only other US citizen that Hayes authorities to join 
Blickenstaff’s team in Madrid was Eileen Egan, of the NCWC.89 In fact, the 
Unitarians were not the only ones who were barred from RSARO. In February 
1943, the British Quakers’ Friends Committee for Refugees and Aliens (FCRA) 
had already been rejected from sending a FCRA representative to Madrid by 
Sir Herbert Emerson with a very vague explanation: ‘at present the way is not 
open for British voluntary workers to go to Spain’. It is not clear whether Hayes 
had anything to do in his decision, or whether the High Commissioner simply 
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considered the Spanish refugee problem to be the competence of the 
Americans.90 
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Evacuation from Spain 
 
Concomitant to the admission and release of refugees in Spain was the 
need —imposed by Francoist authorities— to evacuate all foreigners who fled 
into Spain within the shortest possible delay. This was indeed the most crucial 
issue the point of view of the Spanish government. As summarised by the 
Quaker relief worker Lois Jessup:  
‘The refugee problem from the standpoint of the Spanish authorities is one of 
evacuation. Their interest and desire is that the refugees continue their journey. 
On the other hand, they consider the refugee population a possible source of 
trouble and they are not willing that these refugees be allowed too much liberty 
while they are in Spain, nor do they want any facilities given to them that would 
induce or encourage them to delay their departure or seek to establish 
themselves permanently in Spain or even await here the end of the war’.91 
 
There are two main demographics to consider when it comes to 
emigration from Spain. One comprised Allied nationals of military age and 
POWs. The other stateless refugees, 90.3 per cent of whom were Jews.92 
Naturally, the former group attracted most of the attention from Washington, 
London, and Algier’s Allied Forces Headquarters (AFHQ). When, on 21 
December 1942, ambassador Hayes requested $25,000 for the care of Allied 
refugees and POWs pouring into Spain across the Pyrenees, the money reached 
Spain in just five days.93 That same week, de Gaulle’s CFLN also allocated 
funds for the evacuation of men willing to join the Allied armies. Due to 
shortage of housing and food in French North Africa, however, the evacuation 
of refugees ‘without military implication’ was postponed indefinitely.94  
To arrange the evacuation of French refugees from Spain —the largest 
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nationality group— the US Embassy established a special section known as 
‘French Mission’ on 30 December. The French Mission was headed by Third 
Embassy Secretary Niles W. Bond and Lieutenant-Colonel Pierre Malaise, 
formerly Air Attaché at the French Embassy in Madrid and Henri Giraud’s 
right-hand in the Peninsula.95 Another key personality in the team of the French 
Mission was Monsigneur André Boyer-Mas, who headed the French Red Cross 
(FRC) in Spain. Boyer-Mas had won the favour of Francoist authorities during 
the Spanish Civil War, when he offered his parish in Puginier (Aude) to shelter 
several hundred Spanish clergymen who crossed the Pyrenees fleeing 
anticlerical violence in the Republican zone.96 Like RSARO, the French 
Mission also looked after the interests of French refugees through the mediation 
of the Count of La Granja and the SRC. In October 1943, the French Mission 
followed the strategy employed by RSARO at the beginning of the year. To 
facilitate the transit of refugees through the Catalan Pyrenees, the US 
Consulate-General in Barcelona rented facilities in its vicinity to allow the 
French Mission to open an office branch in that city under the protection of the 
US Consul-General.97  
The evacuation of Allied nationals from Spain was carried out by the US 
and British embassies in Madrid, with the exception of Dutch and Belgian 
refugees, who were evacuated by their corresponding governments-in-exile to 
their respective colonies. The British Embassy was responsible for the 
embarkation of ‘Canadians’, Polish, and British refugees via Gibraltar, usually 
to the United Kingdom.98 The US Embassy, on the other hand, took care of the 
evacuation of French nationals —the group that proved most difficult. On 6 
March, a first convoy of 1,500 French men of military age was due to sail from 
the Port of Cádiz bound for Casablanca.99 Although the evacuation had been 
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approved by Spanish authorities, the Spanish government cancelled the whole 
operation on the same day that the SS Sidi Brahim and SS Gouverneur-Général 
Lépine were scheduled to depart, allegedly due to ‘strong pressure from the 
German ambassador’.100 In view of the lack of cooperation on the part of the 
Spanish, the US ambassador consulted with the Portuguese government. On 
the Morning of 15 March, the Portuguese ambassador to Spain, Pedro 
Teotónio Pereira, told Hayes that Salazar was ‘entirely agreeable’ to allow the 
transit of French refugees through Portugal.101 The only condition of the 
Portuguese government was that, in order to avoid ‘too much of a display’, the 
French convoys should embark from the more discreet Port of Setúbal, 50 km 
south of Lisbon. The first group of 784 French refugees for North Africa sailed 
from Setúbal on 1 April as programmed. According to the Naval Attaché at the 
British Embassy in Lisbon, the PVDE were ‘courteous and helpful to the 
utmost of their ability’.102 This operation was repeated several times over the 
summer and fall of 1943, with each convoy ranging between 619 and 1,165 
men.103 There were also smaller groups of Polish and Czech men between 45 
and 92-strong, which sailed from Vila Real de Santo António, a coastal town 
in south-easternmost Portugal that could be easily reached via ferry from 
Spanish territory.104  
On 19 August, Hayes pressed Jordana again to allow French refugees to 
leave Spain by a Spanish port, as this would simplify the evacuation procedure, 
in terms of Portuguese transit visas, cost, and transportation. This time, the 
MAE proved more sympathetic. Madrid agreed on condition that the Allied 
governments took steps ‘to prevent refugees speaking ill of Spain and Spanish 
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institutions once they have left Spain’.105 From Hayes’ personal notes, it seems 
that the ambassador agreed to Jordana’s petition:  
‘Glad to learn from note just received that Spanish Government consents to 
direct evacuation of French refugees from Spanish ports in French ships. Deeply 
grateful —my Government, myself, and the French Mission also. In response 
to Y.E.’s suggestion, I shall ask our people in Algiers to discourage publicity of 
any notices, or comments of the refugee inflow to Spain’.106 
 
The first convoy of 1,552 French refugees departed from the Port of 
Málaga on 21 October. To avoid confiscation from Vichy authorities in Spain, 
the two ships —SS Sidi Brahim and SS Gouverneur-Général Lépine— sailed under 
British flag. In November, two more sailings took place from the same port. 
Over the year 1944, 4,368 POWs joined Allied Armed forces through Spain, 
according to the British Embassy in Madrid.107 
Unlike POWs, the evacuation of Jewish refugees from Spain did not 
receive as much support from the Allied governments, and was handled mostly 
by non-governmental organisations. In January 1943, the Jewish Agency for 
Palestine (JAP) began to investigate —upon Schwartz’s suggestion— the 
possibility of evacuating Jewish refugees from the Iberian Peninsula to 
Palestine.108 After some deliberation, the project received preliminary approval 
from both Sir Herbert Emerson and the Foreign Office (FO) in London; and on 
19 February, the High Commissioner for Palestine authorised the British 
Passport Control Office (BPCO) in Lisbon to allocate visas to two hundred 
‘physically fit workers’.109 The main challenge to their evacuation was the near 
lack of transportation possibilities. Due to the war in Tunisia, Mediterranean 
sailings were unthinkable. The only alternative route to Palestine, through the 
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Atlantic, was also extremely complicated. This route involved sailing around 
the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa, to the Port of Lourenço Marques, in 
the Portuguese colony of Mozambique. From Mozambique, some refugees had 
managed to reach Palestine by sailing through the Suez Canal to Port Said, in 
Egypt. Others flew from Durban (South Africa) to Palestine via Cairo and 
Alexandria. At this stage in the war, however, these means of transport were 
not easily available.110 In regards to the hazardous route via Lourenço Marques, 
the main issue was that the Salazar government was reluctant to issue transit 
visas for Mozambique without a guarantee that Jewish refugees would leave 
within the stipulated four weeks —unfortunately, the route through the Nile to 
Palestine was also fully booked.111 In an attempt to bypass the Portuguese 
colony, Whitehall tried to persuade the government of the Union of South 
Africa to authorise the transit of these refugees through Durban, from whence 
they could reach Palestine on British troopships. Despite claiming to be 
‘sympathetic to the cause’, however, the South African government refused to 
allow Jewish refugees in transit arguing that the National Party —then on the 
opposition— was stoking antisemitism ‘as a plank in their election 
programme’.112  
To deal with both the issue of transpiration and the screening of refugees, 
the JAP began an urgent search for a ‘special delegate’ to the Iberian Peninsula. 
The person entrusted with this mission was Wilfrid B. Israel, a prominent 
Anglo-German Jew and philanthropist who had already played an instrumental 
role in the Kindertransporte initiative. During the two months following his 
arrival to Lisbon on 26 March 1943, Israel examined hundreds of stateless 
refugees in Portugal and Spain and distributed 200 Palestine certificates.113 On 
1 June, Wilfrid Israel flew to London to negotiate an increase in the number of 
certificates allocated to the Iberian Peninsula. Tragically, the Dutch KLM plane 
which carried Israel —as well as Hollywood actor Leslie Howard and several 
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British secret agents— was shot down by a German fighter plane as it flew over 
the Bay of Biscay. Israel’s death left both the JAP and the FO without his 
detailed report on the refugee situation in the Iberian Peninsula, even though 
most of his suggestions —such as the transportation of refugees through the 
Mediterranean— were eventually adopted.114  
Prior to embarking on his last trip, Wilfrid Israel had turned over the 
completion of this migration work to Dr. Paul Bloch, a German Jewish refugee 
working for RSARO in Madrid. By September, more than 500 persons were 
already in possession of Palestine certificates. In October, the JAP sent Fritz 
Lichtenstein, one of the leaders of the HeHalutz movement in Britain, to take 
over Israel’s role as special delegate in the Iberian Peninsula. In cooperation 
with JDC, HICEM, and RSARO, Lichtenstein re-examined each migration 
case, distributed Palestine certificates amongst the refugees, and sought possible 
transportations solutions.115 In November 1943, after fruitless negotiations over 
the route through Lourenço Marques, the Portuguese government agreed to 
take Jewish refugees to Haifa aboard the SS Nyassa, which was due to sail to 
Kochi (India) to pick up a cargo of coir.116 The Nyassa left the port of Lisbon on 
23 January 1944 with 171 Jewish refugees from Portugal, and collected a 
further group of 567 refugees from Spain at the port of Cádiz. A total of 738 
Jewish refugees from the Peninsula reached Haifa on 1 February.117 With the 
arrival of the spring in 1944, the number of Jewish refugees who reached Spain 
thanks to the efforts of the Jewish underground in Southern France increased. 
Since the majority of them were young Zionists, they awaited the formation of 
a second convoy to Palestine. On 26 October, a convoy of 308 Jewish refugees 
sailed from Cádiz aboard the SS Guinée, which picked up a further group of 434 
Jewish refugees from Tangier before reaching Haifa on 4 November 1944.118 
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In addition to Palestine migration, there were a few hundred Jewish 
refugees who found asylum in Canada. On 17 January 1944, the Canadian 
government offered Jewish refugees in Spain and Portugal the possibility to 
shelter full family units for the duration of the war. At the beginning of March 
1944, the representative of the Canadian Government, Odillon Cormier, 
travelled to Lisbon to screen potential immigration candidates. Together with 
Gwenydd (née Weller) Champsaur, a British volunteer working for the USC 
office in Lisbon, Cormier toured the cities of Barcelona, Madrid, and Tangiers, 
to interview prospective migrants. In the meantime, Joseph Schwartz arranged 
their Portuguese and US transit visas from Lisbon. The immigration conditions 
demanded by the Canadian government were quite restrictive. There were 
whole families, for instance, who were rejected simply because they had 
children older than twenty-one who were unmarried. On 30 March, a first 
convoy of 201 stateless refugees —132 from the Barcelona area, and 69 from 
Madrid— sailed aboard the SS Serpa Pinto bound bound for Philadelphia.119 On 
14 May, a second convoy of 20 refugees, whose Canadian visas took longer to 
arrive, left Lisbon on the same route. This convoy endured a very tense moment 
when a German U-Boat intercepted the Serpa Pinto in high seas. Refugees were 
given half an hour to evacuate the ship while the submarine commandant 
requested instructions from Berlin as to whether or not to torpedo the ship. 
After a negative response, the ship continued its way to Philadelphia. In the 
midst of the chaos, however, a baby and a doctor drowned in the ocean, 
whereas an aged refugee broke his spine and had to spend months in a hospital 
upon arrival to Philadelphia.120 Amongst the 221 refugees who left the Iberian 
Peninsula in this way, there were fourteen couples whose children had been 
previously brought to Canada by the USCOM and placed in foster homes in 
Toronto and Montreal. Upon arrival to the port of Philadelphia, these parents 
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were sent by train to Canada, and managed to be reunited whith their 
children.121 The third and last convoy for Canada sailed on 8 September 1944 
with 71 Jewish refugees from Central Europe who sailed from Tangier to 
Canada aboard the SS Nyassa.122 This brings to 292 the total number of Jewish 
refugees who found refuge in Canada during 1944.123 In addition to Palestine 
and Canadian migration, there were also several hundred Jewish refugees who 
reached North thanks to the Anglo-Saxon negotiations at Bermuda. 
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Bermuda, the IGCR, and Fedhala 
 
On 17 December 1942, the Allied governments issued a joint declaration 
in which they officially acknowledged  Nazi atrocities against European Jewry, 
and condemned Germany’s ‘bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination’.124 
The shifting balance of power in Europe after the Allied victories in French 
North Africa, Egypt, and Stalingrad, meant that the Allies were now in a 
position to invest more energy into tackling the refugee crisis. Indeed, they were 
urged to do so from various sectors of society. In the weeks that followed the 
joint declaration, Jewish and Christian organisations in Great Britain and the 
US organised mass protests pressuring their governments for immediate action 
to save the Jews of Europe.125 Whitehall was first to react. On 20 January 1943, 
the British FO delivered an extensive aide-mémoire to the US State Department 
with the recommendation that the issue of refugees from Nazism ‘should be 
dealt with internationally, instead of as hitherto by private charity or individual 
governments in isolation’; and calling for a meeting to discuss possible 
solutions.126 In late February, after some hesitation, the US government 
accepted the invitation. The resulting Anglo-American Refugee Conference 
took place in Bermuda between 19 and 30 April 1943. Discussions at Bermuda 
centred on two main subjects: the reactivation of the Intergovernmental 
Committee on Refugees (IGCR), and the use of a US military camp in French 
Morocco —near Fedhala— to guarantee the prompt  evacuation of refugees 
stranded in Franco’s Spain.  
The London-based IGCR was born out of the Évian Conference in 1938 
to provide for the orderly migration of Jews and political refugees from the 
Reich. During its first four years of existence, however, the IGCR was rather 
inactive and did not accomplish anything significant despite being supported 
by twenty-nine signatory states. During the Bermuda negotiations, the British 
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delegation deemed this organisation as completely useless, and favoured the 
creation of an entirely new body to deal with the refugee problem. By contrast, 
US representatives insisted that rather than establishing a new organisation they 
should expand and reinvigorate the IGCR —which had been created upon 
President Roosevelt’s initiative. The British acceded to the Americans’ request 
on condition that a new constitution was signed to endow the IGCR with 
greater powers to overcome the shortcomings of its original mandate. Backed 
by forty-nine signatory countries, this new constitution empowered the IGCR 
to rescue, maintain, and distribute relief amongst refugees, negotiate with 
government authorities in their behalf, and seek long-term arrangements to 
tackle their needs. Most importantly, the new IGCR would no longer be limited 
to German and Austrian refugees, as it expanded its mandate ‘to all persons, 
wherever they may be, who, as a result of events in Europe, have had to leave, 
or may have to leave, their countries of residence because of the danger to their 
lives or liberties on account of their race, religion or political beliefs’. At least 
on paper, this was a step towards a broader definition of the term ‘refugee’, even 
if it was still restricted to European persons. Heading the IGCR were the 
League of Nations’ High Commissioner for Refugees, Sir Herbert Emerson, 
and had two vice-directors: Patrick M. Malin, an US citizen, and the Swiss 
Gustave G. Kullmann.127 
Despite the good will of those present at Bermuda, there were practical 
questions regarding the functioning of the IGCR that remained unanswered 
after the Conference. As it had been the case in its early years of existence, one 
of the IGCR’s main handicaps was financial. In principle, the IGCR was to 
receive contributions from all signatory states, but the fragile situation in 
Europe meant that the British and US governments had to underwrite most of 
the expenses. A further problem, this time relating to the expanded definition 
of ‘refugee’, was that persons displaced within their own countries fell outside 
the IGCR’s mandate. But the main obstacle facing the new refugee organisation 
was the lack of personnel. Although the IGCR’s Executive Committee sent 
IGCR delegates to six key regions —French North Africa, Cairo, 
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Czechoslovakia, Italy, Switzerland, and the US— it had no plans to 
significantly expand the organisations’ staff. Rather than providing material 
assistance, however, the job of IGCR representatives was to liaise with the 
IGCR’s headquarters in London, and to cooperate with private relief 
organisations already in the field to improve relief infrastructures in their 
respective regions.128 
In this sense, the success of the IGCR was tied to the ability —and 
willingness— of IGCR delegates to take advantage of the resources at their 
disposal. One success story is that of the IGCR’s Italian Mission. When Sir 
Clifford E. Heathcote-Smith was appointed IGCR representative to Italy in 
May 1944, he enlisted the services of two members of the British Quaker’s 
Friends Ambulance Unit (FAU), as well as two of the most experienced AFSC 
delegates in North Africa: David Hartley, and Howard Wriggins. These were 
extremely dedicated relief workers who had long desired to expand their relief 
missions, and thus profited from IGCR’s sponsorship. In his memoirs, 
Wriggins put it in this way: ‘While in Algiers, I had puzzled over how the AFSC 
was to get a foot in the door in Italy. Here was an unsolicited opportunity … a 
great stroke of luck’.129 When the former Governor of French Gabon, Victor 
Valentin-Smith, was appointed IGCR representative to French North Africa in 
July 1944, the IGCR’s Executive Committee advised him to follow the example 
of the Italian mission and ‘to make use of the Quakers, who have already been 
on the spot for some months’.130 Unfortunately, Valentin-Smith refused to 
follow the Italian example because he saw ‘no advantage’ in partnering with 
the AFSC. The way he saw it, the Quaker organisation was on a ‘welfare level’, 
and therefore had nothing to do with the mission of the IGCR, which was 
purely ‘diplomatic’ in scope. In this context, the first measure as IGCR 
representative to French North Africa was to close down the Fedhala refugee 
centre, allegedly, ‘to help the refugees at Fedhala camp find new homes in other 
																																																																		
128 Emerson, IGCR, ‘Appointment of  Representatives in Certain Countries’ (29 December 
1943); WRB, Part II, Reel 21, File 1. 
129 Howard Wriggins, Picking up the Pieces from Portugal to Palestine: Quaker Refugee Relief  in World 
War II, a Memoir (Lanham, MD: University Press of  America, 2004), 88. 
130 Patrick M. Malin, IGCR, to Maurice Dejean, CFLN London (4 July 1944); USHMM, RG-
67.008M, Series I, Box 7, Folder 29. 
  222 
parts of the world’. Rather than effectively using his IGCR role to assist 
refugees, Valentin-Smith seemed more interested in using that position to get 
rid of the refugees, as his superiors at the French Provisional Government 
feared being left with this burden at the end of the war. Ultimately, Washington 
refused to close the refugee camp at Fedhala, as this was the product of Anglo-
American cooperation and not the IGCR’s competence. As to the benefit that 
the IGCR representative brought to the refugee situation in the North African 
region, there is no best assessment than that of   AFSC representative in 
Casablanca, Kendall G. Kimberland: ‘we have virtually been put on notice by 
Valentin to expect little or nothing from him in the way of cooperation, much 
less support’.131 
Given that the ‘reinvigoration’ of the IGCR failed to improve its operating 
capacity to the extent desired, the IGCR remained mostly concerned with 
policy making and negotiation, and left actual relief operations to private relief 
organisations and to another supranational relief organisation. Created to assist 
the peoples and countries devastated by Axis powers, the United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) was a product of the war itself. 
The first to suggest the creation of an international relief organisation to assist 
the victims of Nazi expansionism was Winston Churchill. On 21 August 1940, 
during a speech at the House of Commons regarding the blockade of Germany, 
the British premier attempted to strengthen the hopes of those under the Nazi 
yoke by promising them ‘immediate food, freedom, and peace’ as soon as the 
Axis powers had been defeated.132 Negotiations in this sense moved slowly over 
the next two years. On 24 September 1941, the British government convened a 
meeting with representatives of fifteen Allied governments at St. James’s Palace 
in London to discuss postwar relief plans for Europe. At this meeting, the Allied 
governments approved Anthony Eden’s proposal to begin inter-Allied 
cooperation on relief matters. In June 1942, Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
Great Britain, and the US, established   the International Wheat Council, which 
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was to administer a wheat pool for intergovernmental relief in war-stricken 
countries. Although the Allies agreed to establish UNRRA in August 1942, the 
unfavourable war situation made it necessary to defer these plans indefinitely. 
Negotiations were resumed in January 1943, and in May, the ‘Big Four’ drafted 
a preliminary agreement that was released to the other forty Allied governments 
to be revised over the summer. On 9 November 1943, representatives from 
forty-four countries convened at the White House to sign the constitution 
establishing the UNRRA, whose primary goals were to provide relief to 
suffering persons following the liberation of Nazi-occupied territories, and to 
arrange for the return of prisoners and exiles to their homes. The  following 
day, the UNRRA held its first council session in Atlantic City (New Jersey). 
The second major issue covered at the Bermuda Conference —which was 
to be the source of even greater controversy between British and American 
officials— related to the refugee situation in Franco’s Spain. On 22 April 1943, 
the British delegation presented Francoist Spain as ‘the only effective channel 
of escape remaining in Western Europe’, and argued that the transfer of Jewish 
refugees to French North Africa was essential to ensure that Spain would not 
close her borders altogether —as it happened the month before. Would this 
channel be blocked, so argued the British delegation, the Allies would not only 
face international criticism for their passivity in the refuge crisis; they would 
also lose an essential supply of manpower. But these persuasive arguments were 
not enough to convince the US delegation, who insisted that North Africa was 
a military priority.133 In truth, North Africa was not the only possibility of 
asylum for Jewish refugees in Spain. In December 1942, Sir Herbert Emerson 
had already investigated the possibility of transferring Jewish refugees from 
Spain to Jamaica’s ‘Gibraltar Camp No. 2’, a refugee camp established in 1940 
to accommodate up to 7,000 evacuees from the British Crown Colony of 
Gibraltar, and which was barely in use. In view of the American opposition to 
the use of North Africa during the Bermuda negotiations, the British 
government considered Jamaica as a last-resort solution to the refugee problem 
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in Spain, although one that was never implemented.134  
The American refusal to the use of French North Africa as a Jewish 
refugee depot was driven by a fear of jeopardising the Allies’ fragile relations 
with French authorities in North Africa, whose position on the Jewish question 
was well known to the Americans.135 Through informal discussions with 
François Darlan and other French officials, Robert D. Murphy had learnt that 
they opposed any ‘sensational steps to improve the lot of the Jews’ as they 
believed that this would inevitably provoke a violent reaction from local 
Muslims.136 President Roosevelt was equally reluctant to sanction this project 
following his exchanges with Resident-General Charles Noguès, who 
commented during the Casablanca Conference of January 1943 that ‘it would 
be a sad thing for the French to win the war merely to open the way for the 
Jews to control the professions and the business world of North Africa’.137 
 Unsatisfied with the refusal of the American delegation, the British FO 
pressured the US Government to rethink its position over the establishment of 
the so-called North African Refugee Centre (NARC), to which Anthony Eden 
‘attaches very great importance’.138 After some deliberation, the US State 
Department and the Combined Chiefs of Staff gave their preliminary approval 
to the NARC project, but the US Joint Chiefs of Staff remained adamant in 
their military security objections. Churchill raised this question informally with 
President Roosevelt in mid-May 1943, on the occasion of the Third 
Washington Conference (‘Trident’), although to no avail.139 On 30 June, 
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Churchill cabled the US President insisting that the NARC was ‘the most 
practical solution’ to alleviate the plight of Jewish refugees in the Iberian 
Peninsula, and added that General Giraud had given his —and therefore the 
recently constituted CFLN’s— general approval.140 Roosevelt gave green light 
to the NARC project on 8 July, and two days later reached an agreement with 
Churchill. Whereas the US Embassy in Spain was to assembly and transport 
the refugees to the Spanish port of embarkation; the British Government was 
to provide shipping transportation over the Strait of Gibraltar to North Africa. 
On 17 July 1943, the President’s Emergency Fund transferred $500,000 to 
OFRRO in Algiers to defray expenses for the project. Eisenhower and Giraud, 
on the other hand, had been charged with the task of designating a suitable 
location for the NARC in French Morocco. On 10 August, they proposed the 
Camp Maréchal Lyautey in Fedhala, situated ten miles north of Casablanca.141  
Despite their initial ratification of the project, French officials imposed 
several conditions that effectively delayed the realisation of the NARC for 
several months. In addition to capping at 2,000 the number of Jewish evacuees 
from Spain that could be sheltered in French North Africa at any one time, 
French authorities also demanded the imposition of internment conditions 
upon the refugees, who would not be able to leave nor work outside the camp 
under any circumstance.142 Although US authorities agreed to the former 
condition, they strongly objected to the latter. In their view, freedom of 
movement was essential to avoid the implication that the Allies were  running 
a concentration camp with Jewish prisoners. In their response, the French 
clarified that it was not their intention to deprive refugees of their liberty, but 
solely to take precautions with refugees whose background was unknown to 
them. In regards to the refugee’s capacity to work, French authorities agreed to 
the granting of working permits to Fedhala refugees after examination of each 
case, and as long as it did not cause disadvantage to the local economy. 
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Refugees without working permits, however, would not be allowed to leave the 
camp —which would be safeguarded by French military guards— under any 
circumstance.143 The final agreement was reached on 6 December during a 
meeting between the representatives of all parties involved: the maintenance of 
the NARC would be the shared responsibility of the US and British 
governments, the newly-established UNRRA would provide the camp’s 
personnel, and the IGCR would be responsible for organising the eventual 
removal of the refugees from Fedhala. The preliminary screening of refugees in 
Spain was to be carried out by an UNRRA representative against a security 
check by French authorities upon arrival to North Africa. After nearly eight 
months, the preparatives for Fedhala had concluded.144 
In early January 1944, UNRRA representative and director of the NARC, 
Moses W. Beckelman, travelled to Spain to publicise this evacuation plan 
amongst Jewish refugees, and conduct the preliminary screening process. To 
his surprise, the number of Jewish refugees remaining in Spain at that time did 
not exceed 1,500. Moreover, 567 of these were in possession of Palestine 
certificates and were expected to sail to Haifa on 25 January. Since Fedhala 
was in closer proximity to Europe and could have tempted refugees in this 
group to withdraw from migration to Palestine, Beckelman postponed the 
official announcement of the NARC project until the day of their departure.145 
Meanwhile, Beckelman gave refugees in Madrid a rough idea of what living 
conditions they could expect at the camp, and the advantages and 
disadvantages of the project. The official announcement with details on the 
NARC project was distributed at the end of January.146 Beckelman said that the 
two questions most frequently asked by prospective refugees were ‘Can I get a 
job?’ and ‘How can I arrange to live outside the camp?’. To this he answered 
that the only way to permanently move out of the NARC was to join the French 
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Foreign Legion, a solution which was not popular amongst refugees 
considering the treatment previously accorded to Jewish volunteers. But most 
of all, they were most apprehensive about travelling to North Africa to be 
confined to a ‘camp’ —itself a word that was enough to provoke terrible 
memories.147 To compensate for the low reception of the Fedhala project, 
Beckelman pressed for the admission of a group of 365 Sephardic Jews of 
Spanish nationality whose arrival to Spain was due in mid-February 1944. 
Their ‘repatriation’ from Bergen-Belsen had been previously obtained by 
RSARO from the Spanish government on condition that these Sephardim 
would leave Spain within the shortest possible delay. Accordingly, Beckelman 
accompanied Samuel Sequerra to the Franco-Spanish border at Portbou to 
greet this group of refugees and screen their applications to Fedhala.148 Two 
additional groups of 75 Spanish Sephardim and 56 Portuguese Sephardim 
‘repatriated’ from France under similar circumstances were also penciled for 
migration to Fedhala.149 
Before their actual sailing to North Africa took place, refugee applications 
still had to undergo a security check by French authorities in Algiers which 
further delayed the whole operation. In addition to rejecting 76 refugee-
candidates on security grounds, the French also objected to the admission of 
160 Sephardic Jews who had arrived in Spain prior to March 1933 and were in 
possession of Spanish passports. This added to the impatience of Spanish 
authorities, who threatened to discontinue the arrival of other groups of 
Sephardim from Nazi-occupied Europe until all foreign-born Sephardic Jews 
with Spanish nationality had been removed from Spain.150 After much pressure 
from Leonard E. Ackermann, the WRB’s special representative in French 
North Africa, French authorities agreed to admit nearly a hundred Sephardic 
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refugees regardless of their date of arrival to Spain.151 In addition to these 
screening complications, the Fedhala project was also deferred by the scarcity 
of available shipping space. Since the British argued that they were unable to 
secure a ship to transport Jewish refugees across the strait of Gibraltar, the 
French proposed sending one of their vessels.152 But the promised ship was not 
available, as it was undergoing reparations at the Casablanca harbour that 
would take at least four more weeks.153 The sailing was postponed two 
additional times, causing growing skepticism on the part of refugees.154 At last, 
on 21 June 1944, the first convoy of 573 Jewish refugees sailed from Cádiz to 
Fedhala aboard the SS Gouverneur-Général Lépine —this was the first French ship 
to berth at a Spanish port since ‘Operation Torch’.155 
The ‘Camp Maréchal Lyautey’ at Fedhala had been built at the beginning 
of 1943 by the US Army, but left unfinished. It consisted of twenty-eight 
buildings of stone with timber and felt roofs, ridge ventilators, and about 25 
showers and sinks made of concrete. Despite being surrounded by a barbed-
wire fence and guarded by former Italian POWs now working for the US Army, 
Fedhala was not a ‘camp’ but a ‘refugee centre’. Refugees at Fedhala were 
referred to as ‘residents’ by twenty staff members that included several clerks 
and relief workers, three nurses, a doctor, an educator, and a military engineer. 
Fedhala had a library, a school, a canteen, and a ‘recreation hall’ with a large 
central fireplace, bulletin boards, and a piano. Jewish religious services were 
organised regularly by the several hundred Sephardim at Fedhala —the largest 
demographic at the NARC. In the evening hours, a terrace from which the 
ocean and the setting sun could be seen through the barbed wire was 
particularly popular amongst the residents.156  Overall, refugees seemed quite 
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positive about their experience at the NARC. Raymonde Tauber, a Fedhala 
resident, said that she felt like in ‘heaven’.157 René Hassid, ‘chef de group’ of the 
first convoy to sail to North Africa, reported at the end of his first week at 
Fedhala:   
‘Unmarried and people alone live in well built barracks, and each family lives 
under a pretty large tent furnished with the necessary beds. We have been given 
a mess-kit and take our meals at the mess. The food is good and we get plenty 
of it. We stand up at 7, breakfast at 8, lunch at 1pm and have dinner at 6pm. At 
11 pm every light is put out. Barracks have the electric light and each tent a petrol 
lamp. There is a recreational hall where people spend their time specially after 
dinner. The medical care is assured by a doctor and the health situation of the 
camp seems be excellent’.158 
 
Rather than distributing cash allowances indiscriminately, camp authorities 
encouraged Fedhala residents to work towards any aspect of camp organisation —e.g. 
cleaning, plumbing, cooking, carpentry— and were given a salary at the end of every 
week in reward for their work. This was of course deliberate, as for many refugees this 
was their first working experience in years. René Hassid shared that opinion: 
‘This is a subtle and generous way to make the residents forget they are relieved, 
we may only regret that sometimes some residents forget it almost too much, 
and complain or discuss about supplementary hours, wages, etc. But a 
psychologist may qualify this too as a good sign of recovery’.159 
 
Despite the fact that Fedhala could welcome up to 2,000 refugees at any given 
point, only 1,397 refugees from Spain ever applied for admission. Of this total, 977 
candidates passed the double screening —70 per cent of the total— and yet the number 
of refugees who ever reached Fedhala was just 634 —45 per cent of original 
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applicants.160 This discrepancy is due to three main reasons: the Spanish authorities’ 
refusal to release certain refugees, refugees being able to arrange their emigration to other 
countries, and the bad state of health of some amongst them.161 On the brighter side, 
Fedhala did host refugees who did not come from the Iberian Peninsula. The most 
numerous was a convoy of 150 Libyan refugees who had been the object of a German-
British prisoner exchange in Lisbon and awaited repatriation to Benghazi.162 If we take 
into account these arrivals, the number of refugees who ever set foot in the NARC at 
Fedhala amounts to 853, a number considerably below the camp’s shelter potential.163  
After the liberation of France in August 1944, Fedhala lost its raison d’être, and 
camp authorities began to seek ways to liquidate the refugee centre —whose high 
maintenance was no longer justified. In fact, IGCR representative in Algiers, Victor 
Valentin-Smith, had been pressing for the liquidation of the NARC since July, a decision 
which IGCR director Sir Herbert Emerson judged premature.164 The first large groups 
of Fedhala residents departed in October. On 13 October, 348 Sephardim were 
transferred to the UNRRA camp in Nuseirat, in British Palestine, by way of Algiers, 
Naples, Tarento, Benghazi, and Alexandria.165 Other refugees were relocated to 
UNRRA refugee camps in Italy, while others remained in Casablanca awaiting 
migration to the US.166 On 20 October 1944, UNRRA assumed responsibility for the 
so-called ‘Yugoslav Refugee Camp’ in Philippeville (Algeria), and on 15 November, 234 
Fedhala residents were transferred to that camp.167 The same day this group left for 
Philippeville, the Fedhala camp was liquidated.168 At the close of 1944, a total of 1,893 
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Jewish refugees had been evacuated from Spain thanks to the combined efforts of 
RSARO, JDC, UNRRA, and the Allied governments. Whilst the majority went to 
Palestine (889), Fedhala (634), and Canada (292), some refugees managed to migrate to 
the US (23), Argentina (18), and the United Kingdom (12), as well as several countries 
in Latin America (25).169 
 
 
  
																																																																		
7, Folder 29. 
169 RSARO, ‘Spain: Activities of  the Madrid Office during 1944’ (28 February 1945); USC, 
bMs-16007/2(2) 
  232 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter Five: 
Rescue Against the Clock, 1943-44 
 
 
  
  233 
Repatriation and Deportation  
 
Following the onset of the mass arrests of Jewish persons in occupied 
France during the spring of 1941, and especially after the implementation of the 
‘Final Solution’, the Nazi Government was faced with the question of what to 
do with Jews living in German-controlled territories who claimed to be citizens 
of neutral countries and countries aligned with Nazi Germany. Although the 
SS resisted to exempt these Jews from deportation to the extermination camps 
in the East, the position of the Auswärtiges Amt prevailed. At this point in the 
war, the Germans could simply not risk ruining their diplomatic relations with 
both the neutrals and their allies, as this would severely weaken Germany’s 
strategic and foreign trade interests. Accordingly, it was agreed that Jews of 
neutral nationality at the transit camps at Drancy and Compiègne would be 
released once the relevant consular officials confirmed that they were citizens 
from a neutral or German-allied country. These Jews were exempted from 
various other anti-Jewish measures such as the requirement to bear the yellow 
star —becoming ‘non-star-bearers’ (Nicht-Sternträger) in Nazi parlance— 
meaning that they were not to be arrested and deported, or at least not yet.1  
In an act of ‘diplomatic deference’, the Nazi government consulted the 
governments of neutral and German-allied countries on whether they 
considered these Jews as rightful citizens and were thus willing to repatriate 
them home in the context of the so-called Heimschaffungsaktion (‘repatriation 
action’). If not, these persons would have to endure to the ‘general Jewish 
measures’ (allgemeine Judenmaßnahmen), namely, arrest, deportation, and 
murder. In so doing, Berlin shifted the burden of responsibility for the fate of 
these persons to third-party governments under a false pretence of diplomatic 
respect and right-doing, and made them passive accomplices in the murder of 
these persons —unless they agreed to repatriate their Jewish nationals.2  
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From September 1942, Germany began to distribute among allied and 
neutral governments an ultimatum for the repatriation of their Jewish citizens 
from occupied France. The two fascist puppet states of Croatia and Slovakia, 
as well as Germany’s allies, Bulgaria, Romania, and Italy, all agreed to the 
application of the ‘general Jewish measures’ to their Jewish nationals in France. 
In October, the German ultimatum for repatriation reached the governments of 
Hungary, Switzerland, and Turkey. In early 1943, the ultimatum was extended 
to Denmark, Finland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and several South American 
countries. Although initially these ultimata concerned only Jews in France, 
their scope was later extended to include all territories under German control 
in Western, Central Europe, and Greece.3 
The German ultimatum for the repatriation of Spanish and Portuguese 
Jews from German-occupied Europe arrived in Madrid and Lisbon on 26 
January and 4 February 1943 respectively. In principle, they were given three 
months to repatriate their Jewish nationals. Owing to widespread censorship in 
Spain and Portugal, public opinion in these two countries exerted minimal 
pressure over their respective governments and thus were not in a position to 
demand the repatriation of their Jewish co-nationals. By contrast, mounting 
pressure from the Allied governments put considerable pressure on the two 
Iberian regimes, who could not ignore the fate of their Jewish subjects abroad 
without risking their ‘image’ in the West. However, even if Salazar’s Portugal 
and Franco’s Spain did eventually engage in negotiations for the repatriation of 
their Jewish nationals abroad, neither of the two governments considered them 
to be citizens in full right. 
Since the late nineteenth century, a number of intellectuals in Spain and 
Portugal began to take interest in the descendants of Sephardic Jews who had 
been expelled from the Iberian Peninsula four centuries before. This movement 
was stronger in Spain than in Portugal, owing to the fact that Spain was going 
through a deep identity crisis which resulted from the loss of its last colonial 
possessions —Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines— in 1898 following a 
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humiliating defeat against the US. Amongst the many responses presented to 
make up for such grave national depression, was the so-called philosephardism 
(filosefardismo). Its pioneer was Dr. Ángel Pulido, a physician and liberal 
politician who became a great advocate of Judeo-Spanish language and 
Sephardic tradition. Pulido’s first encounter with the Sephardic diaspora took 
place during a trip to the Danube countries in the summer of 1880. Pulido was 
greatly impressed to find Spanish-speaking Jews amongst the Jewish 
communities of Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Turkey, whom he called 
‘Spaniards without homeland’ (Españoles sin patria). Following a second trip in 
1904, Pulido started a campaign to repair the centuries-old divide between 
Spain and Spanish Jews in diaspora.4 Propelled more by his patriotism than by 
his philosemitism, Pulido’s campaign highlighted the economic and cultural 
potential of a rapprochement with these communities, and achieved relative 
success among Spain’s educated classes. In 1909, he was authorised to open 
synagogues in Spain, and the following year he obtained the king’s patronage 
to establish the Unión Hispano-Hebrea. This was an organ of cultural diplomacy 
similar to the French Alliance Israelite Universelle, which successfully established 
itself in the Balkans and the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco. Pulido’s 
campaign also triggered the interest of Spanish academia in Jewish studies 
more broadly.5 
During the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, the Spanish and Portuguese interest 
in the Sephardic communities of the Balkan region became a way to increase 
the influence of their countries in the Balkan region. In 1912, the Greeks 
occupied Salonika, ending the Ottoman’s system of capitulations which thus 
far had allowed European powers to protect subjects under Ottoman rule. 
Salonikan Jews numbered about 80,000 at the beginning of the twentieth 
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century out of a total population of 173,000.6 To defend themselves from the 
incipient process of ‘Hellenization’ imposed by the Greek occupiers, many 
Jews who had thus far been Spain’s and Portugal’s protégés sought again their 
consular protection. From 1912, Portugal’s liberal First Republic granted 
Portuguese nationality to virtually all those who sought their consular 
protection.7 Spanish authorities were initially more reluctant to grant 
diplomatic protection to these Sephardim. It was only after the Treaty of 
Lausanne of 1923 abolished the system of capitulations in Turkey that the 
Spanish government granted Spanish nationality to its former protégés under 
Ottoman rule.  As seen from Miguel Primo de Rivera’s military dictatorship, 
this was also a way to expand Spanish influence in the region. The resulting 
piece of legislation was the Royal Decree of 20 December 1924, which granted 
the former Spanish protégés in the Ottoman empire the possibility of becoming 
Spanish nationals. Although Spanish authorities instructed their diplomatic 
legations in the region to give maximum publicity to this decree, many 
Sephardim did not abide themselves by the decree because they thought that 
their origins rendered them Spanish citizens automatically. Only between 3,000 
to 4,000 Sephardim did receive Spanish nationality. Some migrated to Spain, 
but the majority remained in the Balkans or moved to France.8 
To a great extent, the responses of Salazarist Portugal and Francoist Spain 
to the German ultimatum for repatriation of 1943 resemble one another —and 
not in a positive way. Both governments opposed the settlement of their Jewish 
nationals within their borders despite being aware of what awaited these 
persons. Both approached the German ultimatum in purely legalistic terms. 
Both used red tape to delay and hinder the repatriation of their Jewish nationals 
whenever possible. By choosing not to adopt a more proactive stance with Nazi 
Germany as regards rescue, Spain and Portugal failed to save hundreds if not 
thousands of Jewish lives. 
By early 1943, there were a maximum of 300 Portuguese Jews in France 
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who were registered with the Portuguese Consulate-General in Paris. Despite 
initial reluctance to intervene in their behalf, Salazar changed his mind as the 
repatriation deadline of 31 March approached. From the 300, at least 184 were 
repatriated in three groups that reachced Portugal in September and November 
1943, and in June 1944. In Greece, there were only six Jews holding Portuguese 
citizenship according to Nazi figures. But the number of Jews registered with 
the Portuguese consulate was at least fifteen. In this instance, the Portuguese 
government did not engage in negotiations to effect their repatriation to 
Portugal and left them to their fate.9 The largest group of Jews of Portuguese 
extraction —numbering 4,303— lived in the Netherlands. This is the most 
tragic side to the Portuguese side of the story. Since none of them held 
Portuguese citizenship proper, the Portuguese government did nothing to 
protect them despite many appeals from the Amsterdam Jewish Community. 
In a desperate attempt to avoid deportation, Dutch Sephardim engaged in Nazi 
pseudoscientific racial discourse, and tried to convince German officials that 
they belonged to an entirely different ‘race’ than the ‘Jewish’ one. The thesis of 
the so-called ‘Action Portuguesia’ was built on the long-standing myth of 
Sephardic ‘racial superiority’ over the Ashkenazim. Dutch Jews of Portuguese 
extraction attempted to demonstrate this centuries-old pseudoscientific theory 
using all sorts of genealogical, cultural, physical-anthropological, linguistic, 
and psychological ‘evidence’. Unfortunately, Nazi Germany rejected these 
rationales after careful consideration by Wilfried Euler, the ‘Superintendent for 
Jewish Racial Issues’ at the Reich’s New Historical Institute (Reichsinstitut für 
Geschichte des neuen Deutschlands).10 From the 4,303 Jews of Portuguese origin 
who lived in the Netherlands at the beginning of the war, only 500 survived the 
Holocaust.11 
Spanish attitudes towards its Jewish colony abroad were dominated by 
the government’s determination to avoid any Jewish settlement in Spain, and 
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fear to disagree with Nazi Jewish policy. In November 1940, following the 
introduction of the first antisemitic measures in France, MAE Serrano Súñer 
instructed its ambassador in Vichy ‘not to obstruct the application of these 
measures, keeping a passive attitude’.12 Similarly, when Nazi Germany sent the 
repatriation ultimatum to Madrid, the Franco government’s first reaction was 
to suggest the transfer of Spanish Jews to ‘their countries of origin’, such as 
Greece and Turkey. But the German ambassador to Spain rejected this 
suggestion and insisted that the only option available were their repatriation to 
Spain, or their being subjected to general anti-Jewish measures. After two 
months of hesitation, Madrid accepted to repatriate Spanish Jews while 
developing red-tape obstacles to keep this number to a minimum. In this regard, 
Madrid interpreted the law in the strictest possible sense. Only those persons 
who had obtained Spanish nationality by virtue of the 1924 Royal Decree and 
had registered themselves —and their relatives— in the civil registry at a 
Spanish consulate abroad were to be considered Spanish. Those who had 
obtained Spanish nationality and were in possession of a Spanish passport but 
had failed to enter their names in the civil registry were not to be considered 
Spanish, and were left to their own fate.13 The attitude of the MAE was 
blatantly cynical. On the one hand, the MAE’s General Director of Foreign 
Policy, José María Doussinague, considered it ‘not advisable to claim before 
German authorities that because these Sephardim have Spanish nationality 
they are of the same condition than persons born in Spain’. On the other hand, 
the second-highest ranking official at the MAE also instructed Spanish 
diplomats abroad to make sure that the assets belonging to these persons —in 
this instance, referred to as ‘Spaniards’— are protected from the Germans, 
‘since, in a way, they form part of Spanish national patrimony’.14 
But the MAE was not unaware of the negative consequences that inaction 
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over this issue would bring for Spain. The Franco government was being faced 
with a ‘grave dilemma’. On the one hand, the abandonment of the Spanish 
Sephardim in Western Europe represented for the Franco government could 
‘aggravate the hostilities that exist against us already —particularly in 
America— and we run the risk of being accused of executioners or murder 
accomplices, as they have done in the past’. On the other hand, the possibility 
of repatriating  these Sephardim to Spain was not out of the question, since 
‘their race, their money, their anglophilia, and their Freemasonry makes them 
likely to all sorts of intrigue’.15 In view of the pressure from RSARO, JDC, and 
the AFSC, and their willingness to cooperate on this respect, however, the 
Franco government agreed to repatriate small groups of Spanish Jews from 
France on condition that the relief committees took care of the whole cost of 
their repatriation, as well as their prompt evacuation from Spain. In fact, the 
repatriation of further groups of Jewish refugees would only be allowed, 
according to the policy of the Franco government, after the previous group had 
left Spain. The idea was, as minister Jordana put it, that these Sephardim were 
to pass through Spain ‘like light goes through glass, leaving no trace’.16  
The first convoy of 79 Spanish Jews from France reached Spain on 11 
August 1943. A week before, the Spanish government had celebrated a council 
of ministers during which Francoist officials had preemptively agreed to hinder 
the arrival of further groups of Jews by putting the blame on relief organisations 
whenever these were not able to effect their prompt evacuation from Spain. As 
explained by José Doussinague, any delays in the repatriation of these persons 
from Spain would be responsibility of the relief organisations: ‘for as long as it 
takes them to remove these Sephardim from Spain, the rest will remain in the 
concentration camps’.17 Indeed, when RSARO requested the entry into Spain 
of a second group of Spanish Sephardim from France on 25 August 1943, the 
Spanish government responded that this would not be possible until the 
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previous convoy of 79 had been evacuated from Spain.18 In some cases, 
Francoist delaying tactics deliberately obstructed their emigration, for example, 
by demanding that young male Sephardic repatriates were compelled to do 
military service while in Spain, even though they were not considered 
Spaniards in full right.19 When the evacuation of the first convoy of Sephardim 
was finally arranged, the MAE gave the Spanish police with the following:  
‘Upon embarking the group of Sephardim at the Port of Málaga, the police 
should inform them that further negotiations between the Spanish and German 
governments regarding the liberation of other groups of Sephardim interned in 
German concentration camps, as well as their repatriation to Spain, will be 
conditional on their conduct abroad. Any press declaration or statement made 
against the Spanish government will lead to the automatic halt of the 
negotiations with the German government. Following the order of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, the Málaga police should so inform these Sephardim, and 
make sure that they understand the extent of this warning. Ideally, this should 
be communicated to them by a person of their trust, in a correct and polite 
manner —so that they leave Spain with a good impression of our country’.20 
 
Francoist authorities washed their hands of the issue of the fate of the 
Spanish Jewish colony abroad, and only agreed to the repatriation of a reduced 
number of persons after much pressure from the relief organisations. By 1940, 
there were about 2,500 Spanish Jews living in France. Of these, approximately 
500 migrated to Spain prior to the German ultimatum by the own means. From 
the remaining 2,000, Spain repatriated 335 at most. In Salonika, there were, 
according to Nazi figures, 511 Jews of Spanish nationality. Their repatriation 
from Spain was delayed owing to Spanish reluctance. On 2 August 1943, the 
Germans deported 367 of them to Bergen-Belsen, the rest managed to hide or 
flee. After four months of internment in Bergen-Belsen, the group of 367 
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Sephardim from Greece were allowed to proceed to Spain in early 1944, and 
were promptly evacuated to Fedhala thanks to the combined efforts of 
UNRRA, RSARO, and JDC.21 
At the same time the Franco government engaged in the ‘repatriation’ of 
its Jewish nationals from Nazi-occupied Europe, the persecution of Sephardim 
within Spain intensified. From the summer of 1943, Blickenstaff noticed an 
‘increasing tendency of the Spaniards to throw out of the country refugees who 
have been living here for as long as 10 or 15 years, and expulsion orders are 
being served against such people’.22 These persons, in their majority Sephardic 
Jews who migrated to Spain in the interwar years, were not refugees from 
Nazism but Spanish citizens who had married and had sons serving in the 
Spanish army.  
‘It appears that the work permits of these people are now being withdrawn by 
the Spanish authorities, and that they are being told that they must leave Spain. 
This in effect means that their situation becomes similar to that of the refugees 
and that the refugee problem is thus constantly being increased’.23 
 
By August 1943, at least 30 of them had been interned in the disciplinary 
camp in Nanclares de la Oca (Álava).24 Unlike Miranda de Ebro, the Nanclares 
concentration camp was conceived for persons sentenced for criminal activities: 
thieves, robbers, black marketers (estraperlistas), and homosexuals. It was by far 
the worst of all Franco prisons. In words of the camp’s commandant, forced 
labour practices at Nanclares had been refined ‘to work the people until they 
could not stand any longer’.25 Francoist authorities claimed that these Jews 
were there because they had disobeyed expulsion orders. But most of the 
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refugees said not to have been officially notified of their expulsion, neither the 
reasons for it. They were not judged or found guilty of any crime, and yet were 
forced to work breaking rocks and building roads. After a visit to Nanclares, 
Blickenstaff wrote: ‘The treatment of prisoners is extremely bad. Food is not 
adequate either in quantity or in quality, housing conditions are terrible, and 
beatings of the prisoners occur frequently.’ In fact, during his visit he learnt that 
two Spaniards had just died owing to the beatings. Blickenstaff also recalls that 
a German boy refugee at Nanclares, who had been arrested for seeking the 
assistance of the US Embassy in Madrid, ‘received blows very frequently’ 
allegedly to satisfy the Germans.26 Despite RSARO’s relatively good rapport 
with Spanish authorities, Blickenstaff was not able to obtain the separation of 
Sephardic Jews from the rest of criminals at Nanclares. The camp 
commandant’s response to this request is quite illustrative of the treatment that 
these innocent persons received at Nanclares: 
 ‘Driven by an excessive sentiment of humanity I have … I was guided by the 
idea that all these foreigners would stay only a short while and would take 
efficient steps to leave Spain. But things have not developed like that and it seems 
as if these foreigners, being assured of a real comfort which is becoming almost 
familiar, they are asleep in their situation without doing anything efficient 
towards the fulfilment of their expulsion order. Therefore and in order not to 
prolongate their internment by my conduct, I wish to inform you that I feel 
obliged to suspend from now on my intervention of any kind between you and 
them’.27 
 
These Jews were not victims of Nazi racial policy. In fact, they were not 
within Nazi jurisdiction. These were Spanish nationals whom the Franco 
regime persecuted and deported out of its own initiative. These are but a few of 
these cases. José Palomo Sagués, for example, was born to a Spanish-speaking 
Sephardic family in Bursa (Turkey) and moved to Barcelona in the early 1920s. 
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At first he earned his living as a street vendor, then he opened a tie business. 
He married and had a son. On 20 December 1940, he received a visit from the 
Spanish police, and was arrested on the ground that he was a ‘dangerous 
person’. Palomo was interned in Miranda de Ebro until RSARO arranged his 
liberation in early 1943. But in June 1943, José was arrested again and sent to 
Nanclares de la Oca until his emigration could be arranged.28 Alberto Adjiman 
Galimany, a trader of Turkish-Sephardic origin, was arrested for no specific 
reason on 3 May 1943 and sent to prison in Barcelona and later sent to 
Nanclares.29 Jacques Haim Soriano’s penitentiary file states that despite not 
having committed any crime, he was imprisonned ‘pre-emptively’ in Oviedo 
on 11 June 1942. On 9 July 1943, Soriano was also sent to Nanclares de la 
Oca.30 The Sephardic Jew, Abraham Pérez Lívico, resident of Tangier, was sent 
to prison in Madrid (Prisión de Santa Engracia) on 21 August 1941. Jaime 
Zacuto was a Salonika-born Jew of Spanish nationality, who was imprisoned 
in Jaén (Prisión del Partido) on 10 June 1943. Both Pérez Lívico and Zacuto 
were deported from Spain aboard the SS Gouverneur-Général Lépine on 21 June 
1944, bound for Fedhala.31 At least six of these denationalised Spanish Jews 
migrate to Palestine aboard the SS Nyassa on 23 January 1944.32 The fact that 
most of these Spanish Jews were arrested in the summer of 1943 suggests that 
Francoist authorities used the context of the ‘repatriation’ and later deportation 
from Spain of Spanish Jews from Nazi-occupied Europe, as a cover to get rid 
of its own Jewish population in a way that nobody, except the victims 
themselves and a few relief workers, would notice.  
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The Jewish Resistance and the Rescue of  Children 
 
Prior to the summer of 1942, children had been spared from mass arrests 
by the French police. But this situation came to an end during the rafles of the 
Vélodrome d’Hiver of 16 and 17 July 1942. Over 4,100 Jewish children were 
arrested in the occupied zone and, over the following weeks, deported to their 
deaths. In unoccupied France, the arrest of Jewish children only began in late 
August, even though French authorities began taking steps several weeks before 
that. On 3 August, the Vichy government suspended all liberations from the 
camps in unoccupied France, which now became real death traps. By the end 
of the month, 4,000 persons were deported to their deaths.33  
In Vichy France, the arrest of Jewish children began during the so-called 
‘Nuit de Vénissieux’ of 26 August 1942. That evening, a number of OSE social 
workers were called to the internment camp at Vénissieux, in the Lyon suburbs, 
to screen some 1,500 foreign Jews who were to be transferred to Drancy for 
deportation. Realising the extreme urgency of this situation, the OSE’s directive 
committee took the difficult decision of attempting to convince Jewish parents 
to hand over their children to the OSE to spare them from deportation. To 
achieve this, OSE volunteers often lied to parents, promising that their children 
would be returned to them in a matter of days.34 Elisabeth Hirsch, a social 
worker from the EIF, had terrible memories from that night: 
‘We knew that there were at least one hundred children to rescue —their parents 
would be deported the next day. We had to utilise all our forces to convince them 
to entrust their children to us. It was a horrific night. Many parents would not 
want to let go their children, and some kids refused to abandon their families. 
Mothers screamed, kids wept, and the air was charged with cries that continued 
to resonate in my ears for many months to come’.35 
 
After tremendous effort, the OSE managed to rescue 108 children. But the 
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next question was what to do with them. Dr Joseph Weill and his colleagues at 
the OSE agreed that sending these children to the OSE centres was no longer a 
safe way to protect them from imminent police raids. In this sense, the maisons 
of the OSE and the EIF had become mortal traps for Jewish children, and it 
became necessary to disperse them before new roundups took place.36 
Hence, in the aftermath of the Vénissieux incident, the relief workers of 
the OSE and the EIF broke with their previous lawful practices and resorted to 
clandestine methods to guarantee the safety of these children. But first it was 
necessary to dismantle their children’s centres. Thus, when the French police 
broke into the agricultural centres of the EIF in Moissac and Beaulieu with 
arrest orders, they were furious not to find a single child.37 The next step was to 
provide these children with non-Jewish identities. Next, the OSE and the EIF 
employed three different methods to spare these endangered children from 
deportation. There were three options available: to hide them in cooperation 
with a network of religious institutions and French Christian families known as 
the ‘Réseau Garel’, to smuggle them into Switzerland, and to send them to 
Palestine via Spain. In total, around one hundred people worked towards these 
rescue operations, most of whom were young women working under OSE 
leader Andrée Salomon.38 
The Réseau Garel was named after OSE volunteer Georges Garel (born 
Grigori Garfinkel), a Jew from Vilnius who worked as an engineer in Lyon. 
Following the Vénnisieux roundups in late August 1942, Dr Weill entrusted 
Garel with organising and supervising a clandestine network to hide Jewish 
children at the OSE’s and EIF’s centres in the French meridional. The choice 
of the young Lyonais over more senior relief workers is explained by the fact 
that he had never been associated to any Jewish relief agency and thus his name 
was not known to government officials. Rather than establishing a new 
organisation, the Archbishop of Toulouse Jean-Gérard Saliège, who had 
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vigorously opposed the arrests of Jews, convinced Garel to cooperate with 
Catholic welfare infrastructures already in place. Together with his aids, Garel 
toured all potential places of hiding in the unoccupied zone: Christian homes, 
boarding schools, orphanages, hospitals, and youth hostels.39 One of Garel’s 
most notable partners was Abbé Alexandre Glasberg’s Amitié Chrétienne, a 
Christian Jewish-aid organisation that had been active since mid-1941 and had 
a crucial role finding places of hiding where Jewish children could live safely as 
‘Christian children’ under their care. In Nice, Bishop Paul Rémond offered  his 
own quarters to hide 527 Jewish children from the so-called Réseau Marcel, 
organised from Moussa Abadi and Odette Rosenstock.40 In Marseille, the 
Capuchin friar Père Marie-Benoît negotiated, in November 1942, the transfer 
of 30,000 Jews to the Italian occupation zone, and facilitated the escape of 
4,000 more Jews to Switzerland. The protestant group CIMADE also provided 
refuge and shelter to Jewish refugees in multiple locations. In Chambon-sur-
Lignon (Haute-Loire), for instance, a Protestant community of 3,000 villagers 
hid around 5,000 Jews.41 This was not always an easy task since the majority 
of these children did not speak French.42 By the end of the war, Garel’s 
clandestine network still maintained 1,500 children in hiding.43  
Given the success of the Réseau Garel, the smuggling of children into 
Switzerland was seen as a secondary, most dangerous, and sometimes 
unnecessary option given the various ways to hide them in France. According 
to Garel, children chosen for migration to Switzerland usually fell under three 
categories: those with typically Jewish physical traits who could not pass as 
‘Aryans’, those most attached to their religious practices, and those who were 
particularly ‘talkative’ and were not able to play their role as gentiles in a non-
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Jewish environment.44 Given that these children were not only more difficult to 
hide, but also could endanger their peers in hiding, their carers at OSE and EIF 
concluded that sending them to Switzerland was a safer option. This operation 
was relatively uncomplicated, especially because most children spoke Alsatian, 
Yiddish, or German, and could thus easily pass as Swiss. Since older children 
were usually inspected more closely by Swiss authorities, children often dressed 
in the ‘boy scout’ uniforms of the EIF to reinforce their child’s appearance. 
Sometimes, soccer games were organised near the border, in cooperation with 
the AFSC, to allow them to slip into Switzerland after dawn.45 
The majority of children convoys to Switzerland crossed the frontier near 
Geneva, either through Annemasse or Thonon-les-Bains, in the department of 
Haute-Savoie.46 Clandestine passages to Switzerland continued without major 
trouble during the period of Italian occupation, and in spite of strong frontier 
surveillance. Depending on the exact location and time, the Swiss frontier could 
be patrolled by the French, Italian, or German police on one side, and by Swiss 
police on the other side.47 Following the German take over of the previously 
Italian occupation zone in South-East France towards the end of 1943, these 
practices became significantly more dangerous. In a short span of time, three 
children convoys were intercepted by Germans patrols at the Swiss frontier, 
leading to the discontinuation of these clandestine passages. Aware that the 
Jewish resistance in Southern France was organising clandestine rescue 
networks, the members of the OSE and the EIF turned to these underground 
rescue networks to send Jewish children to Palestine via Spain. 
La Main Forte, the embryo of the Jewish resistance movement, began to 
develop in Toulouse during the French débâcle of the summer of 1940. This 
group was a conglomerate of several Jewish-conscious groups of various 
political affiliations, including the religious Zionists of Ha-Mizrachi, the 
socialists of Hashomer Hatzair (‘The Young Guard’), and the Marxists of Poale 
Zion (‘Workers of Zion’). There were also a number of Jewish intellectuals, such 
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as the director of the Nouvelle Revue Française Benjamin Crémieux, the Zionist 
journalist Arnold Mandel, and the Zionist poet and future leader of the Jewish 
resistance David Knout. Despite the fact that most French Jews were highly 
assimilated, gathering around other Jews from all over Europe favoured a new 
sense of ‘Jewishness’ and common awareness of the fate of the Jewish people. 
The Alsatian Jewish poet Claude Vigée noted that even the most secular Jews 
began to attend the circle of Jewish studies led by Rabbi Paul Roitman in the 
old synagogue of Rue Palaprat, ‘because one would be among one’s kind’. As 
many others, Vigée found in this religious congregation a way of living that 
‘that was not completely degrading, which was not pure flight’.48 Naturally, 
some factions of La Main Forte were more partisan than others, but all of them 
shared a basis for common action that looked beyond the challenges of survival, 
into the creation of Jewish nationhood. Towards the end of 1941, Toulouse’s 
Jewish resistance movement adopted the name of Armée Juive (AJ).  
Under the leadership of Abraham Polonski, Aron ‘Lucien’ Lublin, and 
David Knout, the Armée Juive began to recruit members from other Zionist 
organisations such as the Mouvement de la Jeunesse Sioniste (MJS) and the EIF on 
the basis of ‘a friend brings a friend’. To become part of the AJ, new recruits 
had to undergo a solemn initiation ritual to prove their commitment to the 
Zionist cause. Facing a flag with a blue star of David on a white field, they had 
to swear an oath on a Hebrew Bible by which they pledged allegiance to the 
future Jewish state in Palestine.49 In 1944, the EIF (which had been banned in 
1943), the MJS, and the AJ united their forces under the Organisation Juive de 
Combat (OJC), a Jewish fighting group that was formally recognised by the 
Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur (FFI). At least 400 partisans are estimated to have 
fought for the OJC, most notably in the aftermath of the Allied landings in 
Normandy in June 1944, and during the liberation of Paris, Lyon, Grenoble, 
Nice, and Toulouse.50 In addition to fighting the German occupiers, the Armée 
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Juive played a crucial role in the rescue of Jewish children from unoccupied 
France in the last months of the war. 
OSE leader André Salomon first considered partnering with Armée Juive 
to organise clandestine children convoys to Spain during a meeting with the 
head of JA in Lyon, Ernest Lambert, towards the end of 1943. After receiving 
the approval of the OSE’s directive committee, Salomon travelled to Toulouse 
to meet AJ leaders Jules Jefroykin and Abraham Polonski, with whom she 
discussed the possibilities for cooperation. Salomon explained that these 
children were in real peril, who would not be safe in France. The leaders of the 
AJ agreed to take them to Spain provided that they were physically capable of 
enduring the trip through the Pyrenees.51 Up to that moment, the AJ’s only role 
in the children passages to Switzerland had been to support the already existing 
networks of the OSE, the MJS, and La Sixième. By contrast, the AJ was the 
main organisation in charge of the clandestine crossing of adults into Spain. 
Since children were too vulnerable to join adult expeditions organised by the 
Jewish resistance, and needed greater care once in Spain, the AJ created a 
special service to meet their needs.  
The resulting organisation, named Service d’Évacuation et de Regroupement 
des Enfants (SERE), started operations in the early spring of 1944.52 Andrée 
Salomon herself was responsible for selecting the children for migration and 
bringing them to Toulouse. The children chosen for ‘Aliyah’ through Spain were 
either those who had relatives in Palestine, or, most commonly, those whose 
parents had been deported and had no relatives who could take care of them in 
Europe. While awaiting their departure, they were usually sheltered in 
Abraham Polonski’s own apartment in Toulouse. Upon Andrée Salomon’s 
recommendation, Polonski appointed Gisèle Roman as head of SERE, a 
position  which she held until the liberation of the French south in August 1944, 
when the last convoy departed to Spain, and SERE was dissolved.53 Between 
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the departure from Toulouse of SERE’s first convoy on 6 April 1944, and the 
last convoy in August, at least 88 children were rescued  —excluding the 
teenagers— thanks to the joint efforts of SERE, OSE, and JDC.54 
At the time of her appointment, Gisèle Roman, a Jewish refugee of 
Russian origin, was working at the OSE children’s centre in Megève (Haute-
Savoie), and thus was experienced in the organisation of children convoys to 
Switzerland. Her first task upon arrival to Toulouse was to find the safest and 
easiest route possible across the Pyrenees. Roman identified a route through 
Andorra that involved a train ride, a night stop-over at a hotel, an additional 
coach or taxi ride, as well as climbing across the Pyrenees. The convoys used 
to leave from Toulouse in the night train —usually at 3 or 4 am— and arrived 
at Perpignan in the early morning. From Perpignan, they used to hire several 
taxis to Rouze (Ariège), a French village close to the border with Andorra that 
served as meeting point with the passeur (French for ‘smuggler’). In other 
occasions, the convoys got off the train at Carcassone, from whence they met 
the passeur and initiated the journey into the mountains. At that point, adult 
escorts returned to Toulouse. The passeur’s mission was to lead the children 
convoy through Andorra and across the Pyrenees, to the Spanish province of 
Lérida, in the Spanish North-East. Once they arrived at Lérida’s coach station, 
the children convoy was taken over by a liaison of the SERE, usually Gisèle’s 
own husband. While in Spain, children rescued by SERE were looked after by 
the JDC in Barcelona, until their migration to Palestine could be arranged.55 
The train ride between Toulouse and Perpignan was arguably the most 
dangerous part of the trip. For security reasons, the convoy was usually split 
into two smaller groups. Gisèle Roman escorted children aged up to twelve 
years old, whereas Régine, her assistant, took care of the teenagers. 
Additionally, the group was also dispersed amongst various train 
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compartments, usually in a way in which the oldest amongst them would look 
after the youngest. Roman carried herself the children’s few personal 
belongings in her backpack, as well as another suitcase with two automatic 
weapons that she handed over to the passeur upon arrival to the meeting point. 
The fact that some children were also armed with a grenade belt gives a good 
sense of how risky these rescue operations were. Back in Toulouse, Gisèle and 
other AJ members had taught them how to use the grenades through various 
games. It is not clear, however, whether the grenades were actually at any point. 
The youngsters had also been instructed on how to behave during the journey, 
which was heavily controlled by agents of the Gestapo. Upon arrival to the 
destination, they had been trained to disperse themselves throughout the station 
platforms in small groups, while keeping eye contact with Gisèle Roman. When 
she considered that there was no danger in sight she whistled a song, and the 
children followed her out of the station. Following Polonski’s orders, there was 
also a young man who accompanied every group up to the Spanish side of the 
mountains. His responsibility was to personally report to Polonski on the 
conduct of the passeur, and to report on incidents occurred during the journey. 
He was also in charge of returning back to Toulouse the suitcase with the 
weapons the convoy no longer needed.56 
All SERE children convoys except one managed to safely reach Spain, 
which can be seen a success considering the strong police surveillance and the 
many hazards of the journey across the Pyrenees. In that tragic occasion, Gisèle 
had taken a group of thirteen children to Rouze, left them with the passeur, and 
returned to Perpignan to organise the next convoy. The passeur, however, was 
impatient to get rid of the first group children as soon as possible, and took them 
to Andorra without waiting for Gisèle Roman and the second group. In their 
way, they met a German patrol and, since the passeur did not have the ‘special 
mission’ documents Gisèle used to carry with her, the whole group was arrested 
and presumably deported. Decades after, Gisèle still had haunting memories of 
this tragic event: ‘it has been more than twenty years since this happened, and, 
believe me, it has been more than twenty years that I cannot sleep, and when I 
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do, I have nightmares: I see the Germans snatching the children away from 
me’.57 Despite this was the only real tragedy, there were many other instances 
in which the whole group was very close to disaster. In one occasion, Gisèle 
was sitting with a group of 28 of ‘her’ children at the canteen in Carcassone’s 
railway station, when a German border patrol assembled around the table right 
next to theirs. Gisèle quickly realised that the German officers started to regard 
the whole group with suspicion. One of the officers ‘turned pale’ as he 
recognised her. He happened to be a Czech who had known Gisèle before the 
war, and was aware that she was both Jewish as well as an active Zionist. He 
persuaded the other officers that there was nothing suspicious about them, 
saving the entire convoy from an almost certain death.   
To the youngest children, Gisèle presented this journey as an adventure, 
although the older ones were fully conscious of the tragedy that they were going 
through. In one instance, as their train approached the camp of Rivesaltes on 
their way to Perpignan, some of the kids told their guide: ‘you see, Gisèle, this 
is where our parents are’.58 Gisèle Roman continued to take children convoys 
into Spain until the liberation of the French South in August 1944. When she 
took the last convoy of thirteen children to Perpignan in mid-August 1944, there 
was such chaos that she could not find a single taxi to continue their way. 
Finally, she decided to go by foot to Rouze. In their way to the mountains they 
encountered several maquis as well as German frontier police. To the 
maquisards, who were suspicious of the Nazis and French collaborators —
who, ironically, were also fleeing to Spain— she presented documents from the 
French resistance. To the Germans, she showed forged documents that claimed 
she was leading that group of children to Spain as part of a ‘German secret 
mission’. The last convoy managed to arrive safely to Lérida, and Gisèle 
returned to Toulouse where she continued her work retrieving children who 
had been hidden in French households, religious institutions, as well as with 
the FRC. In an already liberated Toulouse, Gisèle and the other relief workers 
hosted all these children in the château that had previously been used as Gestapo 
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headquarters during the war.59 
The last of the SERE’s children convoys to Spain was escorted by 
Elisabeth Hirsch (‘Henriette Ducom’), of Hungarian origin. Hirsch was a 
professional social worker who had previously volunteered at Gurs in 1940, 
and was later recruited by Andrée Salomon to work at the OSE children’s 
centre in Lyon. During the Vénissieux raids in August 1942, she was 
instrumental in saving children from deportation. Following the OSE’s 
complete transition into clandestinity, Hirsch also helped leading children 
convoys to Switzerland.60 Hirsch’s mid-August 1944 convoy to Spain was 
accompanied by three passeurs, and comprised a group of 12 children aged eight 
and above, who travelled alongside 23 adults in a thirty-five-strong group. 
Besides escorting the convoy to Spain, Elisabeth Hirsch had also been assigned 
a special mission. Unlike the previous convoy escorts, who returned to 
Toulouse after handing over to the passeur, Hirsch had been given instructions 
to accompany the group to Barcelona. Once in the Catalan capital, her task was 
to gather all the children who had previously been sent to Spain, and escort 
them until the moment they embarked for Palestine.61 After a three-day 
journey, the expedition reached La Seu d’Urgell (Lérida, Spain). For the 
sixteen-year-old Max Zelman, this moment had a meaningful connotation: ‘At 
last, drained but content, we catch sight of the first Spanish village further 
down, and through it the sight of Liberty’.62 Upon arrival, the Spanish Guardia 
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Civil interrogated all of the expedition members, including the children, who 
were asked about the name of the passeur, the route followed, and each of their 
identities. The children, who were already used to ‘playing their roles’ from 
their time in hiding, made up all sorts of lies. Hirsch was surprised to find out 
that none of them had mentioned the fact that they had been intercepted by the 
maquis. After two weeks of forced residence in Lérida, they were welcomed in 
Barcelona by Samuel Sequerra, of the JDC. As usual, the adults were dispersed 
in pensions, whereas the children were hosted in Barcelona at a children’s 
reception centre that another member of their team had prepared in advanced.63 
Shortly after the departure of the first children convoy in the spring, 
Sequerra appointed the Constantinople-born Laura Margolis, an US citizen, as 
head of a children’s home in Barcelona that was to serve as a reception centre 
for the youngsters sent by the Jewish resistance. As soon as she arrived in 
Barcelona, she rented a large property, furnished it, and hired the needed 
personnel. Margolis also went to Lérida on several occasions to pick up group 
arrivals. The first group of transit children to arrive to Margolis’ home, 
however, were not sent by the SERE, but by the Dutch HeHalutz. These were 
politically-conscious Jewish pioneers in their late teens, who were also waiting 
to go to Palestine. Due to their Zionist upbringing and older age, they looked 
after the younger children convoys that were to come. The first convoy arrived 
at the home in June 1944, and they first sailings for Palestine took place on 7 
and 21 August 1944, with eight and twelve children respectively.64 Their 
emigration was organised by the JDC office in Lisbon, which notified Margolis 
of the date the children had to be ready to depart. Margolis left the Barcelona 
home in August 1944, once the home was already fully operative and her 
services could be of more use elsewhere. 
Margolis remembers how shocked she was when she saw the first children 
refugees from Nazi-occupied Europe arrive in Barcelona. She recalls that the 
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children arrived in a pitiful state, not just owing to the arduous journey across 
the Pyrenees, but also owing to everything they had gone through before —in 
the camps, and while in hiding. All of them had false names and were rather 
introspective. Slowly, thanks to the warm environment at the Barcelona home, 
the kids would ‘open like flowers’, regain confidence in the people around 
them, and shared their real family names —which they had not revealed for a 
long time. There were also very dramatic moments, when the older kids, 
conscious of the inexplicable tragedy of the Holocaust, shared their 
experiences. In this sense, Margolis emphasises how her task was not only to 
accommodate and nourish these children, but also to comfort them and help 
them regain a ‘normal’ life. In parallel to these psychological aspects, they also 
learnt Hebrew and about life in Palestine in preparation for their Aliyah.65 At 
the home in Barcelona, they waited for several months until the ship for 
Palestine could be arranged. On 18 September, they ‘discreetly’ celebrated Rosh 
Hashanah, challenging the anti-Jewish rules of Franco’s Spain: ‘We felt like 
marranos in the times of the Spanish Inquisition’.66 Eventually, all of them 
moved to Cádiz, where the SS Guinée would call on its way to Palestine. While 
in Cádiz, they were accommodated at the Hotel Playa Victoria, on the seaside. 
On 26 October 1944, at 4 am, Dr Sequerra and Elisabeth Hirsch saw the Guinée 
depart to Palestine with a total of 79 Jewish children and 200 adults.67 
Meanwhile, Hirsch sent a dossier to Henrietta Szold, founder of the Hadassah 
movement, to announce the arrival of these young settlers to Palestine. By the 
time she had accomplished her mission with the SERE, Elisabeth Hirsch found 
herself stranded in Spain without documents that proved her real identity. In 
order not to be mistaken for a Nazi collaborator upon returning to France —
many of whom also sought shelter in Franco’s Spain— she had to wait until 
April 1945, when her situation could be normalised. 
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The Jewish Resistance and the Rescue of  Adults 
 
Before Jewish resistance groups began to send adult convoys across the 
Pyrenees in an organised manner, there were many others who attempted the 
clandestine rescue of Jewish persons from unoccupied France in more 
rudimentary ways. In late 1940, for instance, the eighteen-year-old Robert Veil 
created his own resistance group in his hometown of Castres (Tarn). Although 
humble in means, Veil and his companions managed to conceal Jewish refugees 
in their cattle carriages and get them through Spanish customs with success.68 
Like Veil’s, there were many other small-scale individual enterprises to bring 
both Jews and non-Jews into Spain, most of which have not been documented.  
Towards the summer of 1942, the friar Père-Marie Benoît directed small groups 
of Jews towards Spain, from his Capuchin monastery in Marseille.69 Prior to 
the German occupation of Vichy France in November 1942,  refugees were able 
to cross into Spain clandestinely following easier footpaths along the 
Mediterranean coast. After the Franco-Spanish frontier was reinforced by the 
Germans in late 1942, however, refugees were forced to take more difficult 
paths inland, often involving Mountain passes above 1,600 meters.70 The first 
Jewish resistance group to organise such crossings on a large scale were the 
members of La Sixième, the underground wing of the EIF movement —whom 
the ‘cattle-carriage rescuer’ Robert Veil also joined. La Sixième, which was led 
by EIF leaders Robert Gamzon and Marc Haguenau, was created following the 
mass arrest and deportation from France during the summer of 1942. Following 
the ‘Nuit de Vénissieux’ of 26 to 27 August 1942 in the unoccupied zone, Michel 
Elias (‘Cabri’) was sent to Perpignan to explore potential routes across the 
Pyrenees, before himself joined one of the convoys and reached the Allied 
forces in North Africa.71  
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In November 1942, EIF leaders Henri Wahl and Ninon Haït entrusted the 
Alsatian Denise Lévy (‘Belette’) with organising La Sixième’s convoys to Spain. 
Lévy had previously been commissaire of one of EIF’s agricultural camps, and 
managed to save many teenagers from deportation during the rafles of August 
1942. Those chosen for the first crossings were late teenagers and young adults 
who were too old to be hidden in religious institutions or transferred to 
Switzerland. Lucienne Samuel was appointed to lead the first convoy to Spain. 
To that end, she borrowed the identity of Jeanne Barnier, secretary of the city 
council of Dieulefit (Drôme). Thanks to her new identity and ‘special mission’ 
credentials, Lucienne Samuel was able to save a group of fifteen young men 
and women who did not speak French and hence were more vulnerable to 
deportation.72 The group departed from Oloron-Sainte-Marie (Basses-
Pyrénées) on 17 December 1942, towards the Spanish border control at the 
Canfranc International railway station. Unfortunately, it did not go as planned. 
At Bedous, two members of the convoy —Roger Picard and Samy Stourdzé— 
were arrested and deported. The remaining 13 youths in this convoy managed 
to reach Pamplona (Navarra).73 Upon arrival to Spain, the group was sent to 
prison and later transferred to forced residence in various villages in the region. 
Some of them reached Casablanca in November 1943, joined the Allied armies, 
and took part in the Normandy landings.74 After the relative success of the first 
group, Denise Lévy organised two more convoys. The second convoy, which 
left on 1 January 1943, reached Spain safely under Roger Fichtenberg’s 
leadership.75 Unfortunately, the entire third convoy was captured by the 
German frontier police. In view of the increased frontier surveillance, La 
Sixième immediately discontinued these crossings.76 In January 1943, EIF 
united efforts with the Zionist youth group MJS, with links to the communist 
Main d’Œuvre Immigré (MOI), and Fédération des Sociétés Juives (FSJ). La Sixième 
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thus increased its number from  about 88 members, to several hundred.77 
Despite the fact that the Pyrenees seemed unconquerable at the beginning 
of 1943, the Armée Juive sought to build on La Sixième’s pioneering attempts and 
send Jewish convoys across the Pyrenees on a larger scale. However, the AJ’s 
adult convoys to Spain cannot be strictly defined as rescue operations, since 
there were various other safer ways to survive in France other than leaving for 
Spain, such as going into hiding.78 As such, this ‘rescue’ initiative should be 
understood in the context of the Jewish armed resistance against Nazi 
Germany. As put by Henri Wahl: ‘In Switzerland we smuggled mainly children 
and the elderly, it was a land of refuge; in Spain, on the contrary, we organised 
passages for young people able to bear arms’.79 Exceptionally, however, some 
adult convoys did include elderly people and children, and even though they 
could at times compromise the rest of the group. Despite the French patriotic 
tone that these operations acquired after the war, the AJ’s rescue networks to 
Spain had a very strong Zionist component that should not be neglected. In 
fact, the members of the Jewish resistance regarded the flight to Palestine as 
their personal Aliyah, and the crossing of the Pyrenees as their ‘Jewish military 
service’. 
The members of the Jewish resistance encouraged Jewish youths between 
18 and 25 years of age to fight rather than to hide, and offered them several 
possibilities. One option was to fight the Nazis by joining the maquis in France, 
the other, to migrate to Palestine via Spain and join the British Army’s Jewish 
Brigade. Obviously, most of them preferred the second option. In principle, 
they were also given the choice to join De Gaulle’s Forces Françaises Libres in 
North Africa, or any other Allied army of their preference.80 In practice, 
however, the AJ prioritised those wanting to join the Jewish Brigade in 
Palestine due to the complexity and many resources that went into organising 
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the Pyrenees crossings, and the fact that it was possible to join De Gaulle’s 
underground resistance within France. Roughly, 85 per cent of the young adults 
who reached Spain thanks to the AJ’s clandestine network reached Palestine.81 
Only a minority of them remained in Spain for a longer period. This was the 
case of Gisèle Roman’s husband. Owing to his bad eyesight he was not able to 
join the army, and thus chose to act as liaison for the children’s convoys that 
his wife organised from Toulouse as part of the SERE’s rescue initiatives.82  
In April 1943, the Romanian Joseph Kruh (‘Croustillon’), who at that 
time was responsible for recruiting new members for the AJ, was called to 
Toulouse to organise the clandestine crossings into Spain. This mission 
involved finding a passeur they could trust, make it across the Pyrenees and, 
once in Spain, find partners to support these networks financially, receive the 
refugees, and organise their departure to Palestine. Shortly after, in May 1943, 
Croustillon and his associate Shlomo Steinhorn (‘Pierre Lacaze’) had found a 
passeur from Saint-Girons called Adrien, and initiated their way over the 
Pyrenees with other twenty refugees, most of whom were members of the 
Dutch Jewish resistance. Croustillon and Steinhorn paid nearly 30,000 francs 
per person to the passeur, who promised lowering this exorbitant amount to 
5,000 once they started to send convoys more regularly. For reference, it should 
be noted that a worker’s monthly wage was about 3,000 francs. Naturally, some 
‘professional’ passeur were completely unscrupulous and, despite their high 
rates, would vaguely point travellers in one direction and then disappear. 
Without passeur, however, refugees were not able to follow shepherds’ trails and 
were soon lost. Many froze and starved in the mountain awaiting a break in the 
weather. Others were injured and even died due to falls.83 
Upon arrival to the Spanish side, Croustillon gave his French identity 
documents to his guide Adrien, and instructed him to return them to Toulouse 
at the end of the trip so that AJ had proof that he was a reliable passeur to guide 
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further convoys. Croustillon would not need his counterfeit French identity 
documents in Spain, where he declared himself a French-speaking ‘Canadian’. 
After spending several weeks in prison and forced residence in Lérida, 
Croustillon and his companion Steinhorn managed to reach Barcelona, where 
he met with Dr Samuel Sequerra, of the JDC. Croustillon informed Sequerra 
of the AJ’s initiative to send regular convoys, and requested the JDC’s financial 
support and cooperation. Sequerra, however, was suspicious of Croustillon, as 
there were many other refugees who had previously made similarly fantastic 
claims to him. In the absence of any document attesting their identity or links 
to the Jewish resistance, Sequerra refused to cooperate with him.84 The rest of 
Croustillon’s negotiations with the representatives from the WJC and the 
AFSC were equally sterile and disappointing. Croustillon and Steinhorn 
remained in Barcelona, waiting for other convoys to arrive following the route 
they had inaugurated.85 
In the late summer of 1943, the AJ appointed the young Belgian Arnold 
Einhorn —barely twenty years old— to inaugurate a second route through the 
Pyrenees. Despite his young age, Einhorn had been interned in Rivesaltes, and 
had worked for the MJS producing and distributing forged documents amongst 
the members of the Jewish resistance. In the summer of 1943, however, 
Einhorn was denounced to the Germans by an anonymous source, and it was 
no longer safe for him —or the MJS— to continue working in his previous 
underground activities. When looking for a different resistance activity, MJS 
leader Toto Giniewski proposed the AJ in Toulouse to use the young Einhorn 
as a ‘guinea pig’ to inaugurate a new route into Spain. When Einhorn heard of 
the news, he was shocked. He thought it was impossible to reach Spain after 
the Germans had dramatically increased the Pyrenees surveillance from late 
1942. Giniewksi’s answer speaks for itself: ‘Exactly. That’s why we want you 
to try it … Toulouse is looking for volunteers that are desperate’.86  
																																																																		
84 Apparently, Jules Jefroykin had sent a letter to introduce Croustillon to the JDC in Spain, but 
this letter never arrived. 
85 See CDJC, DLXI-54, Testimony of  Joseph Croustillon; and OHD-(1)65, Testimony of  
Joseph Croustillon. 
86 Toto Giniewski is cited in USHMM, RG-50.030.0306, Testimony of  Arnold Einhorn, 24-25. 
  261 
Upon arrival to Toulouse, Einhorn received physical training in order 
endure the demanding journey through the Pyrenees, found a new guide, and 
recruited six people to join his first convoy. The group departed in August 1943, 
guided by the French passeur Bertrand Bordé, whom the AJ was putting to the 
test. Einhorn had received instructions to report to Dr Sequerra, as well as to 
Croustillon and Steinhorn in Barcelona. Although his superiors had told him 
that the whole journey would take only about forty-eight hours, it took him 
much longer to reach Barcelona. In fact, he spent several weeks in the prison of 
Sort and the camp of Miranda de Ebro before he could reach the Catalan 
capital. Einhorn does not give details about what was discussed with these three 
men. It seems that Einhorn’s main task was, as Giniewski had told him, to serve 
as the AJ’s ‘guinea pig’ proving that this second route was possible. In fact, he 
met some Jewish refugees in Spain who were suspicious of him simply because 
they did not know anyone who managed to reach Spain since the beginning of 
1943. After several weeks stranded in Spain, the JDC and the AFSC finally 
booked ship passages for Einhorn and the other Jewish refugees brought by AJ. 
On 25 January 1944, he departed from the port of Cádiz aboard the SS Nyassa. 
Upon arrival t0 Haifa through, he joined the British Army’s Jewish Brigade.87 
In October 1943, after Croustillon’s and Einhorn’s ‘test’ convoys, the AJ 
leadership appointed the Polish Jacques Roitman, aged 21, to establish an 
independent organisation to deal with the passages to Spain, and gave him carte 
blanche to constitute his team as he pleased. The resulting organisation, the 
Service d’Évacuation et de Regroupement (SER), marks the transition from 
improvised to organised evacuation. One of Roitman’s first tasks was to 
establish an AJ maquis at Bic, near Alban (Tarn) to physically train the 
transients before departure. Despite his young age, Roitman had joined the 
Jewish resistance soon after the French armistice of June 1940. His first job was 
to spy the Commissariat Général aux Questions Juives (CGQJ) in Toulouse and 
Grenoble, where he also recruited young members for the MJS and the AJ. 
When Roitman established the SER, the passage to Spain was organised in a 
very ‘confuse and anarchic way’, and only managed to send a few convoys that 
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departed from time to time with no regular schedule. The instructions he 
received from the AJ leadership were clear: to allow as many young people as 
possible to reach Palestine and enrol the Jewish brigade via Spain.88 Roitman 
visited Toulouse, Paris, Lyon, Limoges, and Nice, the main foci of Jewish 
resistance, seeking contacts for his new organisation. The SER needed persons 
to synchronise the arrival to Toulouse of the candidates for migration, to 
provide them with forged documents, and to arrange lodging, equipment, and 
nourishment for the trip. Roitman hired a new passeur from Oloron-Sainte-
Marie, and explored various routes that would be used alternatively. To avoid 
suspicion from the Germans patrolling the area, the transportation of the 
convoy to the base of the Pyrenees had to be arranged in smaller groups over a 
period of two two three days. In addition, Roitman also appointed a ‘chef de 
convoi’, who carried the money for the guides, and a girl, who carried a 
disassembled weapon in a bag for the passeur and reported on any issues upon 
returning to the AJ maquis. Once at the meeting point at the foot of the 
Pyrenees, the passeur took over the group and initiated the hike through the 
Pyrenees.89  
The first SER convoy, of about 50 people, left for Spain in late 1943, but 
had to return due to heavy snow. In mid-January 1944, the same group made 
a new attempt, but this time the passeur had been identified by the Germans and 
shot in situ, leaving the convoy exposed at the meeting point. The first successful 
convoy of the SER left on 28 February 1944 with 30 men, and reached Spain 
on 5 March. Four more groups followed during March and April. After another 
passeur was arrested by the Germans in April, the Oloron-Sainte-Marie route 
was abandoned. During the rest of 1944, there were groups departing every 
month with 15 to 30 people on average, with the exception of the 62-strong 
convoy of May 1944.90 The last SER convoy to cross the Franco-Spanish border 
left on 26 August 1944, shortly after the liberation of Paris.91 Although the 
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SER’s activities cannot be strictly classified as rescue, Roitman did  
exceptionally allow elderly people and children in his convoys, even though 
they sometimes compromised the rest of the group. On one occasion, Roitman 
had just arrived at the train station in Toulouse —which was ‘filled’ with 
Germans— when a twelve-year-old who formed part of the convoy started to 
yell ‘I don’t want to go to Israel! I don’t want to go to Israel!’ putting the rest of 
the group at risk.92 
On 3 May 1944, a convoy of 66 persons —including 16 youngsters from 
the EIF, 8 Jews from the Dutch resistance, and more than a dozen persons of 
advance age— reached Spain following a new route through Andorra. This 
group experienced several tragedies. One Dutch pioneer died after falling from 
a precipice. An older transient died of hypothermia. The group was led by Jules 
Jefroykin, whom the AJ leaders sent to Spain with the purpose of ‘finishing the 
business’ initiated by Croustillon and Steinhorn the previous year.93 The 
Russian Jules Jefroykin, himself a leader of the AJ as well as JDC representative 
in France, travelled to Barcelona at the end of May. Jefroykin had chosen this 
new route through Andorra for two reasons. Firstly, he aimed to restore the 
normal functioning of the SER after the route through Saint-Girons had been 
dismantled following the arrest and execution of some of its members. In 
addition to that, Jefroykin also wanted to establish a faster route to Barcelona, 
where he hoped to reach an agreement with Sequerra regarding the reception 
of refugees sent by the AJ. With good credentials as both leader of the Jewish 
resistance and JDC representative in France, Jefroykin’s negotiations were far 
more successful than  those who preceded him in 1943.94 On 18 July, Jefroykin 
met with Elyahu Dobkin of the JAP, who thereafter helped him obtain 
Palestine certificate for those sent by the AJ across the Franco-Spanish border. 
On 17 May 1944, a French collaborator informed the Germans that one 
of AJ’s convoys was due to leave from Toulouse that same day, causing serious 
harm to the SER and threatening the very existence of these rescue operations. 
Adrien, the passeur from Saint-Girons who had led many of the SER’s convoys 
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through the Pyrenees, was arrested and executed, and a another guide was 
deported. The Germans also arrested Jacques Roitman and other five members 
of the resistance at the Saint-Cyprien train station.95 When the Germans 
arrested them, Roitman had just seen a first group of youngsters depart towards 
the Pyrenees and were about to return to Toulouse to bring the second group 
to the station. Fortunately, those who had already departed to the Pyrenees 
managed to arrive safely in Spain; whilst the remaining 40 members of the 
convoy were warned of the incident on time and did not leave the maquis at 
Bic that day. Next to Roitman was the chef de convoy, Léo Cohn, a well-known 
personality of the EIF and rabbi aumônier of German origin.96 As chef de convoy, 
Cohn carried with him a large sum of money as well as list with the names of 
the entire convoy. As told by Cohn’s wife, Rachel Cohn, Léo managed to 
swallow the list of names while he was being transferred to prison.97 After 
enduring several weeks of torture at Toulouse’s Saint-Michel prison, Jacques 
Roitman was sent to Buchenwald, where he remained interned until liberation 
in April 1945. Léo Cohn was sent to the Drancy transit camp. At Drancy, his 
EIF comrade Elsa Baron attempted to liberate him, but Cohn refused. There 
were hundreds of orphan children at Drancy who were all by themselves and 
Cohn chose to look after them, organise study groups, and practice choral 
singing, as he had done previously with the pioneers of the EIF. Minutes before 
being deported as part of the 77th convoy, on 30 July 1944, Léo wrote a letter 
to his wife Rachel explaining the miseries of these children. After spending most 
of their life in a camp many amongst them did not know even a single detail 
about their own identities. Léo Cohn and 300 of ‘his’ children were murdered 
in the gas chambers upon arrival in Auschwitz.98 Despite the tragedy, Jacques’ 
brother, Léon Roitman, took over the organisation of SER’s convoys to Spain. 
Between June and August 1944, six more convoys of 25 to 45 persons each 
arrived safely in Spain.99 
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Although SER was administered by the AJ, the functioning of these 
clandestine crossings depended largely on the members of the Dutch Jewish 
resistance. The HeHalutz (‘The Pioneer’) was the Dutch equivalent to the EIF 
movement in France, and had also been forced into clandestinity following the 
implementation of the ‘Final Solution’. Like its French counterpart, the 
HeHalutz was also a Zionist movement and thus sought to send young Jewish 
pioneers to Palestine: the halutzim. The fact that they both had this agenda in 
common favoured the development of a symbiotic relationship between the two 
organisations. The Dutch benefited from the AJ’s networks and infrastructure 
in the South of France, which helped their hazutzim reach Palestine via Spain. 
The AJ, on the other hand, profited from an extremely valuable contribution 
from the members of the HeHalutz: German forged documents. 
Back in August 1942, the charismatic German Jewish youth leader 
Joachim Simon (‘Shushu’) began to cooperate with Joop Westerweel, a Dutch 
Christian schoolteacher and principal of a Rotterdam progressive school. 
Together, they established a clandestine rescue network that later became 
known as the ‘Westerweel Groep’.100 Shushu, who was also a member of the 
youth Zionist movement Kadima (‘forwards’ or ’eastwards’) had been arrested 
during Kristallnacht and interned at the Buchenwald camp, with many of his 
fellow pioneers. According to his comrade Joseph Linnewiel, it was in 
Buchenwald that Shushu developed ‘a spirit of rebellion and resistance’.101 After 
his release the following month, Shushu decided to settle in a pioneer training 
camp in Loosdrecht, in the Netherlands —since these had been banned in the 
German Reich— and it was there that he began his clandestine activity. At first, 
the Westerweel Groep focused on hiding Dutch Jews to save them from 
deportation to the Westerbork transit camp. Soon, Shushu and his colleagues 
realised that hiding within the Netherlands was far too risky for both the 
rescued and their underground movement. First, they attempted clandestine 
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crossings into Switzerland, but the first and only convoy to this neutral country 
met with the death of all the participants involved in the operation. In the fall 
of 1942, Shushu met the MJS leader Toto Giniewski in Grenoble and learnt 
about the clandestine networks through the Pyrenees.102 With this in mind, 
Shushu concentrated his efforts on finding a way to transfer the Dutch halutzim 
across Belgium and France. The resulting route initiated in the Dutch village of 
Budel and crossed Belgium through Antwerpen, Ghent, and Brussels, and 
through occupied France to the Demarcation line with Vichy France. In 
January 1943, Shushu was arrested and committed suicide two days later to 
avoid revealing any sensitive information during his impending torture.103 
The man who took over Shushu’s work was the German Kurt Reilinger 
(‘Nano’), a leading figure in the Dutch pioneer movement whom AJ leader 
Lucien Lublin defined as the HeHalutz’s ‘spiritual leader’.104 During his activity, 
Reilinger expanded the existing escape routes to France in cooperation with the 
main Jewish resistance groups in France: the MJS, the EIF-La Sixième, and the 
AJ. At that time, the only way to cross the Demarcation Line was clandestinely. 
To assist escapees from the northern zone on their way to the south, the 
Alsatian Félix Goldschmidt settled in the small village of Viraron, not far from 
the Demarcation Line.105 From the spring of 1943, however, the Dutch 
underground began to use a more sophisticated method of flight. Having stolen 
genuine German stamps and documents on one of their missions, they were 
able to create forged documents and travel as ‘Aryans’ in the trains of the 
Organisation Todt, under the pretext that they had been assigned to work on the 
South-Western segment of the Atlantic Wall —at the base of the Pyrenees. By 
the summer of 1943, the Dutch underground was widely using this system to 
migrate to the south. Thereafter, the leaders of the HeHalutz began to look for 
ways to reach Palestine via Spain. 
Instead of falsifying documents from the Todt organisation, the Dutch 
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pioneers began to use their German stamps in a different way. Benefitting from 
their ‘Aryan’ looks and their knowledge of the German language, the halutzim 
started to disguise themselves as members of the Wehrmacht and the Gestapo. 
This allowed the Dutch Jews to travel from the Netherlands to Toulouse much 
more comfortably, taking advantage of services reserved for the Wehrmacht. 
They used train cars ‘nur fur Wehrmacht’, ate thanks to ‘nur fur Wehrmacht’ food 
coupons, and stayed over at ‘nur fur Wehrmacht’ Hotels, all at the expense of 
Nazi Germany. But this was also extremely dangerous. The SER leader 
Jacques Roitman was extremely nervous when he first met with Dutch pioneer 
Ernst Hirsch (‘Willy’) in one of those Werhmacht-crowded hotels to discuss the 
future collaboration between the French and the Dutch underground 
movements. As a result of this partnership, however, the Dutch pioneers began 
to supply the AJ with ‘special mission’ documents that allowed the SER 
convoys to reach the Franco-Spanish border with much less surveillance, since 
the Germans did not examine their own train cars so closely. Ocassionally, 
these counterfeit documents allowed one of the Dutch Jews —disguised as a 
Gestapo agent— to escort a group of fellow Jews into the Pyrenees’ forbidden 
perimeter. The pretext for these ‘special missions’ was that these were forced 
labourers who had been assigned to build German fortifications along the 
Franco-Spanish border. Obviously, such fortifications were fictional, and the 
convoy would vanish into the mountains as soon as they were out of the reach 
of the Germans.106  
The Dutch pioneer Joseph Linnewiel was one of those halutzim whose 
physical appearance and German  language skills allowed him to lead several 
convoys towards Spain disguised as an agent of the Gestapo. Using train cars 
reserved for the Germans, he would travel between Paris, Lyon, Bourdeaux, 
and Toulouse in order to gather Jews to bring to the Pyrenees. Since Linnewiel 
often felt extremely anxious about his Dutch accent whenever one of the ‘real’ 
Nazis started a conversation, he developed a strategy that resulted quite 
effective. Whenever he saw himself in that situation, he tried to intimidate the 
German soldier in question by adopting the ‘military tone’ that was typical of 
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the Gestapo. While Linnewiel gathered the rest of the convoy’s members, those 
already in the south of France awaited at Le Corps Franc de la Montagne Noire 
(CFMN), or at the maquis established by the AJ at Biques to prepare their 
émigrés for their journey to Palestine. Once all of the members of the convoy 
were ready for the crossing, Linnewiel led the group of 45 towards the Pyrenees. 
Ironically, on their way to Spain, a group of French maquisards nearly shot all 
of them because they could not believe that these were Jews who had managed 
to escape the Nazis.107  
Their courage, however, sometimes came at a great cost. In March 1944, 
Westerweel was arrested, and  with him, the Jewish resistance lost its key 
contacts in the Netherlands. On 27 April, the Germans broke into Paris’s Hôtel 
Versigny and arrested several Dutch pioneers, seized all sort of seals, stamps, 
and printing equipment used to forge German documentation.108 Over the 
course of the war, most of the Westerweel network members were arrested and 
deported, and only a few of them managed to survive the war after contributing 
immensely to the clandestine migration into Spain.109 Overall, the Dutch 
hazutzim smuggled some seventy youngsters into Spain between February 1943 
and May 1945, most of them Dutch youth pioneers from the Loosdrecht and 
Amsterdam pioneer camps.110 
Thanks to the efforts of the AJ, on the other hand, at least 313 persons 
reached Spain between March 1943 and August 1944 —although JDC sources 
suggest the total to be 435.111 Of these, 225 were adults —including 33 women— 
and 88 were children. 2 persons died while crossing the Pyrenees. 6 were 
deported. From Spain, 18 Adults left on the SS Nyassa in February 1944. 175 
adults and 79 children left aboard the SS Guinée in October 1944. The adults 
were mostly former Scouts from dissolved EIF centers, Dutch Jewish refugees, 
and other Zionists who were eager to reach Palestine to join the Jewish Brigade. 
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The children came from OSE homes.112  
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The War Refugee Board in the Peninsula: a Lost 
Opportunity? 
 
On 22 January 1944, President Roosevelt announced the establishment of 
the War Refugee Board (WRB), an executive agency that was ‘to take all 
measures within its power to rescue victims of enemy oppression who are in 
imminent danger of death’.113 The WRB is arguably the most important 
initiative undertaken by the US government to save Jewish lives from murder 
at the hands of the Nazi killing machine. Amongst its main functions were the 
development of plans for the rescue, maintenance, transportation, and relief of 
victims of Nazi oppression, as well as their relocation to temporary havens in 
areas away from danger. The WRB was created on initiative of three Treasury 
Department lawyers —John Pehle, Ansel Luxford, and Josiah E. DuBois Jr.— 
who had grown frustrated over the failure of the US State and Treasury 
Departments to deal with the question of refugees, and in particular with the 
delays in issuing Treasury Licences to relief organisations assisting Jews escape 
the Nazis. As Israeli historian Yehuda Bauer noted, ‘what made WRB such a 
unique body is that it was officially permitted to break practically every 
important law of a nation at war in the name of outraged humanity’.114 Indeed, 
the WRB was endowed with great powers. As an executive agency, it answered 
directly to the US President. WRB staff included the US Secretaries of State, 
the Treasury, and War. WRB was entitled to assistance and supplies from all 
other government agencies, it was not required to obtain Treasury Licenses to 
fund its projects, and, perhaps most importantly, it could bypass conventional 
diplomacy to engage in rescue negotiations with foreign governments and even 
enemy agents. Although initially restricted to a staff of thirty, the WRB soon 
grew into a staff of seventy. To fulfil its mission, the WRB also cooperated 
extensively with US aid organisations in the field, and appointed —or tried to 
appoint— special representatives to strategic areas in Europe: Great Britain, 
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Italy, North Africa, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.115   
Upon its creation in late January 1944, one of the WRB’s main goals was 
to facilitate the evacuation through Spain of as many Jews as possible from 
Nazi-occupied Europe. To accomplish this ‘extremely urgent task’, the WRB 
was conscious of the fact that it was first necessary to establish a ‘moving belt’ 
that would carry refugees already in Spain to the safety of the NARC at 
Fedhala. Evidently, obtaining the cooperation of the Spanish government was 
a precondition to such project. Therefore, the WRB also urged US ambassador 
Hayes to press the Spanish government for the relaxation of Spanish border 
policies, and the establishment of refugee reception centres alongside the 
Pyrenees to welcome and look after the refugees before their prompt removal 
from Spain.116 But Hayes was hesitant to risk US diplomatic relations with the 
Spanish government.117 The WRB’s proposal coincided with the second oil 
embargo imposed by the Allies on Francoist Spain, in protest at its continuing 
to supply Wolfram to Nazi Germany.118 Not content with Hayes’ response, 
WRB Executive Director John Pehle insisted again on the urgency of WRB’s 
plans for Spain, and proposed RSARO director David Blickenstaff as WRB 
representative to Spain.119 Considering that Blickenstaff was already taking 
good care of the stateless refugee situation in Spain, the US ambassador refused 
to make any change ‘which might impair [the] effectiveness of this work’.120  
It is not clear whether Hayes failed to understand the mission and scope 
of the WRB, or simply refused to cooperate. In his view, the number of stateless 
persons pouring into Spain at the beginning of 1944 was negligible, not as a 
consequence of Spain’s restrictive border policy, but due to the many challenges 
facing refugees trying to reach Spain from occupied Europe.121 The WRB 
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agreed with Hayes that the influx of refugees into Spain was at that time 
negligible, and insisted that this was precisely why they wanted to take 
measures before the arrival of spring weather: to increase the number of 
persecuted Jews reaching Spain safely. As envisioned by the WRB, these 
measures involved the establishment of three refugee centres along the Franco-
Spanish border: Tolosa (San Sebastián), Murillo (Zaragoza), and Figueras 
(Girona). Each of these reception centres would have a supervisor and a small 
staff that would liaise with the WRB’s representative in Madrid —most likely 
Blickenstaff.122 Upon crossing the Pyrenees into Spain, refugees would be 
directed by the Spanish police to the nearest of these three centres, thus 
minimising the time they spent in the hands of Spanish authorities, and 
facilitating their rapid evacuation to North Africa.123 But the US ambassador, 
who did not conceal his opinion that the WRB was an ‘unrealistic 
organization’, argued that the establishment of refugee reception camps in 
Spain would be seen by Madrid as an infringement of Spanish sovereignty.124 
Furthermore, Hayes remained adamant that such plans would duplicate the 
work of RSARO, as well as contravene the agreement obtained from the 
Spanish government at the beginning of 1943, by which the US Embassy had 
promised to channel all US relief work through Blickenstaff’s office.125 
Regardless of the potential for rescue of the WRB in Spain, it seems, therefore, 
that there was some ground to Hayes’ hesitations in regards to the WRB 
proposals. It is also possible that Hayes felt too proud of RSARO’s 
achievements to accept sharing the credit for improving Spain’s refugee 
situation.   
On 14 March, Hayes temporarily blocked a Treasury Licence worth 
$100,000 that had been sent to Sequerra for the purpose of rescue of Jewish 
children from France, arguing that David Blickenstaff was the highest authority 
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on refugee matters in Spain. Eventually, Schwartz alerted Sequerra about his 
licence. Hayes believed that the WRB’s plans to engage in clandestine rescue 
operations ‘could well jeopardise’ the position of RSARO in Spain, as well as 
his own relationship with the Franco government. In Hayes’ view, WRB 
officials did not understand the Spanish context, and did not take into account 
the hostility towards relief and refugee matters that was so characteristic of the 
Franco government. Refusing to approach Madrid to request the establishment 
of any additional relief body in Spin, Hayes urged the WRB to ‘take full 
advantage of the already proven facilities’ of Blickenstaff’s organisation.126 
Hayes was the only one to hold this opinion. When the British FO instructed 
Sir Samuel Hoare to appoint David Blickenstaff as the IGCR’s representative 
to Spain, the British ambassador refused echoing Hayes fears, namely, that  the 
establishment of a new refugee organisation in Spain was likely to upset the 
Spanish government.127 Naturally, ambassador Hayes agreed with the British 
ambassador on this point.128 
Demoralised by the ‘absolute impossibility’ of obtaining Hayes’ 
cooperation in Spain, the WRB began to look for alternative partnerships to 
bypass the US ambassador.129 The WRB then decided to enlist ‘special agent’ 
David Zagha, a Syrian-born Jew with contacts in the US Army in North Africa, 
to increase the flow of refugees into Spain. While realising the risks involved, 
the WRB was reassured by Zagha’s previous experience in getting refugees 
across the Pyrenees, and put $2,000 at his disposal to see what he could do.130 
Much to the WRB’s embarrassment, Zagha’s first decision as ‘special agent’ of 
the WRB was to tour the South American continent to acquaint himself with 
government officials in Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, allegedly in 
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preparation for some grandiose rescue plan.131 Rather than focusing on purely 
clandestine methods of rescue, Zagha thought that the best way to alter the 
policy of the Spanish government was to convince General Franco himself, 
hence why he began gathering support around the world. By the time Zagha 
travelled back to Algiers in May, the WRB was less positive that his services 
would be of any use.  Given his great plans were likely to cause more harm than 
good to the WRB’s interests in Spain, Zagha was dismissed.132 
WRB’s work in Portugal was not as problematic as in Spain, at least in its 
early days. In late February 1944, WRB appointed the Unitarian minister 
Robert C. Dexter as WRB representative in Lisbon. Robert and his wife Dr. 
Elisabeth A. Dexter had headed the USC office in Lisbon since 1942, and had 
extensive experience in relief and rescue matters. The fact that Robert Dexter 
was also one of USC’s founders, as well as its Executive Director, seemed to 
provide further reassurances to the WRB. While Robert took this new position, 
his wife Elizabeth replaced him at the head of the USC office in Lisbon. On 9 
February 1944, the representatives of the main relief agencies in Lisbon were 
invited to the US Embassy to greet the new WRB representative to Lisbon, and 
to learn about what Robert Dexter described as the WRB’s ‘emergency life-
saving task’. The WRB offered the relief organisations at Lisbon speedier 
transatlantic communications through US diplomatic channels, political 
support when dealing with Portuguese authorities, as well as additional 
funding.133 In exchange, Dexter urged the representatives from these private 
relief agencies to cooperate with the WRB and with each other, as ‘nothing 
would be more disastrous than competition or organisational strife’.134 But this 
was precisely what followed: competition and organisational strife. 
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 Ironically, the foremost impediment to the WRB’s mission in Portugal 
was the WRB’s representative himself. Dexter’s personality had caused 
numerous issues within the USC over the previous years. In November 1941, 
for instance, Dexter had already threatened to resign from his position as 
director of USC Lisbon to protest for his ‘lack of freedom of action’. More 
specifically, Dexter was disappointed with the reluctance of the US Treasury 
Department to grant the USC with a Licence to allow USC funds to reach its 
Lisbon office. Dexter withdrew his resignation letter a week later.135 When 
comparing Dexter’s correspondence to that of other high-ranking relief workers 
such as JDC’s Schwartz, AFSC’s Conard, or RSARO’s Blickenstaff, Dexter’s 
personality comes across as immature and narcissistic. Despite his multiple 
directing roles at the USC, and his parallel work as OSS agent (codename 
‘Corn’), most of Dexter’s correspondence deals with minute details about 
weather conditions, the courses of his meals, and the timing of his baths. 
Likewise, his drive to offer relief to refugees in need seemed more motivated by 
a thirst for prestige rather than genuine interest in assisting others. Dexter was 
hardly cooperative and was instead strongly opinionated about people both 
within the USC as well as from other committees. Immediately after the AFSC 
opened office in Lisbon, for instance, Dexter began to complain that their mere 
presence in Lisbon caused them ‘untold difficulties’, and concluded: ‘I wish that 
they were not here’.136  
Robert Dexter’s personality cause numerous problems with his own 
coworkers at USC. He repeatedly accused Charles Joy, for instance —whom 
Dexter had replaced as director of USC Lisbon in 1942— for his alleged lack of 
interest in migration and relief work, and despite the fact that Joy was 
completely invested in working with refugees.137 In January 1943, Robert 
Dexter’s contempt for Joy materialised in a letter of accusation that he sent 
directly to USC Chairman William Emerson in Boston.138 In the report Joy 
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submitted in his defence, he confessed ‘a deep sense of disgust and revolt that 
in these critical days, when lives are being lost every day, I must stop an 
important work of rescue … in order to present a defence which I have very 
little interest in presenting’.139 The same can be said of his relationship with 
Martha and Waitstill Sharp. The Sharps were shocked to discover what Dexter 
has said of them in his correspondence with the ARC. They complained that 
Robert Dexter had acted as an individual rather than as USC representative, 
and that he had done ‘all he could to weaken us’.140 As if this was not enough, 
there is also evidence that Dexter was no friend to Jews. Unlike Blickenstaff’s 
staff at the RSARO office in Madrid, Dexter’s staff at the USC office in Lisbon 
were all protestant refugees of various nationalities. Under his command as 
well, USC migration work in Lisbon prioritised political over Jewish refugees, 
as ‘there is far greater danger in granting such visas to Jewish people’.141 In a 
letter to Joy dated 28 September, Dexter shared his views regarding the onset 
of the deportations from France in the late summer of 1942. In view of his 
‘sensitivity’ to the plight of the Jews, it is quite a tragedy that such a man was 
appointed to further the WRB’s mission: 
‘Jewish sources say that they [are] dead on arrival, and there is no reason to 
doubt the story that several [who] die in each wagon are being used for soap. I 
myself doubt this story … and even if [is] true it does not shock me as much as 
some other things. If they are dead they can suffer no more’.142 
 
Dexter’s only rescue initiative as WRB delegate to Portugal was to 
negotiate the establishment of a children’s home in Lisbon to host the child 
convoys that the Armée Juive was smuggling across the Pyrenees. Ironically, 
despite having previously requested mutual cooperation between all relief 
groups in Lisbon, Dexter  did so behind the back of all other relief committees, 
and especially the JDC. The proposal came from the representative of the 
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World Jewish Congress (WJC) in Lisbon, the Turkish-born Isaac Weissman. 
Weissman, himself a refugee from Vienna, became the Lisbon unofficial 
representative of WJC’s Committee for Relief of the War-Stricken Jewish 
Population (RELICO) in early 1941. Unlike most other relief workers, 
Weissman did not believe in maintaining good terms with diplomats and 
authorities, and thus clashed often with Amzalak’s Lisbon Jewish Community. 
Weissman was interested in illegal means of rescue —like the Dexters, he was 
also an OSS agent— and thus clashed with the main two Jewish committees: 
JDC and HICEM. In exchange, Weissman maintained good relations with 
Dexter and the USC, who were more prone to clandestine activities.143 
Weissman’s proposed reception centre in Lisbon was expected to host 300 
children and would cost about $100,000 per month —a rather high amount 
considering that the money would not lead to the rescue of any child strictly 
speaking. When Dexter informed Washington about Weissman’s plans, the 
WRB advised Dexter to liaise with Schwartz, since the JDC was already 
engaged in the rescue of children from France and these activities ‘would be 
greatly endangered if two organizations without coordination through you 
[Dexter] should be trying to rescue the same children’.144 And this is exactly 
what happened.  
Dexter, who felt more sympathy for the riskier relief practices of the WJC 
than for the lawful approach of the JDC, estimated that the WJC would be able 
to rescue children for less money.145 Weissman, in turn, not only resented the 
JDC’s indisputable role as the most prominent Jewish relief agency. 
Additionally, Weissman was adamant that the rescued children should be sent 
to Palestine provided they had no relatives in the US —a point on which the 
JDC disagreed. In May 1944, Weissman sent Manuel Alves, a Spaniard who 
worked for his committee, to bring the children recently arrived from France. 
But on his way to the Franco-Spanish frontier Alves was arrested. Weissman 
claimed that it had been the JDC who denounced his man, in an attempt to 
steal ‘his’ children. Even after the war, the RELICO representative was 
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convinced that he could have saved ‘hundreds upon hundreds more’ had the 
JDC not have interfered in his work.146 
Evidently, Isaac Weissman was, like Robert Dexter, a particular 
personality. It does not seem surprising, then, that Weissman had such an 
admiration for Dexter, whom he described as ‘the most sincere, honest, and 
devoted man for such a consecrated job’.147 Unlike most other committee 
delegates, Weissman operated alone, only reporting to Abraham Silberschein, 
of the WJC Geneva office, and Nahum Goldmann, of the WJC headquarters 
in New York. He had no resources or infrastructure at his disposal. Instead he 
requested funding from the JDC to finance relief initiatives that were already 
covered by the JDC, thus duplicating the offer of relief. Weissman was prone 
to confrontation with other Jewish representatives, most of whom did not share 
his fervent Zionism.148 In December 1942, for instance, many clandestine 
refugees in Portugal tried to avoid arrest by the PVDE through hiding. 
Weissman explained the situation to the PVDE, and convinced them to confine 
these refugees in ‘forced residence’ to the town of Ericeira, where they would 
live at the expense of private relief agencies. In exchange, the police would be 
able to easily control the refugees’ endeavours and pressure them to migrate. 
To that end, Weissman established a Relief Commission for Legalizing Aliens’ 
Stay in Ericeira (Comissão de Auxílio aos Estrangeiros para a Legalisação da sea 
Estadia na Ericeira). Unexpectedly, Weissman was arrested and compelled to 
stay in forced residence for two days before being set free. Weissman was 
convinced that his arrest had been plotted jointly by the JDC and Lisbon’s 
Jewish Community.149 
On 1 June 1944, WRB Assistant Executive Director James H. Mann 
arrived in Lisbon to find a solution to the various difficulties that the WRB 
encountered in the Iberian Peninsula, and in particular, to mediate between the 
JDC and the WJC over the ‘stolen children’ dispute. Prior to leaving for Lisbon, 
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Mann had met with Moses Leavitt (JDC) and Leon Kubowitzki (WJC) in New 
York to get a sense of their conflicting versions. Whereas the JDC maintained 
that Dexter had mishandled the situation and was prejudiced against them, the 
WJC raised all sorts of accusations against the JDC. Upon arrival to Lisbon, 
Mann soon found out that Dexter’s position in the conflict was far from 
impartial. Dexter presented Weissman as a man who could ‘really do the job’ 
and who had been mistreated by Schwartz, who, in Dexter’s opinion, ‘felt that 
the JDC had a monopoly on rescue and relief operations’. Mann concluded 
that Dexter was ‘strongly prejudiced against the JDC’, and that he ‘hadn’t 
devoted too much thought’ to finding new ways of saving more Jewish lives. 
Indeed, even though he had been appointed the WRB’s representative in 
Lisbon, Dexter did not seem to understand why the WRB did not devote more 
time to rescuing people ‘other than Jews’. To top it all, Dexter advised Mann 
not to pay much attention to the views of the Lisbon Jewish Community, whom 
he accused of ‘making a great deal of money out of the war, presumably by 
dealing with the Germans’.  
Mann also discussed the matter with Weissman, who expressly claimed 
that the JDC had ‘kidnapped children’ brought to Spain by the Jewish 
resistance, and that Sequerra had threatened his liaison in the Jewish 
underground (Croustillon) with imprisonment unless these children were 
turned over to him. But Weissman’s list of accusations did not end there, as he 
also blamed the JDC for his arrest during the ‘Ericeira affair’, for refusing to 
fund WJC’s rescue work, and for doing ‘nothing’ towards rescue. These views 
were countered during Mann’s conversation with Schwartz’s subordinate at the 
JDC office in Lisbon: Robert Pilpel. The JDC accused Weissman of kidnapping 
13 of ‘their’ children, and justified their refusal to cooperate with the WJC their 
lack of structure and experience on rescue activities (on this point they 
underestimated them).150 Eventually, Weissman did receive some funds to 
establish his children’s home at Paço d’Arcos, a beach resort in the outskirts of 
Lisbon. However, despite the fact that Dexter invested WRB money in 
																																																																		
150 ‘Report of  James H. Mann on Trip to Portugal and Spain’ (30 August 1944); WRB, Part II, 
Reel 28, File 6. 
  280 
furnishing the house for the rescue of hundreds of children, this centre only 
accommodated 13 children —whom JDC claimed had been stolen from 
them— who had been brought to Spain by the AJ. Following the liberation of 
France in August 1944, Spain became cut off from enemy territory and thus 
lost its rescuing potential. Although the WRB continued its operations in 
Europe until September 1945, Pehle concluded that ‘in view of French victories 
no further efforts should be made to rescue either adults or children from France through 
Spain’.151 
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Conclusion 
 
The Jewish refugee crisis was not a byproduct of Nazi anti-Jewish policy, 
it was one of its primary goals. The Nazi policy of forcing the emigration of 
Jews from the Reich was deliberately engineered, not just for ideological 
reasons, but also with a view to the future war. In the fragile economic context 
of the 1930s, the Nazis exported the ‘Jewish refugee problem’ as a means of 
stirring up antisemitic and anti-refugee feelings abroad, inspiring authoritarian 
responses, and destabilising democratic societies. With every new stage of 
antisemitic radicalisation in Nazi Germany, Jewish refugees were rendered 
increasingly dependent on foreign assistance. Naturally, governments around 
the world resorted to restrictive immigration policies to ‘protect’ themselves 
from these ‘undesirables’. This, in turn, exacerbated the crisis even further.  
With regards to South-Western Europe, the Jewish refugee crisis unfolded 
in three different stages. Each of these stages was triggered by a key event: 
Hitler’s rise to power in 1933, the fall of Western Europe in May-June 1940, 
and the Allied invasion of French North Africa in November 1942. From the 
beginning, France was one of the countries to absorb most refugees from Nazi 
Germany. The liberal Spanish Republic was also welcoming, but did not 
represent a particularly attractive destination to most German Jews. The 
Portuguese Estado Novo, on the other hand, was even less appealing due to its 
militaristic and authoritarian nature. Although the League of Nations made 
several attempts at tackling the situation of Jewish refugees, most member 
states were cautious not to antagonise the Nazi government, and these 
initiatives failed. With the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, Spain’s 
role as a country of refuge vanished. From then on, Franco’s Spain became a 
country hostile to Jews and sympathetic to the Axis. After the violent Nazi 
antisemitic campaign of 1938, Portugal’s role as a country of transit intensified, 
and so did her immigration restrictions. 
Following Hitler’s Blitzkrieg occupation of Western Europe in May-June 
1940, a new wave of refugees began a frantic escape towards the Pyrenees. 
France was divided. The regime that emerged from the ashes in Vichy, was as 
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anti-refugee as it was antisemitic. To stop the influx of refugees, the Iberian 
Peninsula introduced its most restrictive immigration policies. In the midst of 
the chaos, some of these deterrents failed to stop the transit of refugees through 
the Peninsula. But the shortage of transportation meant that many were left 
stranded. The Iberian Peninsula became Europe’s bottleneck. Vichy France 
attempted to dispatch refugees by sea, but the logic of war brought this lifeline 
to a halt. Meanwhile in 1941, relations between the US and Germany 
deteriorated. And so did migration possibilities to the US. As Nazi Germany 
prepared for the ‘Final Solution’, Jewish migration from Belgium and France 
was banned in May, and from all Nazi-occupied territories in October. That 
same month, the Franco government banned Jews from sailing on Spanish 
vessels. From November, all Jews under Nazi rule were rendered stateless. In 
December, the US declared war, and American sailings from the Peninsula 
came to a complete halt. From then on, only Portuguese vessels transported 
Jewish refugees to safety. 
In November 1942, the Allied occupation of French North Africa 
triggered the Axis occupation of Vichy France. The Iberian Peninsula was 
framed between the Allies in the south, and the Axis in the north. A new wave 
of refugees from France reached the Pyrenees. This time all of them were 
irregular. Portugal’s centrality as a land of transit shifted to Spain. From 1943, 
the Western Allies, now in a better military position, began to take steps to 
tackle the refugee situation. They pressed the Franco regime to accept more 
refugees and POWs. In exchange they organised relief and evacuation from 
Spain. In April 1943, the Anglo-American conference met at Bermuda and 
agreed to reinvigorate the IGCR. Despite very good intentions, the refugee 
camp at Fedhala was only functional from June 1944, and did not help the 
rescue of further Jews through Spain. The Jewish resistance was, relative to its 
scale, quite effective in organising the rescue of Jews across the Pyrenees. The 
US WRB, by contrast, did not manage to establish an efficient throughput of 
refugees, and did not improve the situation already managed by RSARO. In 
August 1944, France was liberated and the Iberian Peninsula was cut off from 
Nazi-occupied Europe. The possibilities of rescue ended. 
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